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Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis analyses the importance of supplementary material for art history and 
philosophy by addressing its shifting and problematic relationship to the ‘work of art’. 
Through the use of philosophical and critical theories, including Heidegger, Benjamin, 
Adorno, Deleuze and Derrida, the nature and status of artworks are explored through 
different uses of supplementarity that are identified and developed in order to re-
evaluate the cultural significance of supplementarity itself.  This theoretical analysis is 
complemented by a cultural history that demonstrates, through a discussion of 
changes in artistic practices, theoretical perceptions, markets and ‘cultures of display’, 
the ways in which conceptions of the work of art and supplementarity are historically 
contingent. 
 
The main body of the thesis is composed of four case studies.  In the first, Heidegger’s 
distinction between art and equipment and his notion of causality is used to analyse 
Henry Moore’s maquettes, plasters, and bronze works, in order to distinguish 
preliminary and preparatory material from complete works of art.  The second focuses 
on hierarchy and supplementarity, developing Deleuze’s concept of the simulacrum by 
showing how the drawings and sketches of Antonio Sant’Elia can be considered works 
of art, despite being traditionally identified as supporting material.  Walter Benjamin’s 
theory of aura, and Theodor Adorno’s notion of enigmaticalness, are deployed in a 
third case study that analyses the significance of the relocation of Francis Bacon’s 
studio from London to Dublin, and the use of biographical material to foreground the 
creative process.  The final case study deploys Jacques Derrida’s analysis of Antonin 
Artaud’s works on paper that problematises prevailing classifications of art, and 
Derrida’s interpretation of Artaud’s notion of the subjectile, in order to emphasise the 
often ambiguous status of ostensibly supplementary material. 
 
Overall, the thesis re-evaluates the cultural significance of supplementarity for 
aesthetics by analysing the ways in which supplementary material affects how works 
of art are experienced and understood.      
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Introduction and Methodology 
 
The subject of this thesis is the use and evaluation of supplementary material and its 
relation to ‘the work of art’.  As will be developed throughout this study, supplementarity 
is a generic, umbrella term for anything that is evaluated or made use of in some way 
where a supporting role is asserted – where what is supported is at the same time 
asserted as the work of art properly speaking.  Within gallery and museum settings, 
supplementary material may consist of preliminary or preparatory works, sketch books, 
and former studios.  Supplementarity can also extend to the wall-mounted descriptions, 
gallery leaflets, online resources, objects with a direct biographical association with an 
artist, and immaterial forms such as the psychological state of mind of an artist that can 
nevertheless be asserted and represented through physical material such as letters or 
psychiatric reports.1  Furthermore, books and essays on art constitute forms of 
supplementarity by providing additional information that influences the ways in which 
this or that artist, and this or that work of art, might be interpreted. 
 
Supplementary material can be found across the major art galleries and museums of the 
Western world; exhibitions have included whole sections dedicated to the contents of 
studios; countless numbers of objects have been classified as non-art, yet deemed 
valuable enough to store away in archives.  Such is the ubiquitous use of supplementarity 
within museum and gallery settings that the inclusion of preparatory material alongside 
conventionally established works of art is widely accepted as a natural and unproblematic 
                                                          
1
 For example, Van Gogh’s letters to his brother. 
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method of revealing information and insights into the creative process behind the art.2  
Yet what does the employment of such methods of revealing, itself reveal about 
prevailing or changing approaches to art and artists?  What value judgements and choices 
of categorisation are made when distinguishing between art and non-art, between what 
is (or at least may come to be) deemed worthy of display?  Who makes these decisions?  
Do all forms of supplementary material supplement the work and/or artist in the same 
ways?  To what extent could supplementary material possibly be considered to form 
significant cultural objects in their own right? 
 
The three primary objectives of this thesis can be defined as: 
 
 To explore the ways in which supplementary materials affect and alter the 
meaning of ‘the work of art’ as theorised through different philosophical and 
sociological viewpoints. 
 
 To analyse the various ways in which supplementary materials used, produced by, 
or otherwise associated with artists have been archived, preserved and displayed. 
 
 To understand these various forms of supplementarity as ‘cultural objects’ that 
have their own significance, as well as playing an important role in how works are 
produced, received and interpreted. 
                                                          
2
 For example, The Tate, in London, has approximately 37,000 works by the artist J.M.W. Turner that consist 
of sketches, watercolours, and other drawings contained in his sketchbooks.  See 
www.tate.org.uk/about/projects/jmw-turner-sketchbooks-drawings-watercolours (accessed 10 November 
2014). 
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These objectives can be summarised as:  supplementarity in relation to the work of art, 
supplementarity in relation to archives and displays, and supplementarity itself. 
 
To address these objectives I will draw upon specific philosophical and art-historical 
concepts, as well as concepts emerging or made possible by ‘works of art’ themselves, so 
as to open up and illuminate the importance of the supplement for contemporary 
research into both the creative process and the ways in which art is used in public 
displays.   
 
This thesis is not an attempt to combine different philosophical theories into a unified 
whole.  Instead, it shows how these particular theories – each allowing different 
approaches to the question of ‘what is a work of art?’ – have a significant relationship to 
supplementarity, which in turn is of relevance to art theory and art practice.  Their 
implications extend to discussions of the supplement, and are also extended into new 
areas of philosophical and historical importance for a re-evaluation of the status of the 
supplement.  Therefore this thesis is not intended as a challenge to the philosophical 
concepts employed, but as an investigation into their implications for supplementarity.  
 
The methodological approach of this thesis is now established by explaining the context 
in which this research is taking place, the key questions of the thesis, the rationale behind 
the selection and use of particular philosophical concepts, concepts emerging from the 
history of supplementarity, and the artists and works that will form the subjects of the 
four main case studies in chapters three, four, five, and six.  This introduction will also 
establish how these areas each interrelate, where philosophical and historical approaches 
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to works of art, as well works of art themselves, emerge out of, and in response to one 
another.  Through this I will show the importance of the supplement for past 
developments in these areas, as well as highlighting how each of these areas can be 
utilised to argue for a new interpretation of the value of different types of material that is 
currently predominantly reduced to a supporting role.  What follows will be an 
adumbration of the key works analysed throughout the thesis, with full references 
provided in subsequent chapters. 
 
Research Context 
 
One of the motivations for undertaking this project is to explore an underdeveloped area 
of art theory, the philosophy of art, and art history in general.   Many works used 
throughout this thesis have touched upon the issue of supplementarity; however, there 
has never been a sustained, theorised and historically situated analysis of 
supplementarity itself.   
 
In the following sections of this introduction and methodology I show how key works by 
philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, Martin Heidegger, Theodor Adorno, Walter 
Benjamin, Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and Jacques Derrida, directly 
or indirectly discuss the supplement and art without developing a full historical or 
theoretical account of supplementarity.   
 
These philosophical concepts do not emerge in isolation, but within a reciprocal 
relationship of responses to, and influences upon, events in art history - including the 
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production of works of art, art criticism, the art market, archiving, and displaying of 
works.  For this reason, the chapter on the key philosophical concepts of importance for 
the thesis is followed by a chapter revealing a history of the supplement that is found in 
the history of art production and art theory.  Chapters one and two therefore provide a 
detailed discussion of the key philosophical concepts, and concepts emerging from the 
history of the supplement, that shape this thesis.  What follows is a broad overview of 
important works of both art history and the philosophy of art that relate to 
supplementarity, with a more comprehensive discussion provided in the following 
sections and chapters one and two. 
 
Of the philosophers listed above, it is Kant who first addresses the supplement in the 
Critique of Judgement (1790), by introducing the notion of the parergon as the 
ornamental aspect attached to, but outside of, the work of art.  However, Kant’s concern 
is with the definition of the work of art itself.  Heidegger’s ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ 
(1935-1937), and ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ (1955) both have implications for 
the status of the supplement, but neither explicitly address its relationship to works of 
art.  Throughout Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory (1970), as well as in the essay written with 
Max Horkheimer, ‘The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception’ (1944), he is 
concerned with the role works of art have in culture, as well as the ways in which the 
experience of encountering works of art has been affected by technology and changing 
attitudes.  However, Adorno views supplementarity as an obstacle to understanding 
works of art, rather than considering it as an important area for investigation and analysis 
in itself.  Michel Foucault’s ‘What is an Author?’ (1969) explores how the definition of ‘the 
work’ is distinguished from other forms of writing produced by the same author, but 
6 
 
without specifying how such additional works might be defined.  Jacques Derrida, in both 
The Truth in Painting (1978), and ‘To Unsense the Subjectile’ (1986), identifies the 
importance of supplementarity in the exploration of the ambiguous nature of defining the 
work of art, primarily by developing Kant’s notion of parerga, but he does not propose or 
develop a theory of supplementarity itself. 
 
The issues about the nature of the work of art have been addressed in a number of 
important recent studies in cultural history that, as will be highlighted throughout the 
thesis, are both influenced by, and an influence upon, art practice and philosophy.  In The 
Social Production of Art (1981), Janet Wolff discusses how economic and political forces 
influence the production and reception of works of art.  However, Wolff’s interest is in 
the ways in which works of art are influenced by these contextual factors, rather than 
with the specific role played by supplementarity in their production and reception.  Art 
Worlds (1982) by Howard S. Becker, explores the importance of factors surrounding 
works of art, but he does not concern himself with a discussion of the cultural significance 
of supplementarity.  Naomi Schor’s Reading in Detail: Aesthetics and the Feminine (1987) 
provides an important discussion of how the gendered politics involved in the hierarchical 
and neo-classical literary commentary on the ‘detail’ (as opposed to the totality of a 
work) has been historically ‘reduced’ to ornamentation and a negative association with 
femininity.  However, the focus of Schor’s writing is not directed towards a more general 
inquiry into the hierarchical evaluation of the supplement.   
 
Pierre Bourdieu and Alain Darbell in The Love of Art (1991) frequently mention uses of 
supplementary material such as catalogues, brochures, and wall descriptions, but 
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specifically in the context of the significance of education in understanding works of art.  
Carol Duncan discusses the notion of ‘liminality’ in Civilizing Rituals: Inside the Public Art 
Museum (1995), without extending this discussion to an account of the role 
supplementary material plays in this notion.  In a major collection of essays, 
Contemporary Cultures of Display (1999), edited by Emma Barker, shifting attitudes and 
approaches towards museums, archives, and other ways of experiencing works of art, are 
analysed.  Here, the work of art in relation to its context remains of central importance, 
rather than the significance of how supplementary material has been used.   
 
John Hope Mason’s The Value of Creativity: The Origins and Emergence of a Modern Belief 
(2003), explores the notion of creativity through its historical and theoretical 
developments, but Mason does not attempt to formulate an account of how the status of 
supplementary material has both influenced, and been influenced by, these changes.3  
Larry Shiner’s The Invention of Art (2003) raises the possibility of moving “beyond the 
modern system of art” towards a re-classification of the creative act that would recognise 
the importance of craftsmanship, but does not carry out a discussion of supplementarity’s 
own historical development.4  A more recent work, Briony Fer’s Eva Hesse: Studiowork 
(2009) provides a detailed discussion of the meaning and nature of Hesse’s use of 
incomplete or fragmented pieces produced during the creative process; however this 
valuable specific discussion does not extend their relevance to philosophical and art-
historical theories and developments in general.  As both editor of, and contributor to 
                                                          
3
 John Hope Mason, The Value of Creativity: The Origins and Emergence of a Modern Belief, Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2003. 
4
 Larry Shiner, The Invention of Art, London: University of Chicago Press, 2003, p. 304. 
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Support Structures (2009), Céline Condorelli brings together a number of essays that 
explore the importance of framing and the role of the support in both art-production and 
society in general, but this variety of perspectives does not constitute a concentrated 
analysis of the relationship between works of art and supplementarity.  Lastly, Deanna 
Petherbridge’s The Primacy of Drawing: Histories and Theories of Practice (2010) provides 
an important contribution to the construction of the value of works on paper, arguing 
that their significance for the creative process is often overlooked and relegated to a 
supporting role.  However, Petherbridge does not extend the implications of her analysis 
to other areas of supplementarity.         
 
These works outline the research that is of importance to the context of this study of the 
supplement, whilst indicating the need for a thesis that consolidates their respective 
analyses into a work that places supplementarity itself at the centre of the discussion.   
 
Key Questions 
 
There are four central questions, both asked and addressed, that dictate the 
methodology of this thesis: what is the supplement?  How and why is the supplement 
classified in a particular way?  Why is the supplement important?  How is the supplement 
problematic for understanding the definition of ‘the work of art’? 
 
The address to these questions is made over the course of four corresponding chapters, 
with each one utilising a case study of an artist and their works that have been selected 
due to their suitability for responding to these questions.  These four case studies are 
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analysed through the employment of specific philosophical and art historical concepts 
that not only correspond to the questions outlined above, but which are pivotal for 
identifying the aspects of supplementarity that I intend to bring into the open in order to 
establish its importance for contemporary research.  This research includes the 
philosophy of aesthetics and technology, the history and study of art, and creative 
practice itself.   
 
Of particular importance is the way in which the majority of the philosophical concepts 
used in this thesis were not concerned with the supplement, but instead applied to the 
definition of the work of art.  These concepts were both shaped by, and helped establish, 
historical interpretations of what the work of art might be, with artists both influenced 
by, and challenging, such definitions.  This reciprocal development of philosophical, 
historical, and artistic approaches may have predominantly focused on the work of art, 
but it also, often inadvertently, charts an historical path of the value of supplementarity, 
whilst providing the means to re-evaluate the importance of the supplement.  This thesis 
returns to the questions being asked of the work of art with a change of emphasis, 
turning attention towards the implications that these questions have for understanding 
what the supplement is, how and why it has been classified in certain ways, why it is 
important, and where it becomes problematic for the definition of the work of art. 
 
What is the Supplement? 
 
This question concerns the status of the supplement as it is distinguished from the work 
of art.  Different forms and uses of support, such as biographical material, preliminary and 
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preparatory material, and educational devices are all identified in chapter three, with a 
particular emphasis on the distinctions and definitions of artwork and equipment. 
 
The purpose of this question is to analyse the degrees to which works-for-art (works 
produced by artists that are not conventionally considered to be ‘complete’) and works-
of-art (completed works) converge with one another, or are distinguished in specific 
ways.  The status of the supplement is shown in chapter one to have been a concern in 
the philosophy of art since Kant (where the evidence of working, or the use of 
ornamentation, are considered to distract from the work of art), and Schopenhauer 
(where the early stages of the creative process are celebrated as evidencing inspiration in 
a way that is superior to complete works).  In chapter two, the complex status and 
cultural importance of equipment and technology used in the creative process is shown 
to have shifted historically, with the example of Dürer’s use of woodblocks to create 
multiple copies of works, contrasted with their elevated significance within contemporary 
museums, where the ‘hand’ or trace of the artist is emphasised.  The historical shifts in 
approaches to the art market, commodification, technology, the notion of the artist as 
producer, and the ambiguity that can appear between works produced in creative 
practice, and works deemed worth of display (whether by the artist, or by other parties), 
are all shown in chapter three to have implications for the status of the supplement.  
These areas of art history are explored further in chapter two, included a detailed 
discussion of the different positions taken by Janet Wolff when analysing the role of the 
artist as producer, and in Briony Fer’s study of the problematic studio works of the artist, 
Eva Hesse. 
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Through a discussion of the different stages in the working process of the sculptor, Henry 
Moore, the distinction between equipment and works of art is explored through my 
interpretation of Heidegger’s notion of causality, which illuminates important 
convergences between works-for-art such as Moore’s maquettes, and the monumental 
sculptures that can be derived from them.  Through this study of concepts emerging from 
art history, the history of philosophy, and Moore’s creative practice, the complexity and 
contingent status of the supplement is opened up for analysis.    
      
How is the Supplement Classified? 
 
This question concerns the classification of the supplement, which is addressed in chapter 
four.  This question develops the analysis of the status of the supplement via a careful 
discussion of historically hierarchical classifications of works-for-art and works-of-art, 
together with the ways in which such works can be appropriated. 
 
Two pivotal concepts of the philosopher, Gilles Deleuze, are employed here to extend the 
investigation into the distinctions between work and support: the ‘sign’ and the 
‘simulacrum’.  Deleuze’s work is seen as an important part of (or strongly associated with) 
the French Post-Structuralist movement.  Due to the emergence of Post-Structuralism in 
the late 1960s, and its continuation up to the 1990s, it draws parallels with the 
development of Postmodernism (in particular, a shared concern with relativism and an 
overturning of traditional values).  It is within this context that key works by Deleuze 
would appear:  Difference and Repetition (1968), Proust and Signs (1972), and ‘Plato and 
the Simulacrum’ (1983).   
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The concept of the simulacrum concerns an ‘overturning’ of what Deleuze calls the ‘image 
of thought’ that has dominated Western thinking since Plato, and has implications for 
hierarchical classification of works, and what it means to experience ‘art’.  Deleuze’s 
concept of the ‘sign’ is a development of this new notion of the experience of art, placing 
an emphasis on sensation over interpretations of meaning.  These concepts therefore 
constitute a challenge to dominant ideas and values that have emerged in the history of 
art.  In particular, the systems of classification that began with the introduction of the 
signature and the importance of identification that emerged as the European art market 
grew in the Eighteenth Century, which is discussed further in chapter two.   
 
The notion of hierarchical classification is addressed in chapter two, through a discussion 
of Petherbridge’s assertion that the importance of drawing as “the locus of invention and 
reinvention” has been historically overlooked in comparison to ‘complete’ works.5  
Deleuze’s concepts of the ‘sign’ and the simulacrum are utilised in order to call into 
question the grounds of such hierarchical classification through an analysis of the works 
on paper of the Italian architect, Antonio Sant’Elia, and their subsequent appropriation by 
Filippo Marinetti and the Futurist movement.  This study of Sant’Elia’s atypical works 
explores the conceptual ways in which their qualities as individual moments of creativity 
can be identified and experienced.  The circumstances of the appropriation and 
commodification of Sant’Elia’s works is also shown to lift them beyond historically 
hierarchical modes of classification.  This question of the classification of the supplement 
                                                          
5
 Deanna Petherbridge, The Primacy of Drawing: Histories and Theories of Practice, London: Yale University 
Press, 2010, p. 184. 
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therefore highlights and challenges the reduction of works-for-art to the role of 
subservient supporting material.            
 
Why is the Supplement important? 
 
If the first two case studies and questions concern particular works-for-art and their 
approximation to works-of-art (complicating their classification as supporting material), 
this question and its corresponding case study focuses on material that is predominantly 
biographical.  Why, and in what way, is such supplementary material important?  How 
can material used in a supporting role be re-evaluated in order to expand its significance? 
 
Chapter Two discusses the historical emergence of the ‘cult of personality’ and biography, 
as the status of artists changed.  The Humanist turn that followed the Renaissance, along 
with the increased interest in artists that manifested itself in written biographies and 
higher social standing for successful artists, is encapsulated by the preservation of artists’ 
houses.  In 1871, Albrecht Dürer’s former home became one of the first examples of a 
location being assigned historical importance due to its association with an artist, and in 
1911, Rembrandt’s former residence was opened to the public.  What made these places 
of interest to the public?  This is discussed further in chapter Two. 
 
The subject of the third case study is the reconstructed studio of the painter, Francis 
Bacon, which can be seen as a modern continuation of the interest shown in locations 
associated with celebrated artists.  Great care was taken to relocate the studio from 
London, and reconstruct it in Ireland.  The contents were also subject to the most 
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comprehensive documentation of any art studio’s itinerary.  How is the significance of 
this reconstruction to be evaluated?   
 
I address this question of significance through a consideration of key concepts of two 
philosophers; Walter Benjamin and his notion of ‘aura’ put forward in ‘The Work of Art in 
the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ (1936), and Theodor Adorno’s concepts of 
‘enigmaticalness’ and ‘entkunstung’ (deaestheticisation).  Both Benjamin and Adorno 
were responding to the implications that technological developments in the early 
Twentieth Century had for the production and consumption of works of art.  Highly 
influenced by the works of Karl Marx, their approaches analyse in detail the social role of 
artists and their works.  For Benjamin, technologically reproducible works of art signalled 
the death of aura, the intangible value attached to an original work of art, its history, and 
location, all of which are addressed in chapter two through the historically emerging 
importance of the ‘hand’ of the artist as evidence of authenticity.   
 
For Adorno, an increased cultural interest in works of art threatened to reduce them to 
commodities to be explained and consumed (deaestheticisation), countering this 
demystification with his notion of enigmaticalness, where the importance of works of art 
is found in their mystery, rather than supposed resolutions.  Forms of apparent 
deaestheticisation are discussed in chapter two, by addressing the importance of the 
Museum of Modern Art (MoMA), New York, for providing the template for subsequent 
uses of works of art that emphasise narrative and education.  The implications of using 
education devices within art museums is also explored in chapter two, through a 
consideration of Bourdieu and Darbel’s The Love of Art. 
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In chapter five, I discuss how Benjamin’s notion of aura still appears to be evident in the 
evaluation of Bacon’s relocated studio, echoing the historical examples of venerating 
artists’ environments described above.  I also discuss how Bacon’s studio, rather than 
being a matter of demystification, can be argued to have its own enigmaticalness in a way 
that underlines the importance of the supplement for encouraging public interest in the 
creative process itself.     
 
How is the Supplement Problematic for Works of Art? 
 
The first three case studies all share concerns with the same three areas, whilst focusing 
primarily on one: the status of the supplement, the value of the supplement, and the 
importance of biography for the supplement.  The fourth case study is a culmination of 
these discussions, whilst explicitly addressing how the implications of these discussions 
call for a re-evaluation of the relationships and distinctions between works of art and 
supplementary material. 
 
As with the second case study on Sant’Elia and Deleuze, the historical context of the 
philosophical concepts being employed – Jacques Derrida’s notions of ‘parerga’ and the 
‘subjectile’ - is that of Post-Structuralism and Postmodernism.  Following developments in 
linguistics and semiotics initiated by Ferdinand de Saussure in the early Twentieth 
Century, and continued by Claude Lévi-Strauss in works such as Structural Anthropology 
(1958), the relationship between work and authorship received heightened attention.  
Roland Barthes’ ‘Death of the Author’ (1967), and Michel Foucault’s ‘What is an Author? 
(1969)’ both engage with problems of authorship and interpretation that challenge the 
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centrality of the author that had become established in art and literature from the 1700s 
(as explored in chapters one and two, through the discussion of Moritz).  In a later work, 
Foucault outlines the difficulties of defining an oeuvre: “Does the name of an author 
designate in the same way a text that he has published under his name, a text that he has 
presented under a pseudonym, another found after his death in the form of an unfinished 
draft, and another that is merely a collection of jottings, a notebook?”6 
 
This quotation highlights the same issues of value, classification, and biography that 
Derrida explores in both The Truth in Painting, and ‘To Unsense the Subjectile’.  The latter 
concerns the works on paper of the artist, Antonin Artaud, produced during and after his 
incarceration in mental institutions during World War Two.  This concluding case study 
discusses the interrelations of sanity, genius, myth-building, hierarchies of material, 
institutionalisation, distinctions between works of art and supporting material 
(consciously rendered ambiguous by Artaud), and the role of biographical material for the 
assessment of an artist’s output.  These themes are explored in chapter two, revealing 
historical developments in works such as those of the Goncourt Brothers, which 
emphasise the role of biographical information for interpreting works of art.   
 
Through a consideration of Artaud’s works on paper in chapter six, the historical notions 
of authorship, biography, and the process of production, are brought together to show 
how supplementarity has become intertwined with the making, interpretation, and 
displaying of works of art.  The incorporation of supplementarity into the creative process 
                                                          
6
 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, London: Routledge, 2000 [1969], pp. 23-24. 
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is shown to illuminate struggles against institutionalisation, and emerges as a problematic 
issue for identifying, archiving, and displaying works of art.    
 
Case Studies 
 
The methodology of this thesis consists of a careful unfolding of the main themes relating 
to supplementarity.  There is of course the possibility of a migration of concepts – of both 
theory and practice – along with multiple combinations.  The intention here is to bring 
together theories and practice that resonate vividly, allowing clarity in the analysis.  It 
could be possible to do without philosophical concepts altogether, and simply interrogate 
a variety of case studies under a general theory of the supplement, showing different 
ways in which the issue of support might be encountered.  However, what is of central 
importance here is to identify key philosophical and historical approaches to the question 
of art and the artist.  This will show how supplementarity not only extends these 
approaches into new territories, raising further questions and providing new support for 
their views, but which also shows how such concepts can be used to open up dynamic 
reconsiderations of art practice.   
 
It is not by accident that all four case studies concern artists from the Modernist era.  As 
much as this thesis draws upon concepts and events from the histories of art and 
practice, it is also an analysis of contemporary approaches to, and implications for, 
supplementarity.  By selecting artists from the Modernist era, rather than more recent or 
contemporary art practice, I am able to show more clearly the evidence of historical 
influences upon the production, archiving, and displaying of works of art and 
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supplementary material, and the ways in which these approaches can and must be re-
considered today. 
 
Given the wide-ranging potential for philosophical and historical concepts to be applied 
to all manners of art practice, there is the danger that my method of approach might 
appear arbitrary.  Deleuze wrote a book on Bacon - could his ideas of ‘the sign’ and 
simulacra not be used in my chapter on Bacon?  Is it not possible to discuss Sant’Elia’s 
works on paper by using the debate on aura between Benjamin and Adorno?  And why 
these particular case studies and not others?  For this reason it is necessary to provide 
some clarification regarding my choice of case studies, and my reasons for applying 
specific philosophical concepts to them. 
 
Moore and Heidegger 
 
In this, and subsequent chapters, I decided that concentrating on one particular artist 
would prevent the discussion from becoming diluted and too broad, allowing for a 
detailed examination of how the issue of the supplement can pervade multiple aspects of 
an artist’s method of working, and the use made of that work.  The choice of case study in 
this instance is determined by the necessity of opening with a discussion of the 
classification and distinction of art and equipment, and to see how preliminary and 
preparatory works-for-art might seemingly apply to both.  This chapter therefore 
addresses the problem of classifying works of art that was shown to unfold in the history 
of art discussed above, as well as showing how Heidegger’s philosophical works on the 
meaning and value of equipment can problematise such classifications.  Heidegger’s 
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studies of the nature of art, the artist, and equipment, provide an opportunity to 
investigate where preliminary and preparatory works would apply to his analyses, and for 
this reason it was imperative to select an artist who made use of different forms of 
preliminary and preparatory work during their creative process.  What makes Henry 
Moore so suitable for carrying out this analysis is that on the one hand, his complete 
works are seemingly very familiar and seemingly unproblematic (which allows for a 
greater juxtaposition between these well-known pieces, and my analysis of his less 
defined preliminary and preparatory works), and on the other, the use he made of such 
material was a conventional one.  For Moore, there is a clear distinction between the 
small maquettes, the plasters, and the full-scale sculptures.  At no point does Moore 
attempt to make his works-for-art the focus of his creative practice, which would make 
the analysis in this section less clear.  Heidegger’s approach also makes a clear distinction 
between art and equipment, and between Moore and Heidegger arises the opportunity 
to question whether a careful discussion of Heidegger’s theories, and Moore’s practice 
might reveal how such a distinction may not be as clear as it initially appears. 
 
Moore often wrote about his working process, and this provides a strong foundation for 
being able to develop Heidegger’s notion of causality, which links his approaches to art 
and equipment.  Instead of merely illustrating Heidegger’s ideas, Moore’s working 
process allows these ideas to be both demonstrated and challenged by way of clear 
examples, supported by the artist’s own accounts.  Further, the role of the Henry Moore 
Foundation in classifying and distributing Moore’s preliminary and preparatory material 
allows for the issue of the supplement’s status to be expanded to the realms of display 
and utilisation.  This provides an introduction to a core theme of this thesis; namely, the 
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problems that arise when works specifically categorised as supporting material begin to 
encroach upon the public space of completed works of art.  Another important benefit of 
selecting Moore as the subject of this case study is that his process of working represents 
a choice between developing initial ideas (and the different ways this might be done), or 
deciding to abandon them to their status as incomplete pieces.  This allows for a greater 
contrast to the work that forms the focus of the following case study, which in turn 
emphasises crucial differences between types of preliminary and preparatory works that 
are dependent upon the circumstances of their formation and appropriation. 
 
Sant’Elia and Deleuze 
 
The rationale behind choosing Sant’Elia’s preliminary and preparatory works as the 
subject of a case study was directly influenced by the decision to write about Moore’s 
maquettes.  Though both the maquettes and Sant’Elia’s architectural works on paper 
seemingly share the property of incompleteness, there is a sharp contrast in the value 
attached to them that arises from the circumstances of their use.  Moore lived into his 
eighties, and retained considerable control over decisions about developing or 
abandoning his initial ideas.  His catalogue of completed works emphasises the process-
value of these initial ideas in relation to his overall practice, whilst more easily defining 
them as supporting material for those who displayed the works Moore produced.  In 
contrast, Sant’Elia’s early death has left his works on paper in a severed, more ambiguous 
state, where the absence of completed works bestows greater significance upon them as 
the only evidence of his ambitious and speculative projects.  This caused me to consider 
their importance for showing how, under certain conditions otherwise supplementary 
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material might occupy a similar (if not completely identical) role to that of completed 
works, as well as the processes involved in appropriating such material.  Two important 
concepts arose from my consideration of Sant’Elia’s work; the possibility of preliminary 
and preparatory works to encroach upon the territory usually reserved for completed 
works (which challenges conventional approaches to the hierarchical categorisation of 
works of art, and the manner in which such categorisation has become established in the 
history of art); and the importance of appropriation when the artist’s own power to 
control the uses of his work is diminished or absent (which relates to the developments in 
museum and exhibition displays addressed in chapter two).   
 
Whilst Moore’s work was selected due to its suitability for exploring Heidegger’s theories 
of art and equipment, Sant’Elia’s work was chosen because of the way in which it 
contrasted and resonated with the concepts that appeared from my study of Moore and 
Heidegger.7  This does not mean that the decision to apply the concepts of Deleuze to 
Sant’Elia’s work was arbitrary.  Had Sant’Elia’s work not been appropriate for furthering 
the discussion of the key philosophical concepts I wished to explore, it would have been 
set aside.  Perhaps more than any other philosopher discussed in this thesis, Deleuze’s 
theories (especially that of the ‘sign’) could be drawn upon to re-interpret a wide range of 
works of artists.  However, his notion of the simulacrum, and in particular its relevance 
for bringing into question a dominant approach to representation that had persisted since 
                                                          
7
 Though it should be pointed out that from the earliest stages of my research I was looking at numerous 
artists and their works that could potentially be of use for this investigation, including Sant’Elia.  As my 
method of approach developed, the appropriateness of my research became clearer and more refined.  For 
example, although Kandinsky’s drawings have the potential to be developed into a discussion of 
supplementarity and design, I decided that they were not suitable for unfolding the thesis in a way that 
would allow for the opening up of the key themes. 
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Plato, finds an ideal counterpoint in Sant’Elia’s work.  The content of Sant’Elia’s works on 
paper are already simulations of architectural structures, yet they are copies without 
models, outlines without fulfilment.  The privileged position afforded to these otherwise 
supportive works by the circumstances of Sant’Elia’s death allows for the notion of the 
simulacrum as something that should be encountered on its own terms to be clearly 
highlighted and developed.  Furthermore, the implications Deleuze’s notion of the ‘sign’ 
has for evaluating the artistic ‘qualities’ that distinguish a work of art can be vividly 
applied here in order to reveal the possibility of a radical reconsideration of  
supplementary material such as preliminary and preparatory works.  If the chapter on 
Moore and Heidegger indicates the ways in which supplementarity might be identified, 
this chapter shows how supplementarity might be re-positioned.  Sant’Elia and Deleuze 
complement one another in such a way that allows the assertion and implications of this 
re-positioning to be expressed with clarity.       
 
Bacon, Benjamin, and Adorno 
 
With the popularisation of the ‘artist-genius’ notion came an increased interest in 
understanding the origins and processes of the creative act.  Today it continues to be 
common for exhibitions to include not only biographical material that was not 
immediately part of the production of art, but which in some cases is connected only by 
coming from a shared historical period.8  That this approach remains popular in museums 
and displays ensures that the debates about aura and deaestheticisation raised by 
                                                          
8
 See Tate Liverpool’s 2008 exhibition, ‘Gustav Klimt: Painting, Design and Modern Life’.  
www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tate-liverpool/exhibition/gustav-klimt-painting-design-and-modern-life-vienna-
1900/gustav (accessed 30/07/2014). 
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Benjamin and Adorno continue to be relevant – particularly in a discussion on 
supplementarity.  These critical approaches highlight key concerns about the ways in 
which the ‘art experience’ might be hindered or improved, and provide the thesis with an 
important theoretical context concerning supposed or potential negative aspects of the 
use of supplementarity.  However, in Adorno’s theory of enigmaticalness (which he 
develops in opposition to deaestheticisation, as that which is threatened by the latter), 
there emerges another possibility; the same process that retains this sense of 
enigmaticalness in historical works of art that have lost their original context and have 
become re-rendered as ‘hieroglyphic puzzles’, can not only be found in some forms of 
supplementary material, but will be argued to constitute their primary value when 
displayed.  The focus of this chapter is to outline the criticism directed towards forms of 
supplementarity that have apparently become increasingly distanced from works of art, 
whilst showing, conversely, that an affirmation of such material (made possible by 
Adorno himself) can transform their significance and re-constitute them as culturally 
important in a way that is no longer reduced to mere support. 
 
At an early stage of my research I was already looking at Francis Bacon’s relocated studio, 
and had recognised that it held particular importance in being able to raise questions 
about the re-distribution of meaning, context, the elevation of the biographical, and 
processes of mystification and demystification involved in their use.9  Initially, I 
considered exploring this studio-display by way of Heidegger’s notion of ἀλήθεια (see 
Appendix 1), as this allowed me to address what was lost and what was preserved in each 
                                                          
9
 It is the act of relocation and the precise re-rendering of Bacon’s studio that makes it more appropriate for 
discussion than other art studios, such as Constantin Brâncuși’s ‘atelier’ in Paris, or Jackson Pollock and Lee 
Krasner’s studios at the Pollock-Krasner House in New York. 
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stage of the studio’s existence.  My interview with Barbara Dawson, the Director of The 
Hugh Lane Municipal Gallery of Modern Art who oversaw the relocation of Bacon’s 
studio, was carried out with the ramifications of Heidegger’s notion of ἀλήθεια in mind.  
However, as my research into Heidegger, Benjamin, and (particularly) Adorno developed, 
it soon became apparent that this approach would need to be reconsidered.  Heidegger’s 
theories on causality and equipment made me realise that this would warrant a more 
thorough discussion, accompanied by a case study that would allow my own 
interpretation of their importance to be more appropriately emphasised.  Equally, it 
became clear to me that the significance of Bacon’s relocated studio for this discussion of 
supplementarity was to be found in its relevance for exploring and furthering research, 
not only in debates about aura and deaestheticisation, but also in re-evaluating 
supplementary material as something having significant cultural and artistic value.  Whilst 
the Moore chapter represents a case study chosen for its overall suitability, and as 
general introduction to the problems of classifying supplementarity, the relocated studio 
of Francis Bacon is a unique event that allows for the discussion of aura, 
deaestheticisation, and enigmaticalness to be illuminated. 
 
Artaud and Derrida 
 
The reasoning behind the choice of my final case study involved the consideration of 
several factors.  It is a culmination of the key ideas previously discussed, whilst 
emphasising the problematic nature of supplementarity for approaches to practice, 
display and theory.  One of the primary reasons for Artaud’s use in this thesis lies in the 
ways in which his works on paper knowingly addressed the problematic status of the 
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complete work of art.10  This can be seen in his ‘spells’ and ‘ébauches’, and his use of 
supplementary written material to challenge any efforts to interpret them in accordance 
with ‘conventional’ approaches to unfinished or complete works.  Artaud’s work 
constitutes an important example of how a questioning of prevailing notions of the use 
and hierarchical ordering can be incorporated into the creative act itself, in a way that is 
not present in the other case studies.  However, it is also of great value for the way it 
highlights the practical problems of displaying such work (such as Artaud’s numerous 
notebooks), as well as extending my study of appropriation and the use of the 
biographical to the artist’s mental state itself.   
 
The issue of ‘madness’ explored in this section directly relates to the characterisation of 
artists as troubled geniuses that, following Kant’s artist-genius, became popularised in the 
Romantic period.  As well as showing the mechanisms of hierarchical classification taking 
place that distinguished ‘art brut’ from more recognised figures such as Artaud, it also 
reveals the extent to which mental illness can be allowed to dominate the way in which 
works are packaged and presented, transforming and undermining the artist’s own 
intentions by focusing on the biographical circumstances surrounding their creation.  
Artaud’s work – a challenge to the meaning and status of the supplement – itself 
becomes a supplement to the ‘mad’ historical figure of ‘Artaud’.   
 
                                                          
10
 I had considered basing this case study on the works of Marcel Duchamp, due to a similar awareness of 
the problematic status of his works. However, it became apparent that in addition to the difficulties that 
would be faced by attempting to align Duchamp’s own, very specific theories to the concerns of this thesis, 
Derrida’s works on Artaud provided a more precise and clearer opportunity to bring the various aspects of 
this thesis together.    
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It was not a matter of ‘applying’ Derrida to Artaud (or vice versa).  Unlike the other case 
studies discussed here, Artaud’s influence extended to his written works as well as his art, 
with his writing playing a part in shaping the philosophies of both Deleuze and Derrida.  
The mutual influence of art and theory is seen clearly in Artaud’s work (both written and 
on paper), with Artaud himself referenced by Deleuze in his rejection of the historical 
‘image of thought’ that forms the crux of chapter five.  However, as with his book on 
Bacon, the fact that Deleuze had referenced the influence of Artaud was not in itself a 
reason to ‘couple’ him with that particular artist.  Instead, the combinations I have 
selected are based on what can generate the most productive discussions.  Not only did 
Derrida provide a key text that explored the issue of Artaud, mental illness, and ‘the 
work’, he also developed his theory of the ‘parergon’ by specifically addressing a concept 
invented (or at least extensively re-invented) by Artaud – the ‘subjectile’.  Both the 
parergon and the subjectile are significant concepts for this discussion of 
supplementarity, whereby the role, value, and use of the support are exposed to a 
sustained philosophical study.  Via Artaud’s works on paper, and Derrida’s analysis of the 
support (itself directly influenced by Artaud), this case study represents a culmination 
point where practical and theoretical concerns with the borders and limits of the work of 
art meet my own investigation of supplementarity.  This collision does not result in a 
mere summary or overview of their respective projects. Instead it draws upon them in 
order to forward this discussion by revealing how concerns regarding the definition and 
use of what is called the supplement are not only already to be found to have emerged in 
both practice and theory, but have combined to form the ground upon which this thesis is 
built.    
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Chapter One:  The Supplement and Philosophy 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the key positions and concepts of particular 
thinkers in relation to this project, establishing the foundations of the ideas to be 
discussed, as well as providing more detailed overviews of specific concepts and ideas 
that will be used throughout the thesis. 
 
This chapter will introduce the general positions of certain key thinkers in relation to art, 
before focusing on the relevance of aspects of their theories that are central to the issue 
of supplementarity.  The primary thinkers I will be drawing upon will be Kant, 
Schopenhauer, Heidegger, Adorno, Benjamin, Plato, Deleuze (alone, or in collaboration 
with Guattari), and Derrida.  
 
Kant 
 
In his essay ‘Toward a Unification of All the Fine Arts and Letters under the Concept of 
Self-Sufficiency’ (1785), Karl Philipp Moritz put forward the view that fine or ‘higher’ art 
should not be judged or evaluated on its ability to please an audience, but that its ‘true’ 
qualities are in their internal perfection.  This was the first significant stage in the 
development of theories of art as being autonomous rather than merely instrumental.  
Moritz describes the pleasure in the higher arts as being a matter of losing oneself in their 
beauty, an involvement that constitutes ‘disinterested’ pleasure.  In this way, Emma 
Barker argues:  “The relative ineffectuality of beautiful art, instead of rendering its value 
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problematic, can be construed as evidence of its very excellence.”11  Five years after 
Moritz’s essay, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) concluded his three famous philosophical 
Critiques in 1790, with the publication of The Critique of Judgement.  This work can be 
viewed as a continuation and development of Moritz’s notion of disinterested pleasure 
inspired by the internal qualities of works of art.12  Instead of art being considered as a 
passive quality contained in works such as paintings or sculptures that could be merely 
contemplated and appreciated, Kant redefined art as something experienced under 
specific laws of reason that formed part of the makeup of our mental faculties.  For Kant, 
the experience and understanding of art is ultimately derived from what he terms the 
‘aesthetic idea’, which he describes as “that representation of the imagination which 
induces much thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e. 
concept, being adequate to it, and which language, consequently, can never get quite on 
level terms with or render completely intelligible”.13 
 
The aesthetic idea is aesthetic precisely because it is primarily concerned with sensation – 
it pleases or displeases the senses in a way separate to (and beyond) any conceptual or 
reasoned response.  Such an object of cognition induces a representation in thought with 
which no concept is capable of being suitably aligned, causing the resulting idea produced 
by it to be a matter of sensation.   
                                                          
11
 Emma Barker, Nick Webb, and Kim, Woods, ‘Historical Introduction: The Idea of the Artist’. In The 
Changing Status of the Artist, Emma Barker, Nick Webb, and Kim Woods (eds), London: Yale University 
Press, 1999, p.22. 
12
 See Martha Woodmansee, The Author, Art, and the Market: Rereading the History of Aesthetics, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994, pp. 11 – 34. 
13
 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964 [1790], pp. 175-176 
(original emphasis). 
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Kant argued for the primacy of universal a priori laws that formed the foundation of all 
reason, and from which all possible experience was subsequently derived.  If there was to 
be such a thing as an aesthetic idea that related to the senses, that too would by 
necessity need to be established on universal a priori laws that ultimately existed within 
the faculties of the mind, and the judgements of reason resulting from these faculties.  As 
Kant argues: “Judgement in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained 
under the universal.”14   
 
For Kant, the universality of the experience of art centred upon judgements of taste in 
relation to the beautiful, and the key to this was the possibility of disinterested interest.  
In the natural world, a flower or a mountain range might be said to induce an aesthetic 
idea by stimulating the senses in such a way as to cause pleasure, yet without the 
possibility of being reduced to a concept of reason that explains such pleasure.  In Kantian 
terms, for this pleasure to be pure and free from any concept of reason, it must be the 
result of a disinterested interest, whereby the pleasure cannot be said to result from any 
individual judgment of agreeableness or disagreeableness.  Kant argues this point when 
he says that “everyone must allow that a judgement on the beautiful which is tinged with 
the slightest interest, is very partial and not a pure judgement of taste”.15  
 
With his criteria in place, Kant establishes a method of evaluating works of art in terms of 
their capacity to induce a judgment of beauty that is free from any particular interest.  For 
Kant, the great work of art begins with form.  It is the construction of this form that above 
                                                          
14
 Ibid, p. 18. 
15
 Ibid, p. 43. 
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all renders a work beautiful.  Kant argues: “In painting, sculpture, and in fact in all the 
formative arts, in architecture and horticulture, so far as fine arts, the design is what is 
essential.”16  The designer of the beautiful work of art is, for Kant, the genius.17  Kant 
emphasises a notion of the artistic genius that is essentially on a lower level to learned 
figures in intellectual disciplines because their skills are ‘gifted’ to them from birth, rather 
than being acquired through hard work and discipline (though the latter may play an 
important part in refining their talents).  Kant’s notion of the artist/genius as a gifted and 
unusual figure in society would have significant implications for the notion of the 
romanticised portrayal of the isolated artist (discussed in chapter two), unable to 
understand their own abilities, that continues to influence ways in which artists (and the 
materials associated with them) are characterised today. 
 
Kant arrived at the conclusion that “the design is what is essential” by a process of 
reduction that removed any aspect of a work that may be said to appeal to individual 
preferences, such as the use of colour or expensive materials.  Such appeals to individual 
preferences Kant distinguishes as charms.  Charms such as colour merely gratify the 
senses, whereas the form of a work induces pleasure in its own right.18  Kant argues that: 
“the real meaning rather is that this makes the form more clearly, definitely, and 
completely intuitable, and besides stimulates the representation by their charm, as they 
excite and sustain the attention directed to the object itself”.19  On one hand the work of 
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 Ibid, p. 67 (original emphasis). 
17
 Ibid, p. 168. 
18
 Ibid, p. 67. 
19
 Ibid, p. 68. 
31 
 
art is by necessity something where “some work of man is understood”.20  On the other 
hand, in order for it to be art it must be the result of “an occupation which is agreeable on 
its own account”.21  Work resulting from a process concerned merely with what is 
produced is considered “industrial art” that belongs to the realm of handicraft, and is 
therefore already concerned with a specific interest.22  In contrast to Schopenhauer, Kant 
also insists that the work of art must consist of an “absence of laboured effect” – a 
requirement that underlines Kant’s belief that the work must induce a perfect 
representation of nature through its form, instead of drawing attention to its 
‘createdness’.23  Indeed, the initial, unrefined moments of expression later championed 
by Schopenhauer are, for Kant, of use only as a means of refinement.  He argues that 
“The artist, having practised and corrected his taste by a variety of examples from nature 
or art, controls his work and, after many, and often laborious, attempts to satisfy taste, 
finds the form which commends itself to him.”24  Thus, for Kant, preliminary and 
preparatory works have value only in their potential ability to refine works of art yet to 
come.  
 
In the context of this thesis the most significant part of Kant’s writing on the work of art 
relates to his discussion of charm, and the distinction he makes between the employment 
of this concept to positively support and emphasise the form of the work, and that which, 
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 Ibid, p. 163. 
21
 Ibid, p. 164. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid, p. 167. 
24
 Ibid, p. 174. 
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whilst ostensibly a type of charm, becomes something that Kant considers a hindrance to 
the work.  Kant introduces the notion of ornamentation or parerga (the plural of 
parergon, that is; ‘para’ (beyond or alongside) ‘ergon’ - work, or ‘to work’).  Such 
ornamentation is considered outside or alongside the work of art, and is concerned only 
with an appeal to the senses (and thus obscuring the path to a disinterested interest).  
Kant argues: “If the ornamentation does not itself enter into the composition of the 
beautiful form – if it is introduced like a gold frame merely to win approval for the picture 
by means of its charm – it is called finery and it takes away from the genuine beauty.”25  
Supplementarity is therefore introduced by Kant as a potential aspect of the experience 
of art, in the form of parerga, but in a specifically negative sense of detraction. 
 
This notion of parerga will form the direct inspiration for Derrida’s own concept of the 
parergon (which will be discussed in chapter six), and establishes the first major 
theoretical discussion of the distinction between artistic and non-artistic aspects of the 
experience of a work of art.  More generally, Kant’s writing on the work of art introduce 
key concepts of relevance to the present thesis, including; the notion of art as a cognitive 
experience; the idea of the artist/genius; the primacy of form and design; the utilisation 
of charm to positively emphasise elements of an artwork; and the supposedly negative 
inclusion of parerga as finery to embellish a work of art through the inclusion of 
supplementarity. 
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 Ibid, p. 68 (original emphasis). 
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Schopenhauer 
 
In 1818, Arthur Schopenhauer provided the first major philosophical perspective on the 
importance of preliminary and preparatory works in the creative process: 
 
The very best in art is too spiritual to be given directly to the senses; it must be 
born in the beholder’s imagination, it is due to this that the sketches of great 
masters are often more effective than their finished paintings.  Of course another 
advantage contributes to this, namely that they are completed at one stroke in 
the moment of conception, whereas the finished painting is brought about only 
through continued efforts by means of clever deliberation and persistent 
premeditation, for the inspiration cannot last until the painting is completed.26 
 
Schopenhauer argues “only that idea which was perceived before it was thought has 
suggestive and stimulating force when it is communicated”.27  He contends that the 
instinctual and immediate nature of sketches and initial representations of the 
inspirational idea: 
 
have the great merit of being the pure work of the rapture of the moment, of the 
inspiration, of the free impulse of genius, without any admixture of deliberation 
and reflection.  They are therefore delightful and enjoyable through and through, 
without shell and kernel, and their effort is much more infallible than is that of the 
greatest works of art of slow and deliberate execution.28 
 
This represents an extreme view of art in which what matters is the origin of the creative 
thought, which loses its impact and proximity to its genesis the more it is refined and 
‘perfected’, where: “Understanding, technical skill, and routine must fill up here the gaps 
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 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation Volume II, New York: Dover Books, 1966 
[1818], p. 408 (my emphasis).  
27
 Ibid, p. 409 (original emphasis). 
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left by the conception and inspiration of genius, and all kinds of necessary subsidiary work 
must run through the really only genuine and brilliant part as their cement.”29 
 
Whilst amounting to a brief commentary, this perspective is an important historical 
contribution to the present discussion of the significance of the supplement.  
Schopenhauer identifies the initial stages of the creative process as being more profound 
than the works derived from them by elevating the relevance of creative inspiration 
above its adaptations to a more palpable, and therefore more marketable, form.  If Kant 
introduces the philosophical consideration of the supplement in art, by way of parerga, 
Schopenhauer introduces the implied centrality of the creative process itself, in which the 
earliest material manifestations have the most value through their proximity to 
inspiration.     
 
Heidegger 
 
After The Critique of Judgement appeared, new theories of art continued to be advanced 
that challenged and/or developed the ideas Kant had raised.  Highly influential works 
such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art (1835), 
maintained art’s position as an object of serious academic study, and of its varying 
degrees of importance in society.  However, writing in 1876, Friedrich Nietzsche 
acknowledged the lack of interest in the construction of works of art, stating that “When 
something is perfect, we tend to neglect to ask about its evolution, delighting rather in 
                                                          
29
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what is present, as if it had risen from the ground by magic.”30  The audience wants the 
work of art to appear in such a way in order for the sensation of art to be felt more fully.  
Nietzsche identifies a ground for the complicity of the audience in this relation to art:  
“The wealth of religious feeling, swollen to a river, breaks out again and again, and seeks 
to conquer new realms: but growing enlightenment has shaken the dogmas of religion 
and generated a thorough mistrust of it; therefore, feeling, forced out of the religious 
sphere by enlightenment, throws itself into art.”31  This observation by Nietzsche 
accounts for the space created for an audience willing to embrace art through a 
displacement of religious feeling.  An understanding of this displacement is essential in 
contextualising the theory of art that would, after Nietzsche, be put forward by 
Heidegger. 
 
An important part of my theoretical methodology is the ontological project of the German 
philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), and particularly his interpretations of 
causality, truth, and the distinctions between equipment, and the artwork.  For 
Heidegger, the very history of mankind occurs through mankind’s varying relations to the 
issue of Being, in our confrontation with the questions of what is, and what we are.  
Beings that confront the issue of what it is to be, regardless of the extent of this 
confrontation, Heidegger calls ‘Dasein’.  Dasein (roughly translated from German as 
here/there-being) is the thinking being that has awareness of its existence within a world.     
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 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, London: Penguin Books, 1984 [1876], p. 103. 
31
 Ibid, p. 105. 
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For Heidegger, the relationship Dasein has to equipment is one of forgetting the thing 
itself, and instead utilising it for mankind’s own ends.  Such things are, for mankind, 
‘ready-to-hand’; they have the quality of ‘readiness-to-hand’, with Heidegger asserting 
that equipment is always said of a plurality of things in relation to one another, instead of 
applying to individual objects (the hammer, the nail, the wood, the door, the house, etc.).  
They function best as equipment when they require no consideration, as their properties, 
origin and existence are subsumed within the carrying out of some task, and where: “The 
less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the 
more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it 
encountered as that which it is – as equipment.”32  Heidegger’s use of this term – 
unveiledly – is related to his interpretation of the Greek word for truth, ἀλήθεια 
(alétheia). Heidegger claimed that the original sense of this word - that truth is something 
that emerges out of the hidden or concealed, and for the person apprehending or 
experiencing this truth it is thus unconcealed or unveiled – had become obscured and 
forgotten.  
 
Truth as ἀλήθεια has no universal or singular meaning.  Instead it is a temporal process 
that reveals a thing, a life, or a society for what it is (at least at the moment when truth 
becomes unconcealed).  It is an unveiling that allows the construction of values, the 
relations between things within this construction, and the relations between this 
construction and the natural world, to become dis-closed.  As such, truth is meant here as 
a revelation that allows an ontological sense of Being to transcend the ontical (that is, the 
everyday and ‘matter-of-fact’) concerns of a phenomenological ‘reality’.  The latter, 
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through repeated familiarity and conditioning, obscures the former.  Truth as 
unconcealment is therefore not only a revealing of the constructed nature of such a 
reality, it is also a manifestation of the continuously temporal, fluctuating relationship 
Dasein has with both concealment and unconcealment.         
 
Traits, concepts, associations and meaning persist in things, or else they sink into the 
abyss of the forgotten, where: “in forgetting not only does something slip from us, but 
the forgetting slips into a concealment of such a kind that we ourselves fall into 
concealedness precisely in our relation to the forgotten”.33  Here, Heidegger is referring 
to our estimation of the truth as something that can only be assessed through what is 
evident for our consideration at a given moment, and where precisely what is concealed 
is unable to play a conscious role in our grasping of a thing.  Heidegger posits the opposite 
of truth not as falsity, but as ‘oblivion’ (his translation of the Greek λήθή, or ‘lethe’), 
where the unconcealed truth, through not being preserved, becomes obliterated from the 
world – becomes concealed, and becomes a truth to which people are now oblivious.   
 
Heidegger argues: “since ἀλήθεια is the overcoming of λήθή, what is unconcealed must 
be saved in unconcealedness and be secured in it”.34  To secure something in 
unconcealedness is to preserve it in its unconcealed state, and consequently from λήθή, 
from a ‘withdrawing concealment’.  The ongoing interplay here between ἀλήθεια and 
λήθή constitutes the site where Dasein receives Being, where what is received is 
sometimes preserved, sometimes forsaken and allowed to withdraw into oblivion.   
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From 1935 to 1937, Heidegger worked on a lecture series he delivered earlier in the 
decade that evaluated art in terms of ἀλήθεια, Being, preservation, duration, and 
equipment.  This would later be published under the title ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’.  
In Heidegger’s philosophy, a distinction is made between the usefulness of equipment, 
which comes to the fore the more its own existence as an object fades into forgetfulness, 
and the work of art, which Heidegger understands as something that, unlike the piece of 
equipment, is capable of allowing the being of truth (as ἀλήθεια) to come forth into 
unconcealment, where something essential to Being itself is revealed, instead of the 
everyday or ontic experiences which disappear into the background.  The artwork exudes 
an unconcealed truth of Being that allows an experience of truth, and pulls Dasein out of 
the ‘ontic’ everyday being within a world.  
 
For Heidegger, the work of art occupies a special significance for Dasein, and for the 
relationship between Dasein and ἀλήθεια.  Equipment is no doubt important and 
necessary for Dasein, however its significance remains at the level of the ontic, that is, the 
level of our dealing with-in Being, rather than our dealing with Being itself that Heidegger 
argues is made possible by great works of art.  Yet the preliminary and preparatory work 
is precisely that which falls between artwork and equipment – the non-art-work (or work-
for-art) of the artist.  The significance of these distinctions between equipment, works of 
art, and works-for-art for this thesis is in their implications for the classification of 
supplementary material that appears to exist between equipment and artwork.  
Heidegger defines great works of art as that which reveal, in very specific ways, a sense of 
truth about the worlds they appear within, and which are only preserved for a short time.  
In contrast, equipment is defined in terms of being forgotten or concealed in its utility.  It 
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is the possibility that the problematic nature of works-for-art can be identified between 
these two definitions, and therefore opened up for clearer analysis, that forms the basis 
of the case study of Henry Moore.             
 
For Heidegger, the work of art is not something made, like a hammer, shoe or pen, but 
something created.  The work of art is the coming-into-existence of a truth that relies on 
no other purpose or function than to abide as a work of art in-itself.  The work of art is 
capable of disclosing something of the essence of Being, precisely because its existence - 
its ‘what-it-is’ - is not immediately concealed within the demands of functionality.  The 
work thrusts forward in its self-disclosing truth, where “the thrust that the work, as this 
work, is and the unceasingness of this inconspicuous thrust constitute the constancy of 
the self-subsistence of the work”.35  However, for both the equipment and the work of 
art, concealment is required in order for them to ‘fulfil’ their purpose, though in entirely 
contrasting ways.  With the work of art it is “precisely where the artist and the process 
and circumstances of the genesis of the work remain unknown, this thrust, this ‘that it is’ 
of createdness, emerges into view most purely from the work”.36  Here, Heidegger 
indicates that for the work of art to step into view, to step out of concealment into 
ἀλήθεια, it must be devoid of any trace that would draw attention to its mode of 
production, or to the interventions of any producer whatsoever.  The ‘being’ of the artist 
is, in such instances, concealed.   
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Similarly, where the piece of equipment avoids drawing attention to the materials that 
constitute it, and the processes that formed it, it is considered to best fulfil its purpose.  
However, here this purpose is most successfully achieved by moving in the very opposite 
direction to the work of art, away from the unconcealed light of self-evidence and instead 
towards a concealed existence where the equipment is considered to succeed the better 
it is subsumed within the fulfilment of an act (in contrast to, for example, the light bulb 
only considered when it blows).   
 
Heidegger’s notion of causality that appeared in ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, 
develops his theories of equipment, production, and work (including art-work) in terms of 
how four causes (discussed in chapter three) combine to ‘induce’ work.  This notion of 
causality, when considered in relation to works-for-art (such as sketches, maquettes, or 
preliminary paintings) provides a bridge between the opposing forms of equipment and 
art that Heidegger asserts, with works-for-art being both equipmental art, and artistic 
equipment.  The detailed discussion of Heidegger’s philosophy of art and equipment 
therefore prepares the ground for the detailed discussion of causality that is the subject 
of chapter three.  
 
It is important to emphasise the historical and social necessity of Heidegger’s 
understanding of great works of art, and the role of the creative process.  Heidegger 
traces the historical movement away from the relationship between great artworks and 
truth by showing the gradual shift in the ancient Greek understanding of the act of 
creation.  Originally the term techne had the sense of designating a form of knowledge 
that constituted an active engagement with the world of beings (physis).  This 
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engagement could apply to the production of both utensils and works of art due to the 
involvement of the “kind of knowledge that guides and grounds confrontation with and 
mastery over beings, in which new and other beings are expressly produced and 
generated in addition to and on the basis of the beings that have already come to be 
(physis)”.37  No distinction was considered relevant or necessary between the creators of 
utensils and the creators of works of art.  Instead, the fundamental consideration was not 
the properties, qualities, significance of what was being produced, but rather a 
consideration of that within and against which they were produced.  As such, the 
craftsman and the artist were both equally considered technites. 
 
Heidegger argues that this conception changed after Plato, with the notion of beings (all 
things in nature/physis) being distinguished and evaluated in terms of both their inner 
and outer limits, where “what limits is form, what is limited is matter”.38  This emphasises 
a conceptual pairing of matter and form (hylé-morphé) that would dictate the way in 
which art was to be interpreted.  It is at this stage, Heidegger argues, that the notion of 
the beautiful, as that which “properly shows itself and is most radiant of all” becomes the 
paramount qualitative measure of a work of art and its ‘greatness’.39  For Heidegger this 
was the origin of the branch of interpreting art called ‘aesthetics’, whereby: 
 
The work is represented as the bearer and provoker of the beautiful with relation 
to our state of feeling.  The artwork is posited as the “object” for a “subject”; 
definitive for aesthetic consideration is the subject-object relation, indeed as a 
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relation of feeling.  The work becomes an object in terms of that surface which is 
accessible to “lived experience”.40 
 
As such, the original sense of art as the bringing forth of a world, and the disclosing of 
ἀλήθεια becomes lost, replaced by a new branch of human studies that is increasingly 
removed from the greatness of great art, with even the notion of the beautiful becoming 
transformed over the centuries.  During a lecture series of 1935, Heidegger contended: 
“For us today, the beautiful is the relaxing, what is restful and thus intended for 
enjoyment.  Art then belongs to the domain of the pastry chef.”41  It is a blunt and 
damning summary of the decline of the profound importance of art, alluding to its new, 
superficial, disposable, even edible status.  Heidegger echoes the famous statement from 
Hegel, who declared that:  “Art, considered in its highest vocation, is and remains for us a 
thing of the past.  Thereby it has lost for us genuine truth and life, and has rather been 
transferred into our ideas instead of maintaining its earlier necessity in reality and 
occupying its higher place.”42  
 
In reference to this statement, Heidegger concludes his own account of the historical 
progression of aesthetics away from art’s original capacity as that which ‘unconceals 
truth’ by interpreting Hegel’s words in terms of art’s incapacity to make manifest “what 
beings as a whole are”.  He argues: 
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Hegel never wished to deny the possibility that also in the future individual works 
of art would originate and be esteemed.  The fact of such individual works, which 
exist as works only for the enjoyment of a few sectors of the population, does not 
speak against Hegel but for him.  It is proof that art has lost its power to be the 
absolute, has lost its absolute power.43 
 
Of course the decline of art’s “absolute power” could be sutured to the corresponding 
decline of art’s religious function, or its ‘cult-value’ as it had already been termed by 
Walter Benjamin in ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’.  Whilst 
Heidegger had no interest in preserving religious connotations in art, he nevertheless 
seemed to retain a belief in the profound potential of great works of art, and looked back, 
perhaps paradoxically and romantically, to a distant age where the most admired works 
of what we now call art were revered as resonating an indeterminate aspect of divinity.  It 
is precisely the echoes of this apparent indeterminate profundity (and its possible 
continuation) that, concurrently with Heidegger’s own lectures and writing on art, formed 
the locus of the debate between Benjamin and Adorno that is developed in chapter five. 
 
Heidegger’s writing on works of art, equipment, and causality, are of value to the present 
thesis due to their importance for engaging with the question of ‘what is the 
supplement?’ that guides chapter three.  Heidegger’s theories on the work of art, 
equipment, and in particular, causality (where I argue that slippage appears between 
artwork and equipment), provide an invaluable framework to which the status of various 
forms of supplementary material can be applied and questioned.  
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Benjamin and Adorno 
 
During the mid 1940s, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer collaborated on the essay 
‘The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception’.  At the heart of their work was 
a concern for the deliberate and systematic cultural ‘dumbing down’, whereby every 
aspect of Western culture was increasingly simplified and reduced to an easily 
consumable state, with the ultimate intention of pacifying the general public and 
decreasing the likelihood of radical political action.  For Adorno, ‘high culture’ and ‘high 
art’ would (and for him, had already begun) to suffer from this process.  Adorno coined 
the term ‘entkunstung’ (deaestheticisation) to represent the various forces that act upon 
or around a work of art in such a way as to disrupt the aesthetic experience.  As an (albeit 
negative) concept that addresses the ‘outside’ influences that affect the art experience, 
this will be a key term for this discussion of supplementarity – one which links the 
relevance of this thesis to philosophical, curatorial, and art practice debates about the 
boundaries and considerations of display that can bear upon the reception of a work.  
Adorno explains that “Those who have been duped by the culture industry and are eager 
for its commodities push for the deaestheticisation of art.  Its unmistakeable symptom is 
the passion to touch everything, to allow no work to be what it is, to dress it up, to 
narrow its distance from the viewer.”44 
 
This narrowing of the distance from the viewer takes place through educational 
mechanisms, via concerted efforts to reduce the complexities of works of art (whether 
painting, music, or film) so as to increase their accessibility, and consequently, their 
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popularity.  For Adorno, it is precisely the difficulty and unfamiliarity in works of art that is 
at the very heart of what makes a great work.  The most successful works would be those 
that must be ‘worked at’ in order to appreciate them, rather than being made 
immediately available.   
    
The most ‘successful’ artworks had what Adorno called their ‘enigmaticalness’.  Central to 
this concept was the way in which the greatest artworks operated beyond standard forms 
of logical analysis, whilst simultaneously seeming to emerge from an internal logic beyond 
our comprehension – creating questions to which there are no answers.  In their 
unfamiliarity and their mysteriousness, great artworks find their power.  Consequently it 
is the unravelling of this mystery, and the familiarisation with the work, that undermines 
it.  Adorno contended: “the better an artwork is understood, the more it is unpuzzled on 
one level and the more obscure its constitutive enigmaticalness becomes”.45  He argues 
that “those who peruse art solely with comprehension make it into something 
straightforward, which is furthest from what it is”.46 
 
Adorno draws a clear distinction between understanding and experiencing an artwork.  
The enigmatic artwork presents itself as a puzzle, but it is precisely this puzzlement and 
enigmaticalness that generates its effectiveness, and leads to the pleasure that can be 
experienced (in contrast to the passive ease of popular culture).  The ‘interpreters’ writing 
about artists and their works are drawn into the puzzles they consider to have been 
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presented to them, and feel compelled to overcome the questions by locating the 
solutions.  The ‘educators’ are then able to gather the fruits of the research undertaken, 
and present the ‘answers’ in an easily consumable form to the general public.  
Understanding is then offered in place of experiencing, as the enigmaticalness of a work is 
rendered impotent beneath a bombardment of facts, solutions, and instructions on how 
to ‘decipher’ its meaning, its historical context, and its value.  In this respect, 
supplementarity would, for Adorno, be an obstacle to the enigmaticalness of a work due 
to its supposed revelatory qualities.  However, I will develop this concept in chapter five 
in order to show how enigmaticalness can in fact be connected to certain uses of 
supplementary material.  I will show how the apparently demystifying traits of such 
material both mystify and emphasise in a unique way the puzzling nature not only of the 
works of art, but of both the supporting materials themselves, and the significance of the 
creative process.      
 
The increased emphasis on understanding – as opposed to experiencing - a work, 
seemingly began to affect the production of works themselves.  Part of the 
enigmaticalness of an artwork would, for Adorno, lie in its ability to transcend its formal 
existence, allowing the physical medium to slip smoothly from the viewer’s awareness as 
they dwell within the experience that the work generates.  However, Adorno could see a 
marked change appearing in the construction of artworks that indicated a move towards 
a transparency of the means of production, which heretofore had been largely or entirely 
absent.  Artworks had been arrows pointing away from their physical ‘thingness’ or the 
act of being created; now artists, musicians, filmmakers and other practitioners of the 
arts were increasingly willing to create works that conformed or played upon their 
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anticipated reception.  The value of artworks was – for Adorno at least – beginning to 
shift significantly away from being the locus of a profound experience.   
 
In contrast to the enigmaticalness that had previously proved to be the measure of an 
artwork’s charm and value, a new clamour for understanding was prevailing, with the 
medium itself highly scrutinised for the slightest signs of clues that could lead to a 
resolution of the puzzles before them.  This took hold to such an extent that the 
‘unfathomableness’ or esoteric quality of a work would begin to be seen as a negative 
value, whereas the ‘graspability’ of a work – its ability to be decoded and communicated 
to all – would be seen as a measure of its success.  The criteria for what made a successful 
work of art was shifting from its enigmaticalness to its capacity to be understood.  Adorno 
argues that: “In contrast to traditional art, new art accents the once hidden element of 
being something made, something produced.  The portion of it that is ϑεσει grew to such 
an extent that all effort to secret away the process of production in the work could not 
but fail.”47    
 
It is clear that Adorno is describing critically the increased tendency of artists (at least of 
the time) to ensure that their works make no attempts to conceal their form, but instead 
focus on this, emphasise it and champion it.48  When Adorno talks of ‘ϑεσει’, he is 
referring to a Greek word that means to ‘bring forward’, to ‘place’, ‘situate’, ‘put’ – 
ultimately its quality as something ‘made’ as opposed to something naturally occurring, 
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and in the above statement, he means in the sense of a founding property of artworks, 
but one that had predominantly started to become more and more prominent.  This 
‘process of production’, and ϑεσει, are important terms for the argument of this thesis – 
as I argue in chapter five that ‘madeness’ becomes emphasised and elevated in 
importance as museums and galleries make use of supplementary material.  There is also 
a parallel to be drawn here between Adorno’s ‘enigmaticalness’ and the concept of ‘aura’ 
put forward by Adorno’s friend and colleague, Walter Benjamin, with whom Adorno 
developed a close academic relationship through their shared association with the 
Frankfurt School.    
 
The aura of a work, for Benjamin, could be loosely described as an experienceable 
‘quality’ that issues forth from an ‘actual’ individual or unique object/work – one that 
included the trace of its history within itself.  Prior to the advent of photography, 
paintings and sculptures could be experienced only by the act of going to see them.  This 
emphasised the significance of ‘presence’ in relation to the experiencing of a work.  This 
constituted one of the two extreme poles in which Benjamin perceived artworks to be 
received and valued:  ‘cult value’, which in its most extreme cases lay in the inaccessible, 
and the mystically clandestine status of a work of art which created a powerful aura 
around it.  Such works were produced and utilised so as to be received with reverence, 
because they occupied the role of magical or religious transmitters.  Benjamin describes 
them thus: “Artistic production begins with ceremonial objects destined to serve in a cult. 
One may assume that what mattered was their existence, not their being on view.”49  The 
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exclusive position of the cult object and its accompanying cult value began to wane, as 
the skills of artists were increasingly used to produce non-ritualistic works.  For Benjamin, 
this saw works being progressively produced, received and valued in terms of the 
opposite pole to cult value; ‘exhibition value’.  The key characteristic of works of art that 
are received in terms of their exhibition value is that of inducing pleasure and/or 
appreciation without requiring any ceremonial function. 
 
As the religious prominence deteriorated, the reverential character (cult value) lingered 
(and lingers) on, with public religious sentiment displaced and replaced, as Nietzsche 
observed, by a new form of reverence.  Mechanical reproduction, ushered in by 
photography and film, meant that the exclusive power of presence (and the ‘aura’ of the 
work that emanated from this) was reduced.  Mass reproduction removed the distance 
between a prospective viewer and the work they wished to see, and as a result the aura 
of such works was, at least in part, eroded.  On the other hand, this new technology 
created the possibility of future works of endlessly reproducible art in which the last 
traces of aura (and the associated cultism of the object) would no longer be present.  At 
the same time, reproduction also disclosed more clearly the properties of that form of art 
which Benjamin claimed it would render redundant.  Howard Caygill explains that “it was 
the development of the technology of reproduction which enabled the category of the 
authentic to emerge and lend authority to the original work”.50  Emma Barker makes a 
similar observation, saying that “despite the significance of Benjamin’s analysis, it is 
undeniable that the fascination of the unique original has been substantially enhanced by 
the mass production of images - if copies did not exist, it would be impossible to define 
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any object as an original”.51  Though the category of the authentic had already marked a 
decisive shift towards the prominence of the artist during the Eighteenth Century, as 
dealers and collectors increasingly sought evidence of authorship as a way of determining 
value (a point discussed further in the next chapter), the emergence of mass reproduction 
radically transformed the meaning of the original work of art.   
 
Though not mutually compatible in their meaning, Adorno’s notion of ‘enigmaticalness’ 
and Benjamin’s notion of ‘aura’ had points of comparison and similarity.  Both addressed 
a property of art that was intangible, and which had a powerful effect on the way in 
which a work could be potentially experienced.  Both notions were also ones that were 
considered to be highly vulnerable.  Adorno and Benjamin considered the vulnerability of 
enigmaticalness and aura in different ways.  Adorno (together with Horkheimer) spoke of 
the ‘culture industry’ in negative terms.  The subtitle for their essay ‘The Culture Industry’ 
- ‘Enlightenment as Mass Deception’ - clearly indicates the view that the new media of 
the time, and the forms of art that accompanied this media, were pacifying the masses 
under the false impression that they were being supplied ‘culture’, that they were able to 
participate in what had previously been available only to a select few.  Mass produced art 
forms such as film and photography, along with the introduced reproducibility of 
paintings and sculptures, now meant that such works were being experienced in a way 
that could seemingly be grasped by everyone.  This was regardless of their education 
and/or social standing, as the makers of works of art increasingly utilised their mass 
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reproducibility for financial gain via the medium of entertainment, as the embryonic form 
of what would be deemed ‘pop culture’ began to take shape.  
  
As technological developments allowed works of art to reach a much wider audience than 
ever anticipated, a new problem emerged.  For the privileged few, an appreciation of the 
‘enigmaticalness’ of a work had been largely nurtured from youth, however suddenly 
there was a substantially increased audience (or potential audience) that had little or no 
notion of this ‘enigmaticalness’.  The issue of a ‘correct’ way of appreciating a work of art 
- which had previously been the concern mainly of the philosophers of aesthetics and art 
historians, was now a matter of public interest (and is discussed further in chapter three).  
With this came an increased need (and demand) for guidance and explanation to assist 
the uninitiated in their efforts to participate in culture, and consequently to better appear 
‘cultured’.  For Adorno and Horkheimer: 
 
The work of art, by completely assimilating itself to need, deceitfully deprives men 
of precisely that liberation from the principle of utility which it should inaugurate.  
What might be called use value in the reception of cultural commodities is 
replaced by exchange value; in place of enjoyment there are gallery-visiting and 
factual knowledge:  The prestige seeker replaces the connoisseur.52     
     
Adorno lamented the process of deaestheticisation that changed the production and 
consumption of artworks in such a way as to conceal the enigmaticalness of works 
beneath utilitarian purposes as objects of mere cultural education.  Walter Benjamin, 
however, was more optimistic about the potential such a dramatic change could bring.  
For him the decline in the “authority of the object”, and with it the ‘cult value’ of works of 
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art, cleared the path for art to occupy a new role and value.  When Benjamin says “the 
greatly increased mass of participants has produced a change in the mode of 
participation”, he does not see this negatively, but instead emphasises that what both he 
and Adorno were discussing constituted the beginning of this new mode of participation, 
and as such, it would take time for society to adjust.53   
 
The different receptions given to this new technology by Adorno and Benjamin occurred 
at a point in history where the political climate had pushed the utilisation of such 
technology to its most extreme limits.  The world was in a state of confusion and 
uncertainty.  Susan Buck-Morss reminds us that: “It must be recalled that for Benjamin as 
for Adorno, truth was relative to the historical present.  This means that Benjamin’s 
interpretation of the dialectical development of art was a construction of the past as it 
formed a constellation within existing conditions.”54  This observation is of particular 
relevance to the preservation and subsequent use made of supplementary material by 
galleries and museums, where decisions to persevere with, or return to, such material in 
display settings carries with it the influence of the values of the time – values that can 
become crystallised in the permanence of the museum setting. 
 
Both Adorno and Benjamin were sensitive to the shifting values brought about by the 
new technology, having witnessed the initial waves of change becoming incorporated for 
increasingly politicised ends.  Whilst to an extent both Adorno and Benjamin recognised 
the ‘magical’ and ritualistic role of the earliest works of art, the apparent echoes of this 
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function were interpreted in different ways.  Adorno felt that the enigmaticalness of 
ritualistic works was a property that was not born out of the ‘cult’ value and left lingering 
as a trace in works that later shed any semblance of outwardly ceremonial purposes.  
Instead, it was a characteristic of the work of art that made it so suitable for the task of 
evoking the otherworldly and spiritual.  In other words, the enigmaticalness came before 
the ‘cult value’ of the earliest works rather than being a necessarily associated product of 
it.  It is the enigmaticalness of the work that makes a work ‘work’.  It does not require a 
religious or ritualistic value (or even an echo of this) in order to do this.    
 
For Adorno, this would ultimately cause the developments in mechanical reproduction to 
have a severe effect on this character of art.  Adorno argues that “If one is within the 
artwork, if one participates in its immanent completion, this enigmaticalness makes itself 
invisible; if one steps outside the work, breaking the contract with its immanent context, 
this enigmaticalness returns like a spirit.”55  Here, Adorno highlights the way in which the 
enigmatic existence and character of the work - that causes a spectator to become ‘lost’ 
in the suspension of functional and tangible reality – is made apparent by any attempts to 
understand a work, thereby banishing any possibility of ‘genuinely’ experiencing it.   
   
With the technological developments that brought art into the sphere of mass exposure 
came, as I have touched upon, an interest in understanding such works, due to the 
majority of the ‘new audience’ being ill equipped to experience them without some 
scepticism and hesitation, and therefore requiring not simply guidance, but convincing.  
However, Adorno summarises the problem of such a task: 
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It is impossible to explain art to those who have no feeling for it; they are not able 
to bring an intellectual understanding of it into their living experience.  For them 
the reality principle is such an obsession that it places a taboo on aesthetic 
comportment as a whole; incited by the cultural approbation of art, alienness to 
art often changes into aggression, not the least of the causes of the contemporary 
deatheticisation of art.56 
 
Whilst Adorno sought to detail the destructive effects of deaestheticisation that (for him) 
caused works of art to be reduced to the status of mere problems or question marks at 
the expense of an ‘appropriate’ experience, Benjamin looked upon the developments 
from another perspective.  
  
Benjamin anticipated an inevitable demise of aura, and with it the last vestiges of ‘cult 
value’.  The ‘authentic’ work – defined by its presence in space and time (and 
consequently its historical existence) was in the process of losing its authority, as 
technical reproducibility bypassed the limitations of traditional works in favour of a more 
intimate proximity.  Benjamin outlines an important factor in the traditional relationship 
between an audience and a work of art:  “Distance is the opposite of closeness.  The 
essentially distant object is the unapproachable one.  Unapproachability is indeed a major 
quality of the cult image.  True to its nature, it remains distant, however close it may 
be.”57        
      
This distance was increasingly dissolved by the multiplicity and subsequent availability of 
the work through reproductions.  The experiencing of a work that had historically been 
governed by its physical presence – shaped by the significance of its context and 
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persisting existence (and consequently its particular attributed value in the hands of its 
preservers) - was transformed.  It was no longer even necessary for a work to exist in 
order for it to be seen.  However, what was being seen was for Benjamin something 
altogether new.  Benjamin explains that:  
 
The technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain 
of tradition.  By making many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for 
a unique existence.  And in permitting the reproduction to meet the beholder or 
listener in his own particular situation, it reactivates the object reproduced.58  
 
This ‘reactivation’ occurs free of any reliance upon the continuing existence of the 
‘original’ work.  The ‘original’ may or may not exist, but it in no way dictates the 
experiencing of the copy.  The formal properties of the ‘original’ work of art in question 
are partially replicated in the copy, with the size, weight and texture of the original (in 
painting), and both volume and depth (in music) for the most part missing.  In the case of 
size, the dimensions of a painting could easily be replicated, but for the sake of 
pragmatism (namely, easy distribution) it is usually reduced.  In the case of weight and 
texture, these physical properties would remain beyond the abilities of mechanical 
reproduction.  Already it can be seen that a copy jettisons particular properties that 
remain attached to the presence of the original, and as such it indicates a reduction of a 
work to its most transmittable qualities (a point that will be returned to in chapter Six).  It 
is therefore only these transmittable qualities of the original that forms a significant part 
of the experience to be had by the beholder or listener of the copy.  The authority of the 
original is undermined by the act of taking that part of it which is deemed most 
significant, whilst leaving other aspects of it aside.  It is as if the process of reproduction 
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highlights the ‘insignificance’ of aspects of an original work, and by attaching the isolated 
‘significant’ properties to new qualities such as durability and transmittability, the 
authority of the original is surpassed. 
 
Furthermore, the copy is experienced by its audience in their “own particular situation”, 
and it is these new contexts the work is thrown into that most drastically ‘reactivate’ the 
reproduced work.  No longer fixed to the location and context of an original work, the 
reproduction is free to be experienced in any number of particular environments.  The 
‘cult value’ is nullified by a reduction of the distance that is engendered by the presence 
of the original work within its particular location.  For Benjamin, the distance between the 
work of art and the viewer is never greater than when the latter is confronted with the 
material existence of the former.  It is raised on a pedestal, placed out of reach even 
when within touching distance.     
 
The original work’s object-value is highlighted by additional aspects such as the number 
of viewers, the presence of security, the protective frame, the surrounding works, and the 
very design of the room within which it is displayed.  In the case of supplementary 
material, its inclusion serves both an educational and symbolic value, as that which 
appears to reinforce the authority of the work it supplements.  In this catalogue of 
additional content that informs such an experience of art, Derrida’s notion of the 
parergon is at its most evident.  It is also here where the divergence of opinion between 
Benjamin’s and Adorno’s approach can begin to be more clearly delineated.  Adorno 
writes: 
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Conceived non-dialectically the theory of aura lends itself to misuse.  It becomes a 
slogan for the deaestheticisation of art that is under way in the age of the 
technical reproducibility of the artwork.  Aura is not – as Benjamin claimed – the 
here and now of the artwork, it is whatever goes beyond its factual givenness, its 
content; one cannot abolish it and still want art.  Even demystified artworks are 
more than what is literally the case.59 
 
For Adorno, that which “goes beyond (the artwork’s) factual givenness” is pivotal in 
experiencing it.  It is also an important acknowledgement (one that is of pertinence for 
chapter six) that aspects of what goes beyond an artwork’s content is also essential for 
making art possible.  Having criticised the processes of deaestheticisation at work in the 
displaying of works alongside supporting material, Adorno’s statement affirms the 
essential role played by that which extends the art experience beyond the work’s “factual 
givenness” and towards its content.  This will be shown to have significance for my 
interpretation of the use of supplementary material in museums and galleries (and for 
contemporary discussions of such uses), where the value of such material is not reduced 
to historical and educational use alone.      
 
For Benjamin, auratic works (with all the mechanisms of preservation and veneration 
involved in maintaining them) become, in the wake of technological reproducibility, 
anachronisms that look to defy historical developments of cultures, styles, tastes, and 
values.  Caygill explains:  
 
The auratic work of art which pretends to be immune to the passage of time is in 
truth only a particular way of negotiating finitude, that is, by denying it.  Such 
works, as monumental, literally refuse their future, since time is arrested in their 
claims to uniqueness and duration.60 
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Rather than constituting a clean break with auratic work, the developments of technical 
reproducibility in art during the early to mid-Twentieth Century produced two new 
notions – those of the authentic original, and multiple copies.  The tension between these 
two poles would (and continues to) divide interpretations of value, display, and the 
production of art itself.  The effect of technical reproducibility upon the cultural relevance 
of the authentic original is critical to understanding the use and evaluation of 
supplementarity, and will be explored in more detail throughout this thesis. 
 
Aura, the ‘original’, deaestheticisation, and enigmaticalness are identified in this section 
as key concerns for the thesis as a whole, wherein the importance of biography, the 
model and copy, educational processes, and the ‘mystifying’ qualities of artworks, have 
implications for all four case studies.  These notions and concepts are addressed directly 
in chapter five, in the case study of Bacon’s relocated studio. 
 
Deleuze, Derrida, and Plato 
 
Both Deleuze and Derrida would appear, on the surface, to have many similarities.  Both 
were born around the same time, and lived in or around Paris for a similar period (Derrida 
1930-2004; Deleuze 1925-1995); both knew each other during their academic training; 
both were broadly associated with the Post-Structuralist movement of philosophy; both 
made their mark on the philosophical ‘scene’ in the late 1960s; and both could be loosely 
described as thinkers concerned with the notion of ‘difference’ as a neglected concept.  It 
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is a mark of the widespread acknowledgement of the proximity of their approaches that 
Leonard Lawlor, in ‘The Beginning of Thought: The Fundamental Experience in Derrida 
and Deleuze’, explores the subtle but significant ways in which they could be 
distinguished from one another.  Lawlor describes their shared starting point:  
 
Although both Derrida and Deleuze will abandon later the idea of the simulacrum 
that they developed in the Sixties, it functions as their point of diffraction.  In most 
general terms, the simulacrum is a repetition, and image, that has no model or 
original.  Since the idea of the simulacrum consisted in lacking an original, both 
Derrida and Deleuze could use it in their project of reversing Platonism.  For both, 
reversing Platonism consists in destroying the hierarchy of the image and 
original.61        
 
This reversal of Platonism is discussed in chapter four, however an outline of Plato’s views 
on art and artists is necessary to support that section.  Plato criticises the illusory qualities 
of poetry and painting which obscure the activity of the rational mind to understand the 
world, but also encouraged distorted emotional responses and unrealistic desires.  Such 
was Plato’s conviction that poetry and painting were corrosive influences that in his 
proposed ideal society they would be forbidden.62  In order to account for the most 
intelligent and insightful works of poetry, Plato formulated his theory of ‘inspiration’, 
whereby poets were mere instruments through which gods would communicate, thus 
downplaying the contribution of the individual poets themselves.  Within Plato’s 
hierarchical ordering of human occupations, poets and artisans were allotted a lowly 
status.  As one of the most important intellectual figures in history, it is difficult to 
overstate the influence Plato had on subsequent thinking and notions of art and culture.  
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As such, his negative assessment of individual ‘creativity’ dominated Western attitudes 
towards artists for centuries. 
 
Deleuze and Derrida’s re-interpretations of Plato’s philosophy of identity is important for 
this thesis due to the ways in which their distinct approaches engage with, and open up, 
historically established methods of hierarchical classification.  In chapter four, Deleuze’s 
approach allows predominant attitudes towards the classification of works produced by 
artists (including conventionally defined supporting material) to be clarified and 
questioned.  In chapter six, Derrida’s exploration of ambiguities and slippage of both 
meaning and use in apparently distinguished areas of art and supplementarity, enables an 
analysis and questioning of such distinctions that can take place within the creative 
process itself, and how the same established methods of hierarchical classification, 
alluded to above, accommodate or resist such problematic ways of working.         
 
Deleuze 
 
Deleuze, alone and with the psychoanalyst Félix Guattari, developed a complex form of 
philosophy that can be generally described as affirming the notion of difference itself.  
This philosophy of affirmation rejected the solidifying of structures (including those found 
in notions of identity, representation, psychoanalysis, and art) that would form 
apparently closed systems of meaning and value, in favour of an open-ended series of 
interconnecting ‘intensities’ of experience (whether physical, mental, imaginary, etc.).  As 
with Derrida, there is a resistance to the permanence of meaning in Deleuze’s thought 
that acts as a dynamic ‘method’ of engaging with, and evaluating (in a fluid, temporal 
61 
 
manner) the world and the structures that exist within it.  As such, it is all too easy to 
become caught up in the array of colourful terminology populated with desiring-
machines, bodies without organs, and lines of flight.  However, this is not to say that 
Deleuze (as well as Guattari) was not highly systematic and thorough in his/their 
approach, where beneath the variety of terms and phrases lies an extremely developed 
logic (even when it is a logic of the illogical) that encounters and re-evaluates the entire 
history of philosophy itself.  Nevertheless, it is important, precisely due to the scale of the 
concepts they deploy, to remain clear in my selection and application of their ideas within 
the context of this investigation.  The significance of Deleuze for this thesis will be the 
ways in which his notion of works of art as ‘signs’ and his theory of the simulacrum 
provide a new way of understanding both the status of, and historical forms of 
hierarchically classifying, supplementary material.    
 
Deleuze, writing in 1969, outlines his views on a notion of modern art that is irreducible 
to a single system or theory, whilst at the same time confronting the Kantian model of 
aesthetics: 
 
Aesthetics suffers from a wrenching duality.  On the one hand, it designates the 
theory of sensibility as the form of possible experience; on the other hand, it 
designates the theory of art as the reflection of real experience.  For these two 
meanings to be tied together the conditions of experience in general must be 
conditions of real experience; in this case, the work would really appear as 
experimentation.  We know, for example, that certain literary procedures (the 
same holds for other arts) permit several stories to be told at once.  This is, 
without doubt, the essential characteristic of the modern work of art.  It is not at 
all a question of different points of view on one story supposedly the same; for 
points of view would still be submitted to a rule of convergence.  It is rather a 
question of different and divergent stories, as if an absolutely distinct landscape 
corresponded to each point of view.63     
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To expand on this briefly, Deleuze returns to two forms of sensation defined by Plato.  On 
one hand, there is the object of unproblematic recognition (Plato uses the example of a 
finger).  It provokes no further thought when considered in isolation.  On the other hand, 
Plato considers all its fingers together, in terms of size, weight, solidity, etc.  The 
distinctive properties and their combinations must, for Plato, be questioned and thought, 
and thus such a sensation becomes that of the intelligible realm (as that which is thought-
provoking) rather than remaining purely in the visible realm as unproblematic 
recognition.64  Deleuze recognises in Kant a correlation between Plato’s recognition and 
identification of objects in general, and Kant’s corresponding formulation of common 
sense, in which the I think of the subject is the harmonious unity of the faculties of 
consciousness that at the same time recognises the object.  Deleuze relates this to what 
he calls the image of thought; a classical approach to thinking consistently preoccupied 
with specific notions of identity.  Whilst it is not practical to carry out a full explanation 
here, it should be noted that within the image of thought, and in Kant’s formulation of it 
in particular, thinking becomes subordinated to representation, with Deleuze describing 
the key ways in which representation was defined: “Identity with regard to concepts, 
opposition with regard to the determination of concepts, analogy with regard to 
judgement, resemblance with regard to objects.”65 
 
Deleuze also drew a correlation between the second form of sensation described by 
Plato, that which puzzles and provokes thought, and the brief moment in Kant’s Critique 
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of Judgement where Kant details the confrontation between the faculty of the 
imagination, and the sublime – in which a sensation is so overwhelming, no 
representation of it is possible.  As Daniel W. Smith explains:  
 
In confronting its own limit, the imagination at the same time goes beyond this 
limit, albeit in a negative way, by representing to itself the inaccessibility of this 
rational Idea.  It presents to itself the fact that the unrepresentable exists, and 
that it exists in sensible nature.  From the empirical point of view, this limit is 
inaccessible and unimaginable; but from a transcendental point of view, it is that 
which can only be imagined, that which is accessible only to the imagination in its 
transcendental exercise.66  
 
Between Plato’s ‘thought-provoking’ sensations, and Kant’s ‘unrepresentable’ sensations, 
Deleuze designates what he calls signs.  The ‘sign’ can be understood in general terms as 
that which poses a problem or puzzle for thought, and that which (crucially) is only 
capable of being sensed.  Here Deleuze understands signs (as sensations), as consisting of 
intensities (that can only be sensed), and which are intensities inasmuch as they are 
different in kind to one another.  Difference is therefore the being of the sensible itself.67  
In this way, Deleuze creates the concept of the virtual, as that field of unrepresentable 
differences that can only be sensed, and not thought.  As these differences are combined 
into intensities and subsequently ordered, homogenised and cancelled out in our 
experience, they appear as qualities that become empirically graspable, and, as Deleuze 
puts it, become actualised.  This actualisation of the virtual constitutes the condition of 
experience.  In contrast to the classical ‘image of thought’, identity, opposition, analogy, 
and resemblance, do not form the condition of experience, but are merely derived from 
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it.  The importance of Deleuze’s concepts of the virtual, and ‘signs’ for a re-interpretation 
of the value of works-for-art, will be discussed in more detail in chapter four. 
 
Deleuze determines a notion of thought without image, and is able to reject both the 
Platonist understanding of art as mere imitation, and the Kantian notion of art as a 
reflection upon a representation – both of which rely upon understandings of 
resemblance in art.  Instead, Deleuze puts forward the claim of an aesthetics that, if it is 
to be understood correctly, finds its compositional conditions united with the conditions 
of real experience - as issuing forth from sensation.  However, art not only issues forth 
from sensation, but crucially, produces sensation itself.  As Deleuze and Guattari would 
later argue, “the work of art is a being of sensation and nothing else”.68  Art creates a sign 
that perplexes thought and can only be sensed.  Smith explains that “the work of art, as a 
compound of sensations, is not a unification or totalisation of differences, but rather the 
production of a new difference”.69   
 
Art for both Deleuze and Guattari is not reducible to a theory or system, and they are 
explicit on this point – “In no way do we believe in a fine-arts system; we believe in very 
diverse problems whose solutions are found in heterogeneous arts.  To us, Art is a fake 
concept, a solely nominal concept.”70  As expressed throughout their works, the question 
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posed of any composition or combination of disparate elements is not ‘what does it 
mean?’, but “how does it work?”71  
 
This “how does it work?” constitutes the point of departure for my own application of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas of art to that of the issue of the classification of 
supplementarity.  In chapter four I will develop this notion of the virtual, and in particular 
Deleuze’s distinctive re-interpretation of the Platonic concept of the simulacrum, in order 
to engage with the relationship between supplementarity and hierarchical systems.  
These hierarchical systems will be addressed in terms of the traditional, dominant ‘image 
of thought’ that has dictated the ways in which supplementarity in art has been 
commonly organised and interpreted, whilst establishing the implications for 
supplementarity when the fundamental principles of this approach are challenged and 
undermined.    
 
Derrida 
 
Derrida states that: “One of the gestures of deconstruction is not to naturalise what isn’t 
natural, to not assume that what is conditioned by history, institutions, or society is 
natural.”72  This comment indicates that the “gestures of deconstruction” are not 
established beforehand as some unified whole.   
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The specific gesture of deconstruction is not determined beforehand in any given 
situation, but can only be made in the moment of engagement with that which it de-
constructs.  Derrida chose this word in order to emphasise its multi-faceted use as that 
which simultaneously destructs that which it constructs – and conversely a destruction 
that is constructive.  In its most generalised use, deconstruction has become a popular by-
word for theoretical approaches that expose the fallacy of certainty in a text (of any sort), 
and also of showing that a text in and of itself is unable to contain any meaning, with this 
instead being a construct formed between the text and the one who engages with it, 
within a context of other texts (such as historical, institutional, cultural and societal).  As 
such, the very movement of deconstruction is one that constantly undermines itself, with 
Derrida saying that “the enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to 
its own work”.73  Exposing the very framework of that which carries out the exposition, 
deconstruction is always in a precarious situation of its own making. 
 
With this in mind, it can be better understood why there is an inevitable sense of 
uncertainty in Derrida’s discussions of given topics.  It is a necessary uncertainty that is 
consistent with the very inconsistency of that which Derrida is deconstructing.  This 
approach is apparent in his 1994 lecture (and subsequent book) Archive Fever, in which 
his discussion, taking place at the Freud Museum in London, turns on the meaning of the 
museum itself, as well as a notion of the archive as it is understood not in terms of the 
past, but of the play of forces that govern the act of archiving.  The relevance of the 
archive for this discussion of supplementarity is pivotal, with the main themes of the 
thesis ultimately relating back to the issues of selection and preservation.  Therefore it is 
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important to include this brief discussion prior to a more extended exploration of some of 
Derrida’s idea later in the thesis.   
 
In a very real sense, any work of art that is preserved is essentially archived; all the more 
so if it is preserved within a public institution such as a gallery or museum.  The contents 
of the archive imply decisions of selection, rejection, categorisation, and function, along 
with all the events that inform those choices (and who choose).  As shall be seen in the 
four case studies, supplementary material exists in a variety of forms that can be loosely 
determined as preliminary, preparatory, biographical, and historical.  In all those forms 
their availability for use as supplementary material requires processes of initial and 
continual preservation.  Derrida situates the act of archiving not only in the present (as 
that which determines the archive), but in a particular relationship between the present 
and the future: 
 
In an enigmatic sense, which will clarify itself perhaps (perhaps, because nothing 
should be sure here, for essential reasons), the question of the archive is not, we 
repeat, a question of the past.  It is not the question of the concept dealing with 
the past that might already be at our disposal, an archivable concept of the 
archive.  It is a question of the future, the question of the future itself, the 
question of a response, of a promise and a responsibility for tomorrow.  The 
archive: if we want to know what that will have meant, we will only know in times 
to come.  Perhaps.  Not tomorrow but in times to come, later on or perhaps 
never.74          
 
 
There is here an echo of Heidegger’s understanding of the preserved and the forgotten, 
where the truly forgotten is precisely that which cannot be recalled or encountered.  The 
archive becomes the promise of a history for the future.  Carolyn Steedman observes 
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that: “In Derrida’s description, the arkhe – the archive – appears to represent the now of 
whatever kind of power is being exercised, anywhere, in any place or time.”75  It is both 
the represented now of the moment of archiving, and in a very real sense also the 
represented now of its continued archiving.  The meticulously maintained maquettes at 
Henry Moore’s former studio at Perry Green, the extensively catalogued collection of 
Sant’Elia’s drawings and sketches in Como, the comprehensive database of debris from 
Francis Bacon’s studio at the Hugh Lane in Dublin, and the ongoing digitisation of Artaud’s 
notebooks in the Bibliothèque nationale de France in Paris all represent, in quite 
distinctive ways, power being exercised in an historical now that initiated such archiving.  
In addition to this, they also represent the now of their continued preservation, where 
“what this will have meant” awaits a (potential) future present.    
 
The importance of a close scrutiny, not only of this or that body of supplementary 
material, but of the particular power relations, motivations, and underlying constructions 
of value involved, becomes imperative for understanding the complexities of varying 
points of divergence and convergence necessary in forming a theory of the 
supplementary.  Two ways in which Derrida explores such issues are to be found in his 
work on the ‘subjectile’ (a term used by Antonin Artaud), and the related notion of the 
parergon (a term developed from Kant’s own discussion of ornamentation in relation to a 
work of art).  Between these two terms, Derrida establishes an approach to art and the 
creative process that is continuously confronting established limits, definitions, standards, 
and systems of both expression and interpretation.  The ramifications of this 
confrontation for supplementarity consist of a challenge to accepted orderings of such 
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material in ways that allow for a more in-depth analysis of the subtle (and often 
ambiguous) distinctions between various forms of creative production, and their 
subsequent division into categories and orders of significance.  It is within this 
‘framework’ that I will make use of Derrida’s concepts and arguments.  The significance of 
Derrida’s work on the ‘subjectile’ and the ‘parergon’ will be important for re-evaluating 
the permeable borders and interrelating layers of meanings that exist between and within 
works of art, supporting material, the mythologising of personality, and mechanisms of 
institutionalisation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to show that supplementarity has been, directly and 
indirectly, intertwined with the historical philosophy of art, whilst introducing the 
concepts of most importance for the intentions of this thesis.  This chapter opened with a 
discussion of Kant, who was responsible for theorising a new way of experiencing art that 
continues to be influential.  Kant begins the philosophical consideration of 
supplementarity through his observations on ornamentation and parerga.   
 
Schopenhauer offers the first major philosophical argument for overturning traditional 
approaches to the classification of supplementary material, by asserting that the works 
produced in the early stages of the creative process are superior in value to complete 
works, due to their closeness in time to the moment of creative inspiration.  The 
complete work is in turn chastised as a compromise and appeal to taste and the art 
market. 
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Heidegger’s distinct approach to art and equipment is discussed in detail in order to 
prepare the ground for the analysis and interpretation of Heidegger’s notion of causality 
in chapter three.  I will argue that certain works-for-art such as sketches and maquettes, 
when considered in relation to Heidegger’s framework of causality, can be revealed to 
share qualities of being both artwork and equipment, despite Heidegger placing these 
two forms of ‘work’ in opposition to one another.  Heidegger’s concepts of truth as 
unconcealment, equipment as concealed ‘readiness-to-hand’, preservation and oblivion, 
and causality, will be invaluable for revealing the problematic and fluctuating status of 
works-for-art and other forms of supplementarity. 
 
The section on Benjamin and Adorno also goes into detail due to the implications their 
concepts and ideas have for all areas of this thesis.  In particular, aura, the ‘original’, 
deaestheticisation, and enigmaticalness, are all important issues that concern the 
different ways in which supplementary material has been archived, discussed, employed 
as educational devices, and displayed in specific contexts in relation to complete works of 
art.  Technological developments, changes to creative practice, and approaches to the 
marketing and displaying of works of art, are all shown to respond to one another in ways 
that have implications for the experience of works of art, and for supplementarity. 
 
The discussion of Deleuze and Derrida reveals the importance of their rejection of Plato’s 
philosophy of representation, which, in different ways, they identify as having a powerful, 
but restrictive influence on Western society that continues to the modern day.  The 
analysis of Deleuze’s concept of the ‘sign’, and his re-interpretation of Plato’s concept of 
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simulacra, will be valuable for forming a framework within which to consider the 
‘location’ and classification of art and supplementarity in chapter four.  Derrida’s 
philosophical analysis of the nature of the archive is addressed, which whilst not being 
directly discussed in any of the four case studies, is revealed to be an important 
underlying concern of the thesis as a whole, wherein the supplement is heavily 
dependent upon the value judgements of the past that allow specific material to be 
archived at all.  Derrida’s interpretation of Kant’s concept of parerga, and Artaud’s use of 
the term ‘subjectile’ (both pivotal for the discussion in chapter six), are also introduced 
here, where their significance as concentrated studies of dissolving distinctions between 
artwork, support, process, and institutionalisation, is asserted.                      
 
As distinct but important parts of much wider philosophical projects, the concepts and 
ideas of the thinkers outlined above cannot be made to fit together seamlessly without 
encountering numerous conflictions and contradictions.  Instead, the concepts discussed 
in this chapter are carefully employed over the course of this thesis in order to open up 
specific, problematic, and productive areas of supplementarity so as to arrive at a 
detailed theory of this important, yet under-developed area of study.   
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Chapter Two:  The Supplement in Art History 
 
 
This chapter provides a complementary historical perspective to the philosophical 
debates discussed in the previous chapter.  The purpose of this chapter is to indicate the 
key events in art history where supplementarity is directly or indirectly involved, and to 
show how its role and importance for art has fluctuated and become established as a 
major consideration for the creation, interpretation, and experience of art.  The chapter 
begins with an overview of historical events that have shaped the concept of 
supplementarity.  This is followed by sections that explore the categories of 
‘interpretation and display’, ‘the production of value’, and ‘technology, equipment and 
the supplement’.  These categories explore the impact of supplementarity in art history, 
through detailed discussions of specific examples. 
 
Historical Overview of the Supplement 
 
The ‘birth’ of supplementarity can be located in the work of Phidias (480 – 430 BC), who 
acquired a considerable reputation as a sculptor and painter.  This reputation allowed 
Phidias to become one of the first known examples of an artisan who was able to create a 
body of work through developing his own practice.76  As well as being one of the earliest 
examples of an artisan being appreciated and celebrated in their own right, thus enjoying 
the status normally associated with the figure of the ‘artist’, Phidias was responsible for 
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producing what could be classified as the earliest supplementary material to later be 
recognised and revered for its own sake. 
 
In the 1950s, archaeologists excavated a site believed to be the location of Phidias’ 
workshop, and discovered various artefacts such as moulds and tools, as well as a wine 
glass with an inscription that identified it as belonging to Phidias.77  Because the vast 
majority of ancient Greek art, including Phidias’ most famous work, the Statue of Zeus, 
have been lost, these moulds and tools took on immense historical significance despite 
their merely functional origins.  Indeed, these moulds survived because of their lack of 
value or significance which led to them being buried in the first place.  The moulds now 
constitute the only tangible evidence of an artisan whose work has since attained 
legendary status, and are now presented under glass in the Pergamon Museum in Berlin, 
along with detailed written explanations of their significance. 
 
A key moment of change in the role and significance of the artist occurred during the 
Renaissance.  Catherine King notes how Giovanni Villani’s writing on famous Florentines, 
in the Fourteenth Century work, New Chronicles, included a biography of the artist Giotto, 
an indication that the artist was beginning to be considered of sufficient interest and 
status to be ranked alongside other ‘famous’ figures in Florentine society. 
 
Within a century, artists’ reputations for producing high quality works began to be an 
important consideration, with King stating that:  “Fifteenth-Century contracts for 
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commissions increasingly show patrons insisting that they were paying for the personal 
skills of an individual artist rather than merely expensive and showy pigments and gold 
leaf.”78 
  
The culmination of this new perception of the role of the artist and its concomitant 
conception that art had a history came in Giorgio Vasari’s The Lives of the Most Excellent 
Italian Painters, Sculptors, and Architects, from Cimabue to Our Times, which was first 
published in 1550.79  Generally accepted as the first encyclopaedia of artists, The Lives 
charted developments in Italian art history from the Thirteenth to the mid-Sixteenth 
Century, focusing upon the individual qualities of each artist, and the validity or 
shortcomings of their particular methods for furthering the progress of Italian art.   
 
Developments in technology at this time allowed work to be distributed on a larger scale.  
Paul Wood writes of how Albrecht Dürer’s work and reputation benefited from the 
technology that allowed him to make numerous prints from woodcuts: “Mechanical 
reproducibility was central to Dürer’s practice as an artist.  Wide distribution on both 
sides of the Alps fostered both his fame and his commercial success.”80   
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By the Seventeenth Century, the Protestant Reformation was sweeping through Europe, 
and this had a profound, if unintentional, effect on the social role art would play.  Kim 
Woods, referring particularly to one of the centres of commercial art trade – Haarlem - 
explains how: “The Protestant Reformation saw the demise of religious sculpture.  Many 
Protestant reformers regarded images as at best inessential and at worst idolatrous.”81 
The result was to quickly create a large group of skilled artists who had now lost their 
most significant source of trade, leaving few options other than to make smaller, 
inexpensive works, and to rely on private patronage.  This marked an important change to 
the work of art later discussed by Walter Benjamin (and explored in chapter one), where 
‘cult-value’ started to be replaced by ‘exhibition-value’. 
 
As ‘exhibition-value’ became more popular in the Eighteenth Century, the art market 
grew considerably.  The notion of ‘old masters’ appeared, and with it came a hierarchical 
ordering of works deemed to be of greater or lesser value.  For the art dealers and 
collectors of the Eighteenth Century, it was vital to have an understanding of which works 
could be attributed to which artists.  Barker asserts that: “Instead of assuming that the 
beauty of a particular painting was what mattered most, the art market foregrounded 
attribution as its principal concern.”82  It was at this stage that the ‘hand’ of the artist 
began to become all-important to those with a financial interest in fine arts, opening the 
way for the importance of biographical and historical association that continues to 
dominate uses of supplementary material in gallery and museum displays. 
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The art market was also beginning to become more influential in establishing reputations 
by emphasising unique qualities in works that brought the attentions of collectors to their 
individuality, where collectors would have the opportunities to distinguish themselves 
from others.  Barker explains that: “In the late Eighteenth Century, art dealers started to 
realise that buyers could be attracted not just by famous names but also by the special 
cachet of rarity and unfamiliarity.”83 The limited output of an artist was now being turned 
into a virtue in which the very exiguity of the work need not hinder the establishment of 
an artist’s reputation.  This foreshadows the commodification of supplementary material 
that was to come, where archived material not recognised as complete works would be 
promoted for their novelty.   
 
In The Author, Art, and the Market: Rereading the History of Aesthetics (1994), Martha 
Woodmansee traces the historical developments that affected the meaning and value of 
art itself that took place in the Eighteenth Century.84  Woodmansee discusses Abbé 
Charles Battaux’s treatise ‘The Fine Arts Reduced to a Common Principle’ (1746), Moses 
Mendelssohn’s essay ‘Reflections on the Sources and Relations of the Fine Arts and 
Letters’ (1757), and, in particular, Karl Philipp Moritz’s essay ‘Toward a Unification of All 
the Fine Arts and Letters under the Concept of Self-Sufficiency’ (1785).  These works 
introduced a new approach to artists and their works, emphasising the individual genius 
of artists and the special nature of the greatest works of art that, as discussed in chapter 
one, would become an important influence on Kant’s Critique of Judgement. 
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Towards the end of the Eighteenth Century another major development occurred in art 
history – the first public museums displaying works of art began to appear.  Arguably the 
most important public art museum to emerge during this period was the Louvre in 1793.  
Gradually, other countries would follow this example.  By making works of art available to 
the public in this way, the cultural status of artists and their works would considerably 
increase, and with it an interest in the artists themselves.   
 
Romanticism saw a defining shift towards individuality and originality.  Kant’s ‘genius’ 
artist, gifted by nature with intangible and indefinable skills, began to become an 
increasingly popular view.  The expensive deals involving works of ‘old masters’ altered 
the potential social status of artists, and in the Romantic era of liberated individualism, 
artists were encouraged to give free reign to their imaginations.  As Barker, Webb, and 
Woods argue, in their collaborative introduction to The Changing Status of the Artist:  “It 
was only around 1800 that the emphasis shifted decisively away from the skill of the 
painter or sculptor to the exceptional personality of the creative artist.  It has since been 
popularised in countless biographies, novels, and films.”85  During this period, the 
distinctions between biography and mythology began to blur. 
 
Linda Walsh sites the work of the Goncourt Brothers, French Eighteenth Century Painters 
(1859-1875), as an important moment in a shift of writing on art towards retrospectively 
applying the prevailing concerns of Romanticism to ‘mythologise’ the lives of artists of the 
past, concentrating on the example of their description of Jean-Antoine Watteau that 
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characterised him as a tragic and melancholic artist, ushering in the ‘cult of personality’ or 
the biographical.  This approach served to build an image not only of the artist 
themselves, but to deploy such characterisation as a method of gaining insights into their 
works.  Walsh states that: “with such attitudes in mind the exploration of an artist’s life 
and feelings became viewed as a legitimate way of deriving meaning from and attributing 
status to his or her works of art”.86  With written works such as those of the Goncourt 
Brothers, ‘outside’ factors such as the events and emotions of the individual lives of 
artists started to be utilised in order to supplement the work itself.   
 
The Nineteenth Century saw the image of the ‘tragic’ artist become widespread.  Paul 
Wood, in his study of Dürer, charts the origins of this characterisation of the artist back to 
the Fifteenth Century, with the artist beginning to be portrayed as being both introverted 
and melancholy, where: “at the extremity of self-consciousness is the recognition of one’s 
own mortality”.87  Wood, aware of the strength this image of the artist still retains, is 
careful to point out that “this notion of eccentricity has become so overworked in the 
modern period that the portrayal of the misunderstood artist, forced into 
incomprehensibility by a creative urge he barely controls, has descended into cliché”.88  
Such ‘characterisation’ has particular resonance for the chapters on Sant’Elia (the tragic 
‘heroic’ death), Bacon (the ‘chaos’ of the creative process), and Artaud (the ‘insane 
genius’).   
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In 1871, one of the earliest reconstructions of an artist’s dwellings took place in 
Nuremberg, when the house that Dürer lived in from 1509 to 1528 was converted into a 
museum almost 350 years after his death.  With no surviving furnishings the artist, 
Friedrich Wilhelm Wanderer, was asked to redesign the house in a manner that came 
close to reproducing the appearance it might have had during Dürer’s time there.89  Such 
was the change to the cultural status of artists and their biographical traces that when the 
house occupied by Rembrandt between 1639 and 1656 was reconstructed in 1906, it was 
opened by Queen Wilhelmina.90  These examples represent a dramatic shift towards 
raising the level of an artist to that of an historical (and not just creative) figure, around 
which an entire simulated transportation to another century was produced.  
 
The end of the Nineteenth Century, and early Twentieth Century, saw dramatic changes 
for both approaches to, and forms of, works of art.  The Modernist period led to 
movements such as Dada, Cubism, Futurism, and Surrealism, with each challenging 
conventional approaches to the work of art, whilst artists showed a greater awareness of 
their own techniques and the social role of art.  Technological developments in 
photography and film not only changed the ways in which works of art could be produced 
and defined, but also altered the ways in which works of art could be seen, discussed, and 
by whom.  The changing relationship between art and the public can be seen in the 
reaction to the theft of Leonardo Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa in 1911.  The media attention, 
including photographs of the empty wall space where the Mona Lisa had hung, saw a 
surge in attendance to the Louvre, as the French public clamoured to become involved in 
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this dramatised event.  The empty wall space, the abandoned frame, the photographs, 
newspaper articles, and even Da Vinci’s former home as the site of vigils, would all 
become supplementary material to the missing painting.91 
 
By 1929, New York’s MoMA had opened, inviting the public to take a journey through the 
‘evolution’ of Modernist European painting and sculpture, signalling an increase in 
displaying works of art within an educational context.  By the 1960’s, Conceptual art and 
Process art were pushing the boundaries of what it meant to create works, and 
complicating the manner in which they could be interpreted by critics and the public. 
 
In 1966, American conceptual artist, Mel Bochner, was asked to produce a display of 
drawings for the art history department of the New York School of Visual Arts.  The 
display, ‘Working Drawings and Other Visible Things on Paper Not Necessarily Meant To 
Be Viewed as Art’ (1966), consisted of numerous drawings, musical scores, receipts, and 
other ‘visible things on paper’.   These were gathered from Bochner’s friends, including 
Sol LeWitt, Donald Judd, John Cage, and Dan Flavin, Xeroxed a hundred times, placed in 
notebooks, and then placed on four sculpture plinths.  This is an early example whereby 
conventionally defined supplementary material was re-represented as the focal point of 
an exhibition (emphasised through the use of conventional approaches to displaying 
artworks), rather than as support.  Tony Godfrey argues that this exhibition “has often, 
with good reason, been cited as the first exhibition specifically of Conceptual art.  The 
viewer became a reader, an active participant: as there was no immediately obvious art 
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on show, the readers had to make or deduce the art experience for themselves”.92  Not 
only does this indicate an important moment in the use of supplementary material within 
the history of art, but the notion of viewers becoming readers having to make or deduce 
the art experience is of central importance for chapter five.      
 
Pierre Bourdieu and Alain Darbel, in The Love of Art (1969), explored the implications of 
how museums and galleries addressed the different audiences, analysing the 
backgrounds of gallery-attending demographics and how they engaged with the plethora 
of educational devices (including wall-mounted descriptions, guided tours, leaflets, and 
exhibition catalogues).  The types of works being produced at this time, along with the 
increase in new audiences (often with little education in the history of art) called for this 
discussion of such supplementary approaches to displays.   
 
The problematic nature of the supplement and its relationship to works of art was 
explored in Rosalind E. Krauss’ essay ‘The Originality of the Avant-Garde (1981), in which 
she questioned the legitimacy of the installation of Auguste Rodin’s The Gates of Hell at 
the National Gallery in Washington.93 Cast in 1978, The Gates of Hell made use of Rodin’s 
plasters to create an imagined version of this unfinished work, rendering the plasters 
“potential multiples” without an original.94 Accompanied by a film showing the casting, 
this unashamedly speculative project provoked Krauss to argue that “what is at stake are 
                                                          
92
 Tony Godfrey, Conceptual Art, London: Phaidon Press Limited, 1998, p. 116. 
93
 See Rosalind E. Krauss, ‘The Originality of the Avant-Garde’. In The Originality of the Avant-Garde and 
Other Modernist Myths, London: The MIT Press, 1985, pp. 151-157. 
94
 Ibid, p. 153. 
82 
 
the aesthetic rights of style based on a culture of originals” before declaring the 
temptation to label the work as a “fake”.95  Such themes of originality and casting are 
addressed in the case study of Henry Moore. 
 
Another work from 1981, Janet Wolff’s The Social Production of Art, explored the 
implications of a variety of Marxist theories for understanding the conditions under which 
both artists and their works are produced.  Six years later, Naomi Schor’s Reading in 
Detail: Aesthetics and the Feminine, called attention to the ways ‘the detail’ had been 
historically rendered as supplementary and of lesser concern than the whole, whilst 
aligning the detail with the feminine in a hierarchically ‘lower’ position.  Schor’s writing on 
the detail draws attention to the ways in which interpretations of works of art can be 
dictated and framed by prejudice and entrenched attitudes, which are themes that apply 
to this thesis in its discussions of hierarchy, institutionalisation, and the classification of 
supplementary material.96 
 
Carol Duncan’s Civilizing Rituals: Inside the Public Art Museum (1995) analyses the 
ritualistic nature of experiencing art within museums, highlighting the notion of 
‘liminality’ as the act of entering a space that transforms everyday experience.97  In 1997, 
the National Gallery in London used the transformative effect of the gallery space to 
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emphasise the revelatory nature of supplementary material in their series of ‘Making and 
Meaning’ exhibitions.98  
 
The 1990s also saw two significant technological developments, with the emergence of 
the World Wide Web, and digital technology.  As with the emergence of film and 
photography at the turn of the Twentieth Century, these developments would usher in 
new approaches to the market, theory, production, and archiving of works of art.  Artists 
such as Mark Amerika began to make internet-based works, and collaborative online 
artworks such as ‘The Thing’ (initiated by Wolfgang Staehle) increased in both size and 
popularity.99 Adapting to this new way of engaging with works of art, museums across the 
world started to establish online archives of their works, occasionally with ‘virtual tours’ 
that redefined the experience of ‘seeing’ exhibitions.   
 
The internet and digital technology has important implications for supplementarity.  
Online projects change the manner in which the ‘hand’ of the artist, and the use of 
supporting material, are involved in making works of art, whilst digital technology offers 
new possibilities for digital archiving and re-assessments of archived material.  However, 
as digital archiving has developed, there has often been an increased concern for issues of 
originality, authenticity, and authorship.  The digital archiving website, ‘The Rhizome 
ArtBase’ (1999 to the present), partly named after a philosophical concept of Deleuze and 
Guattari, had originally set out to enable greater interaction, sharing of ideas, and the 
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availability of a wide variety of art projects.100  Whilst these values are maintained, a 
considerable amount of care is now taken to emphasise the importance of the site for 
supporting or backing up (and therefore preserving) art projects, and ensuring that links 
to original websites are available.  As digital conservator for ‘The Rhizome ArtBase’, Ben 
Fino-Radin, states “what began as a web platform for presenting and sharing art works, 
grew into an effort more conscious of preservation and bibliographic practices”.101  As 
with the emergence of reproducible technology, historical concerns for originality and 
authorship are not necessarily usurped by the possibility of availability and multiplication 
(as Benjamin had hoped), but can retain their importance in an industry where 
bibliographic identification and promotion is often necessary for maintaining and 
advancing careers.   
 
In more recent years, the supplement has continued to be a prominent part of art 
production, the art market, and art theory.  In 2009, a preparatory drawing by Raphael, 
‘Head of a Muse’ (1508-1511), sold for £29.2m – a record for a work on paper.  Benjamin 
Peronnet, of Christie’s, describing the importance of the piece, declared that “this truly 
exceptional drawing offers us a glimpse into the working mind of a genius”.102  This 
continues the use of ‘genius’ as a description of artists initiated by Moritz and Kant, and 
further popularised by Romanticism.  In the same year, Briony Fer’s Eva Hesse: 
Studioworks (2009) explored the problems of defining Hesse’s works-for-art, as well as 
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Hesse’s own reassessment of her practice.  Deanna Petherbridge’s The Primacy of 
Drawing: Histories and Theories of Practice (2010) represents a major study of how 
drawing should be considered to be more than a mere support.  The 2010-11 exhibition 
at Tate Britain, ‘Rachel Whiteread Drawings’, was dedicated to the preliminary and 
preparatory works of Whiteread.  In words that echo Peronnet’s comments on an artist 
that lived half a millennium earlier, the Tate website explains that “these collages and 
drawings provide a fascinating and intimate insight into the creative process behind 
Whiteread’s work.  While her sculptures are often large-scale and involve a team of 
fabricators, these paper works provide a more personal, mobile counterpoint”.103 In 
August 2014, MoMA announced that they would utilise digital technology to convert their 
collection of Andy Warhol’s films, thus supplementing the original films with copies that 
will not only better preserve their content, but also enable a much wider use of footage 
for exhibitions, study, and performances.104  
 
Although this historical overview does not claim to be comprehensive, it highlights the 
important developments that have directly, or indirectly, concerned the production, 
evaluation, consumption, and archiving of the supplement.  I will now address three 
categories emerging from this overview that are of importance for this thesis – 
classification in displays, the production of value, and technology, equipment and the 
supplement.  
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Interpretation and Display 
 
This category is of importance to the thesis as it addresses the processes of appropriation 
and commodification that are evident in the highly influential construction of MoMA, as 
well as Bourdieu and Darbel’s major study of the implications of supplementarity for the 
interpretation of displayed works of art, discussing the role of educational framing of 
displays.  The relationship between art and education is crucial for understanding one of 
the primary uses of supplementary material.  Academic education can supplement the 
experience of works of art by providing exhibition-goers with the tools to understand 
historical developments, as well as prevailing analyses of what certain works ‘mean’.  
Educational techniques employed by galleries and museums involve using a variety of 
devices (such as leaflets and wall-mounted descriptions) to make works of art more 
widely accessible.  These devices, as I argue, can also have the effect of switching the 
experience of art away from the appreciation of works, towards an experience and 
appreciation of the creative process.    
 
The benchmark for a new form of art presentation was established by MoMA in New 
York.  Founded in 1929, MoMA created methods of spacing, lighting, and overall context 
that were adopted across the world, and which continue to dominate contemporary 
cultures of display.  The first director of MoMA, Alfred H. Barr Jr., and the head of its 
architectural department, Philip Johnson, formulated the visual presentation of the new 
gallery after their experiences when visiting art exhibitions in Europe during the 1920s 
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and early 1930s.  Small galleries and temporary shows had started to present artworks in 
plain white spaces, in order to emulate the appearance of art studios.105       
 
MoMA was the first museum to be devoted entirely to displaying modern art, and from 
the beginning Barr envisioned the museum as serving both a cultural and an educational 
function.  This included a special concern for showing the ‘evolution’ of art as a “sequence 
of movements developing out of each other”.106  Here, the layout itself becomes a 
supplement to the works on display, framing the way in which the works are experienced 
whilst simultaneously appropriating the works to establish a narrative.   
 
It is important to consider briefly the relevance of the appearance, and continuing 
endurance, of the ‘white cube’ model established by MoMA.  Brian O’Doherty, the first to 
use the term, describes how:  
 
The ideal gallery subtracts from the artwork all cues that interfere with the fact 
that it is ‘art.’  The work is isolated from everything that would detract from its 
own evaluation of itself.  This gives the space a presence possessed by other 
spaces where conventions are preserved through the repetition of a closed system 
of values.  Some of the sanctity of the church, the formality of the courtroom, the 
mystique of the experimental laboratory joins with chic design to produce a 
unique chamber of esthetics.107    
 
This statement highlights an important issue concerning the displaying of supplementary 
material within such a setting.  If, as O’Doherty asserts, the work is “isolated from 
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everything that would detract from its own evaluation”, the addition of supplementary 
material of any kind would by necessity either assist with, or avoid hindering, this process 
of evaluation.  However, this assertion becomes problematic if supplementary material 
disrupts or distorts this process when used to assist in the construction of a narrative, or 
as educational devices.  One of the themes that will be developed throughout this thesis 
is the relationship between supplementarity and works of art, with the inclusion of 
supplementary material in displays often significantly altering the evaluation of the works 
it appears alongside.  The ‘sanctity’ and ‘mystique’ of the space not only serves to present 
the works of art as ‘sacred’ objects removed from the outside world, but also ensures 
that any supplementary material appearing within such a space is also elevated to a level 
of prominence.108            
 
The approach to displaying works of art initiated by MoMA encouraged simultaneously an 
educational engagement with these works, as well as experiencing them within a 
sanctified environment.  Presenting works of art from different movements in a way that 
encourages an ‘evolutionary’ interpretation both supplements the works by framing 
these works in an historical context, as well as moving the works of art themselves to 
supplementary status, as they support such an interpretation.  The introduction of works-
for-art into the gallery setting as educational material further complicates the issue of 
what is being experienced.  On one hand, the use of works-for-art and more evidently 
educational devices, looks to explain the works of art, with the latter remaining of central 
importance.  Works-for-art such as preliminary and preparatory works are commodified 
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by museums and galleries so as to emphasise their revelatory value, which itself 
translates to their market value.  On the other hand, a by-product of such 
commodification, as well as the inclusion of explanatory devices, is the attention it gives 
to the creative process itself.  Production and product are brought together within the 
concentrated atmosphere of the white cube, allowing works of art themselves to become 
supplements to a centralised re-positioning of the creative act. 
 
The approach to displaying works of art that began with MoMA marks an historical shift 
in emphasis for the experience of art, where ways of working start to jostle with the 
results of this work, for a position of importance within the gallery setting.  Rather than 
remaining stable in a supporting role, educational devices open the door for a re-
classification of supplementarity as evidence and puzzles of the enigmatic creative act.  It 
is this possibility that dictates my re-interpretation and application of Adorno’s concept of 
enigmaticalness that is analysed in chapter five.  The commodification of works-for-art by 
museums and galleries changes the experience of art by creating a new way of engaging 
with displayed material.  Simon Sheikh states that “making things public is also an 
attempt to make a public”, however, whilst I agree with this statement, the implications 
of encouraging a new audience for displayed works are unpredictable.109           
 
Some of these implications were explored in detail by Pierre Bourdieu and Alain Darbel, in 
The Love of Art (1969).  This included a series of opinion polls and interviews taken from 
people attending free-admittance museums and galleries across Europe, with particular 
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attention given to revealing the social, economic, and educational background of the 
museum-visiting demographic.  Broadly speaking, the results (and their analysis) revealed 
that there was a distinct correlation between higher levels of education, economic 
wealth, and the likelihood of both attending and ‘appreciating’ art exhibitions.  
Correspondingly, the less wealthy and less formally educated were far less likely to visit 
museums, or to feel competent in their interpretation of the works.  Bourdieu and Darbel 
are clear in their view that the work of art is not something self-evident and universally 
accessible, but instead “as with all cultural objects, a work of art can reveal different 
levels of meanings according to the interpretative framework applied to it”.110   
 
Their study revealed that galleries and museums would approach this issue of accessibility 
in different ways, with some choosing to provide educational aids (such as explanatory 
panels, arrows, guides, etc.), whereas others preferred to let the work ‘speak for itself’.  
Depending on social class and/or formal education, educational aids in Bourdieu and 
Darbel’s study are considered largely unnecessary, or unbecoming.  However, Bourdieu 
and Darbel point out the symbolic value in the inclusion of aids.  They identify a common 
feeling of esotericism experienced by the working-class visitors, where the lack of 
educational aids in effect serves to exclude them from gaining a more informed 
appreciation of what they see before them.  On the other hand, Bourdieu and Darbel 
argue: “Arrows, notices, guidebooks, guides or receptionists would not really make up for 
a lack of education, but they would proclaim, simply by existing, the right to be 
uninformed, the right to be there.”111  Bourdieu and Darbel’s study of such educational 
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devices constitutes an important exploration of the effects of supplementarity on how art 
is experienced, though not on the meaning of supplementarity itself.   
 
As Bourdieu and Darbel argue, museums and galleries play a significant role in the ways in 
which supplementary material is classified and commodified, as well as how it is used and 
consumed by audiences.  Not only is such material frequently used to establish a 
biographical and/or educational narrative that supplements the work of an artist, the 
work itself exists within a larger art-historical narrative consisting of revered figures and 
celebrated art movements.  Hierarchies of historical prominence become established, 
with supplementary material often utilised as a way of embellishing reputations.  
However, such embellishment within an educational framing of the gallery or museum 
experience transforms the cultural focus of the creative act itself, and therefore calls for a 
re-evaluation of the distinctive forms and significance of supplementary material that is 
central to this shift in focus.      
 
The Production of Value 
 
The relevance of this category for the overarching concerns of this thesis is its focus on 
the problem of interpreting and defining the production of works of art, and the role of 
supplementarity in such processes of definition.  The discussion centres on two conflicting 
positions: Janet Wolff’s definition, following Karl Marx, of art as manufacture, and Briony 
Fer’s assertion that not only is the creative process more complex and far-reaching than 
this definition allows, but that the supplement occupies an important position in 
complicating such a perspective.  This section provides a frame within which Heidegger’s 
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notion of causality, discussed in chapter three, can be understood, as well as having 
implications for the themes of hierarchy, the use of biographical material, and the re-
classification of the supplement explored in chapters four, five, and six, respectively.   
 
The sociological role of both art and artists began to be explored in greater detail from 
the mid-Twentieth Century, as the influence of Karl Marx became increasingly important.  
Though Marx’s major works appeared a century earlier, it was only at this point that an 
interest in his conception of the role of art and artists developed alongside the increased 
availability of Marx’s work - important works such as Grundrisse were not available in the 
West until 1953.112  This became the occasion through which to re-evaluate the role and 
function of art and artists within society.  In Marxist terms, the artist was a worker, and 
the creative process consisted of ‘producing’ products.  Instead of the artist being 
considered to be detached from society, transcending the conventions and concerns of 
their time, Marxist and associated sociological interpretations emphasised the 
importance of the market and an intricately interwoven series of social conditions in 
determining both the type of works being produced, and the likelihood of their success or 
failure (both critically and commercially).  This application of Marxist analysis renders the 
work of art a commodity, and like any other commodity, its exchange-value is determined 
by the producer and the consumer.113   In this context, Wolff argues that: “art is always 
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‘manufacture’”.114  The success or failure of an artist’s products would therefore be 
interwoven with their reception. 
 
Writers such as E.D. Hirsch Jr., and Jeremy Hawthorn have explored this issue of reception 
and evaluation, raising questions about the temporal nature of meaning, the dominant 
ideologies that might influence or dictate an interpretation of a work, and the issue of 
whether or not there is a single ‘correct’ way of consuming creative products.  With such 
considerations in mind, Wolff argues against the prominent role of the individual 
practitioner/author in interpreting their works: 
 
A monolithic and unifying entity, to which all works known to be by a particular 
person have to be referred, and in terms of whose supposed personality and 
characteristics they have to be explained, is mistaken both because it usually 
depends on an unanalytical concept of the subject (as ‘free’ and creative), and also 
because it necessarily operates with a partial analysis of the author (constructed 
in terms of an imputed set of defining characteristics).  The way in which authors 
are produced, or constructed, must be explicated.  And the complexity of their 
works, which escapes any unifying formula, must be capable of recognition.115   
 
Wolff is unequivocal in her view on the prominence of interpreting works of art through 
their relation to their authors, stating that “any history of art as a history of artists has to 
be rejected”.116  Instead, both artists and their artworks should rather be approached as 
themselves products of social structures, codes and conventions, as should any current or 
future evaluation.  Wolff’s analysis raises significant issues about supplementarity as it 
argues that this is part of the social and historical construction of both the author and the 
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work of art, with the author or artist becoming of secondary or little importance for 
understanding their works.   
 
Briony Fer’s essay for the 2009 exhibition catalogue, Eva Hesse: Studioworks, adopts an 
altogether different position on the production and definition of works of art, and the 
importance of the role of the artist for their interpretation.  The exhibition itself is an 
illustration of the interweaving relationships between archive theory, its use in art 
criticism and cultural practice, and reassessments of artists’ own practice.  The German-
born American sculptor, Eva Hesse, would create various test pieces from which she 
would formulate ideas for larger, complete works.  In chapter three’s discussion of British 
sculptor, Henry Moore, this is established as a familiar and historical method of creating 
sculptures.  What is distinctive about Hesse’s use of these test pieces is her re-framing of 
them as works of art, rather than reserving for them only a supplementary role.  After 
Hesse’s friend and fellow artist, Sol LeWitt, placed a private collection of Hesse’s test 
pieces in a glass case, Hesse recognised the way in which this conventional form of 
displaying works of art constituted a challenge to the traditional theories and approaches 
to archiving.  Supporting, preliminary or preparatory works produced by artists would 
either be discarded by the artist themselves, or if the artist was of a sufficient level of 
fame, stored away in museum archives or displayed in ways that emphasised their 
supplementary use.  Instead, Hesse created a series of works in which her test pieces 
were presented and exhibited in glass cases, without any explicit supplementary function 
(see Figure 1).  As Fer observes: “The act of encasing these little experimental things in 
glass seems both to make a claim for them and at the same time puts a question mark 
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over what they are.”117  The creative use made by Hesse of her own test pieces not only 
constitutes a response and questioning of dominant theories of archiving and definitions 
of works of art, but also served as the inspiration for the Eva Hesse: Studioworks 
exhibition itself, in which other test pieces and ‘studio sweepings’ were given centre 
stage.  Fer’s own study into the complex nature of what she termed Hesse’s “sub-objects” 
instigated this exhibition, which she co-curated, recalling Bochner’s complication of the 
distinction between curator and artist, when re-presenting supporting material of other 
practitioners.118  This demonstrates the circular and reciprocal relationship between 
archive theory, artistic responses to archive theory, theoretical theories of such a 
response, and the conversion of this theoretical study into a new contribution to both art 
exhibitions and theories of the archive.  Despite its theoretical and aesthetic value, the 
exhibition also calls into question the very act of using Hesse’s studio works in this way.  
With Hesse’s career lasting only five years, such a reframing of the significance of the 
exhibition’s contents can be interpreted as an act of commodification that turns the 
sparseness of available material into an opportunity to make new claims, and re-classify 
such material in ways that might make it of more interest to the public.  Such re-
classification also potentially increases the market value of archived works-for-art.  This 
echoes the appropriation of Sant’Elia’s works on paper that are discussed in chapter four.  
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Fer’s notion of sub-objects constitutes a challenge to Wolff’s assertions that art is 
manufacture, and that the complexity of creative works must be capable of recognition.  
Fer describes the sub-object as “something that does not quite rise to the status of an 
Figure 1: Eva Hesse, 'No title', 1968. The Estate of Eva Hesse. Image redacted. 
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object but remains closer to a thing.  They play somewhere in between these two 
terms”.119  Commenting on the art critic Lucy Lippard’s use of words such as ‘test pieces’, 
‘studies’, ‘models’, and ‘prototypes’ to describe Hesse’s studio works, Fer emphasises the 
ambiguous and problematic nature of what is being described: “All the words and the 
slippages between them seem to be symptomatic of the objects falling through their 
net.”120 
 
These same words reoccur throughout this thesis, both in my own use, and in referenced 
quotations.  Fer’s highlighting of their indefinite positions, and the implications this has 
for the discussions of the creation, classification, display, and theoretical interpretation of 
preliminary and preparatory material, serves to emphasise the precarity of what is being 
discussed, and the space this opens up for further philosophical, art historical, and art 
practice investigation.   
 
Such words also continue to perpetuate the ‘manufacturing’ role of the artist as producer, 
and works of art that are the products of these various stages of study, modelling, and 
prototype-making.  The following quotation from Fer signifies her distance from Wolff’s 
view that art is “always” manufacture:  “Although the term ‘creativity’ has tended to get 
tied up with exhausted notions of individual expression of emotion and feeling, the whole 
question of what it is that artists do can’t be so easily dismissed.  To call it production 
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helps to shift the focus, but then misses the things that differentiate artistic work from 
other kinds of work.”121 
 
Marxist notions of the artist as producer, forever borne of their historical circumstance, 
and bound to the requirements of various consumers, may be applicable to the 
appearance of displayed test works such as those made by Hesse, that call into question 
historical preconceptions, but they do not account for the uncertainty created by the 
questions themselves.  The “point at which ‘non-work’ becomes a way of working” 
introduces ambiguity into the causal process, hierarchical ordering, and the importance of 
both the creation and experience of supplementary material.122  Marxist terminology of 
manufacture is inappropriate for such material, as it elevates notions of order and the 
methodical movement towards a designated outcome, above the inquisitive, accidental, 
spontaneous, and unpredictable soil from which works of art grow and continue to 
resonate.  In such a conception of the supplement, even biographical material such as an 
artist’s studio or a psychiatric report, emerge not as tools of decipherment, or distracting 
obstacles to ‘complete’ works, but as valuable spotlights on the unanswerable, enigmatic 
and evasive nature of the creative process.  
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Technology, Equipment and the Supplement 
 
The importance of this section to the thesis is in its address to the significance of the 
material nature of both classically defined works of art, and supplementary works.  This 
extends to the importance of technology for both the causal emergence of the creative 
process, and the possibility of using supplementary material.  Technological 
developments not only dictate the form and utilisation of equipment, but also influence 
the ways in which works created by artists are categorised and archived.  The themes 
addressed in this section have implications for the relationship between the philosophy of 
technology and supplementarity, as precise considerations of the connection between 
technological developments and the status of supplementary material, as well as the 
process of distinguishing such material from works of art, are explored and evaluated. 
 
The artist, Albrecht Dürer (1471 – 1528) made use of the technological developments of 
his era in a very particular way that complicates the distinction between what is support, 
and what is the work of art.  The first stage of Dürer’s practice was to draw the image by 
hand.  The drawing would either be made directly onto wood, or onto paper that was 
then attached to wood.  The drawing would then be etched into the wood through traced 
carving, destroying the original drawing in the process, before being used to make any 
number of impressions, either by Dürer himself, or one of his team of workers.       
 
The Metropolitan Museum of Art (MET) in New York, which possesses two woodblocks is 
eager to stress that, despite the uncertainty over Dürer’s direct involvement, the trace of 
the artist looms large (with an implied sense of authorship).  They explain on their 
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website that:  “the intricacies involved in shaping the patterns of curving and tapering 
lines in order to create pictorial effects never before achieved in woodcut must certainly 
have required Dürer's close supervision, if not his hand on the knife”.123  The emphasis on 
physical techniques “never before achieved in woodcut” implies that they were too well 
executed to have been the work of a mere assistant, thereby promoting the apparent 
importance of these woodblocks through their association with Dürer himself.  
   
Even works in which Dürer’s direct involvement is in no doubt can be problematic in 
relation to both supplementarity and categorisation, as in the case of his copper 
engravings.  Dürer’s most famous works, a trio known as the meisterstiche (master 
engravings), are so revered that, in the words of Angela Campbell: “almost every 
institutional and many private print collections in the US and Europe have an impression 
of at least one of his three best-known prints”.124  Despite being derived from the same 
original engravings, efforts have been made by many of the owners of these impressions 
to assert claims of qualitative superiority in comparison to the others.  As Campbell 
explains: “These surviving impressions, not surprisingly, have been the subject of endless 
comparison: every print custodian wants to know that his/her impression is among the 
very best and/or the earliest (this is sometimes thought to mean the same thing, though 
it often does not).”125  Campbell is undertaking an extensive study of the chronological 
ordering of the impressions, using modern digital technology in order to detect subtle 
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degradation of etched lines that occur during the printing process.  The distinctions 
between these impressions, and the suggestion of jostling for hierarchical positions, bring 
to light some important issues in modes of classification and evaluation that arise even in 
copies derived from existing original pieces.  It also illuminates the important issue of how 
historical and contemporary technology can be combined to produce new knowledge.126  
Both the issues of hierarchical classification, and of the relationship between old and new 
technology, will be addressed in the case studies of Sant’Elia, Bacon, and Artaud. 
 
In The Primacy of Drawing: Histories and Theories of Practice, Deanna Petherbridge 
emphasises the significance of the ‘hand’ of the artist that such digital techniques can 
uncover and archive, whilst simultaneously questioning the implications of digital 
technology for preserving and archiving what she considers to be important information 
about the creative process.  For Petherbridge, the information found in drawing does not 
merely provide an insight into an artist’s approach and genius, but constitutes the very 
essence of its value.  Petherbridge describes the “spacial and textural journey” that is 
recorded by the process of sketching and drawing.127  The various journeys revealed 
through drawing are “strategies” of learned style, technique, and artistic expression that 
weave together to constitute the work of art, rather than simply arriving at it.128  Each of 
the four case studies discussed in this thesis, concerns in different ways the interrelation 
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between mystification and demystification that supplementary material can embody, and 
the importance this has for technology. 
 
Petherbridge argues that the relationship between equipment and the creative act is not 
just a means to an end, but intricately intertwined: “Tool, material, medium and 
techniques are so closely interconnected as to be difficult to unscramble.”129  The 
significance of this interconnection is underlined by Petherbridge when she states the 
possibility of: “a deep social or psychological dynamic to complement drawing’s primary 
role of invention by employing simple tools”.130  Technology does not simply assist the 
creation of works of art, but both shapes and is shaped by it.  A digitised or photographed 
version of a drawing may capture its likeness, but the original drawing itself, as 
Petherbridge would argue, contains traits that are seemingly beyond reproduction.  In 
contrast to the clamour to digitally analyse Dürer’s master engravings, such an 
interpretation elevates the original above its copies, and calls for an overturning of any 
hierarchical classification that would reduce the value of material made by artists (whilst 
itself implying a new hierarchy).  This issue is addressed in all four case studies, as 
different approaches to supplementary material involving the hand of the artist and their 
utilisation of equipment, are explored within specific theoretical frameworks. 
 
Yet Petherbridge appears to turn against the very interconnectedness between invention 
and tool that she had earlier asserted.  Whilst “in the digital age, the newly generated 
image has no more status than any other in a chain of simulacra” the “unique hand 
                                                          
129
 Ibid, p. 118. 
130
 Ibid, p. 122. 
103 
 
drawing on paper remains redolent with meaning and promise, as well as history”.131  The 
choice of computer programmes, coding, the precise compiling of image databases, and 
the evidence of technical proficiency involved in the digital drawing seemingly become 
devalued in comparison with the textual depths offered by hand drawing.  Such a 
perspective reveals what is at stake for the content of archives when technological 
developments change processes of creative practice.  Not only does the nature of what is 
archived change, but technological developments also bring with them new 
considerations that force a re-consideration of entrenched and established theoretical 
areas of priority.  The case study of Sant’Elia in chapter four explores further these issues 
of hierarchy, simulacra, and the role of the medium in evaluating the status of 
supplementarity and the work of art. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The historical overview at the beginning of this chapter provides a broad outline of the 
events in art theory and practice that have seen the meaning of the supplement continue 
to shift in use and value, establishing the context in which this present discussion takes 
place.   
 
This chapter identifies issues of importance for the present analysis of supplementarity, 
and its relationship to the work of art, including:  the emergence of the centrality of the 
artist, accompanying biographical accounts, the shift from ‘cult’ value to ‘exhibition’ value 
of works, the romanticised notion of both the ‘genius’ and melancholic character of 
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artists (and the mythologising of artists), the importance of the ‘hand’ of the artist, and 
novelty, for the interests and growth of the art market, and the emergence of public art 
museums.  These historical events not only reflect developments and shifts in approaches 
that supplement works of art, but show how approaches to the work of art have 
historically influenced (and continue to influence) the importance or denigrated value of 
works-for-art. 
 
The late Nineteenth Century, and the Twentieth Century, were shown to be periods of 
tremendous change in approaches to the creation, interpretation, and displaying of works 
of art (and by extension, supplementary material).  The first reconstructions of residences 
with a connection to celebrated artists began to appear, art movements became 
increasingly aware of their processes of working, and museums such as MoMA 
introduced concentrated ‘spiritual’ environments, as well as emphasising the use of 
narrative-based and educational interpretations of works of art.  The supplementing of 
works of art via educational devices appears as an important theoretical and sociological 
concern in Bourdieu and Darbel’s The Love of Art.  Supplementarity was directly linked to 
the popularisation of Conceptual art, thus marking its most explicit and integrated 
influence within art practice and art history.  The social role of the artist as ‘producer’ is 
shown to have been asserted within a Marxist ideology, with implications for the use of 
equipment and other supporting material that describe them as components of 
manufacture.  Technological developments in internet-based art, and digital archiving, are 
shown to have implications for the archiving and consequent availability of different 
stages of the ‘working’ of works of art, whilst also maintaining and strengthening forms of 
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supplementarity such as support, preservation, and continuing concerns with originality 
and authorship.                    
 
The categories of ‘interpretation and display’, ‘the production of value’, and ‘technology, 
equipment and the supplement’ that conclude this chapter, not only provide more 
detailed analyses of specific historical events of importance for this re-consideration of 
the supplement, but identify key themes that will unfold over the course of the 
subsequent case studies.  Although categorised and addressed in separate sections, there 
is of course slippage between these themes that reflect the fluctuating and unstable state 
of defining works of art, and those works that are employed in specific ways to support 
them.  For this reason, these themes will be returned to throughout the remainder of this 
thesis with different considerations in mind, as I construct an evaluation of 
supplementarity that does not seek to fix these themes in place, but which identifies how 
such an evaluation is made possible. 
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Chapter Three: Art and Equipment 
 
This chapter will use, as an example, the work and working methods of British sculptor 
Henry Moore (1898-1986) to advance this investigation into the complex status and 
interrelation between the ‘preliminary’, the ‘supplementary’, and ‘completed’ works of 
art. 
 
I will consider the distinction between art and equipment, and the emerging 
classifications of supplementary material that relate to this distinction.  Of particular 
relevance to this chapter is the variety of supplementary materials that can be produced 
and put to use during the lifetime of an artist (whether by themselves, or through the 
interventions of others who have had varying degrees of contact with the artist and/or 
their work).  In particular, I will look at the vast amount of preliminary material 
comprising of maquettes, sketches and intermediary plasters, and the ways in which this 
material has been utilised in different ways, sometimes to supplement ‘completed’ 
works, sometimes to help recreate the imagined reality of an artist’s daily working life.  To 
respond to the question ‘what is the supplement?’ it is necessary to discuss the variety of 
supplementary material used in the making and displaying of works of art, and the 
slippages that can appear when trying to define their status.  
 
This chapter will be of use to promote studies into the undeveloped differences and 
crossovers between Heidegger’s theories of art and equipment, with Heidegger’s theory 
of causality forming a bridge from one to the other.  It will also be of value to advance 
studies into Moore’s working process by carefully analysing the various stages in which 
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his creative process materialised, as well as showing how issues such as market forces, 
commodification, and the necessity of expanding his reputation came to directly 
influence the production and use of Moore’s output.  Within the overall framework of the 
thesis, this chapter addresses the question of what supplementary material is, how it 
differs and compares to complete works and in what ways such classifications are 
significant for studies of art practice, archive theory, museum theory, the philosophy of 
technology, and cultural studies into the role of education.     
 
This discussion will be developed by drawing upon Heidegger’s essential distinction 
between art and equipment.  I address Heidegger’s notion of the ‘instrument’ in relation 
to causality, thus enabling an analysis of the relationship between idea and form.  In turn, 
this will help to illuminate the uses and valuations associated with the variety of 
supplementary material produced in (or out of) Moore’s creative process.   
 
The transition from preliminary status to supplementary status in Moore’s work will be 
directly related to the Heideggerian distinction between equipment and art.  It is not so 
much the conclusions that Heidegger reaches that are of primary significance here, but of 
positioning this current discussion within the framework of Heidegger’s approaches to 
art, equipment, and causality in a way that can produce new findings that will advance 
the investigation into supplementary material.   
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Heidegger and Equipment 
 
In chapter one I showed how Heidegger defined great art as that which allowed for a 
‘presencing’ of truth as ἀλήθεια.  Alternatively, equipment has the quality of ‘readiness-
to-hand’ that is always put to use, as opposed to its appearance as ‘presence-at-hand’, in 
which the ‘thingliness’ of a thing removes it from its usefulness as part of a system of 
equipment.  In this respect, art and equipment are, for Heidegger, quite distinct.  Yet, at 
the same time, Heidegger states in Being and Time (1927) that: “The work to be 
produced, as the ‘towards-which’ of such things as the hammer, the plane, and the 
needle, likewise has the kind of Being that belongs to equipment.  The shoe which is to be 
produced for wearing (footgear); the clock is manufactured for telling the time.”132  Such 
work therefore both entails a use of material, and a ‘usability’ of that towards which 
equipment is employed.  There is an apparent discrepancy here between art as ἀλήθεια, 
distinct from any equipmental function, and the use of equipment for producing that 
which has this same “kind of Being that belongs to equipment”.  This chapter focuses on 
this apparent discrepancy as the locus for a discussion of the problematic and complex 
nature of evaluating preliminary and preparatory material, showing how particular 
approaches to art practice can disrupt and act upon such theoretical distinctions. 
 
Another importance of this distinction and apparent discrepancy for the present 
discussion is in its ability to bring the issue of art-equipment more clearly into view.  
Heidegger counters any objections about the discrepancy between equipment and art in 
‘The Origins of the Work of Art’: 
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The readiness of equipment and the createdness of the work agree in this, that in 
each case something is produced.  But in contrast to all other modes of 
production, the work is distinguished by being created so that its createdness is 
part of the created work.  But does not this hold true for everything brought forth, 
indeed for anything that has in some way come to be?  Everything brought forth 
surely has this endowment of having been brought forth, if it has any endowment 
at all.  Certainly.  But in the work, createdness is expressly created into the created 
being, so that it stands out from it, from the being thus brought forth, in an 
expressly particular way.133    
 
The work of art, despite being something produced through the use of equipment, is thus 
distinguished from a shoe, or a clock, through the unconcealment of its createdness, 
whereas the latter conceal their createdness in order to function as the equipment they 
are.134  Heidegger therefore accounts for the use of hammers, nails, canvases, clay, kilns, 
paper, pencils, and any other thing that exists prior to the creative process, but which 
may be employed during the process itself in order for its createdness to appear (as 
opposed to being used to produce yet another form of equipment).  That is not to say 
that the use of such things in the created process become apparent in themselves.  
Instead, Heidegger makes the same argument for art as he does for the produced 
equipment, where that for which equipment is used is able to be what it is (whether art 
or equipment) all the more when the equipment that produced it is concealed.  
Heidegger explains this position: “Precisely where the artist and the process and the 
circumstances of the genesis of the work remain unknown, this thrust, this ‘that it is’ of 
createdness, emerges into view most purely from the work.”135  This foreshadows 
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Adorno’s own concern with developments in art practice, culminating in Process art that 
had become increasingly popular towards the end of Adorno’s life in the late 1960s, 
where the ‘madeness’ (ϑεσει) of works obscured their potential enigmaticalness.  The 
apparent demystification of the work of art that such evidence of production induces, is 
discussed further in chapter five.   
 
But does Heidegger’s position apply to all aspects of the creative process?  Can the 
production of art be compared to that of the production of a shoe or a clock?  Whilst it 
could be said that the lack of attention given to a nail in the final form of a thing - 
whether a work of art, or a door - allows that which is produced to be more clearly as 
what it is (where I do not consider the nails securing a canvas to a frame when 
experiencing a work of art, or the nails that hold together the door when I open it), does 
this comparison hold true for all things used in the process of producing a work of art?   
 
The current discussion of production in the creative process is in effect positioned 
between two poles:  equipment, and that which the equipment is put to use to produce.  
If what is produced can be called an ‘end’ (and it will shortly be seen that this in itself is a 
problematic term), this end can be seen to change the ways in which certain elements 
used in the process of production are to be evaluated.  For example, the production of a 
clock may involve the use of components (fashioned through the use of further 
equipment) such as dials, hands, gears, and glass that are gathered together in such a way 
as to produce an end – the clock itself.  However, what if the clockmaker, in order to 
prepare better for the final production of the clock, first produces a prototype?  The 
prototype stands in quite a distinct relationship to that of mere component parts, having 
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been produced through the gathering together of these parts in order to produce an end 
of sorts.  Yet this end itself is also of a distinct relationship to that of the final clock.  It 
may lack the finesse expected of a clock intended for commercial use, or it may contain 
errors borne of experimentation.  Perhaps it is constructed as a point of reference for 
finalised versions, and as such incorporates a design that allows it to be disassembled and 
reassembled with ease.  Such a prototype could be said to consist of both an equipmental 
function as part of a larger process orientated towards producing the finished clock, and 
at the same time a more distinguished and marked proximity to the finished clock itself 
(through appearance, composition, and function) that differs significantly to that of a cog, 
or a dial.  It is not identical to the finished clock (due to such factors as intended purpose, 
or the level of execution), yet it embodies the key properties of the finished clock (it looks 
like a clock, it shows the time, etc.).  It does this to such an extent that it may appear to 
an outsider as being indistinguishable from the latter, and may even be confused with the 
finished product itself.  In such an example, the prototype receives its distinctive meaning 
from the existence (whether actual or intended) of the end towards which it is put to use; 
that of equipment that shows the time of day. 
 
This analogy highlights the importance of how material is ‘framed’.  A model produced by 
an artist as a reference and piece of equipment for a larger project, can become re-
evaluated if the model is removed from its equipmental context and re-framed within a 
gallery setting.   
 
What meaning, then, can be given to a maquette?  Like the prototype clock, it is not some 
interchangeable piece of equipment such as a nail or a piece of clay (albeit of a particular 
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size and/or quantity).  Instead, it is a particular composition that enters into a 
distinguished relationship with that which is intended as the ‘end’ of the process of 
production it forms a part of.  Like the prototype, it might share in the appearance and 
material composition of the product that follows it.  Yet unlike the prototype it is not in a 
relationship with another, better executed piece of equipment yet to come, but is instead 
in an altogether different relationship – a relationship with a work of art.  If the prototype 
clock can be said to contain the properties of the finished clock as equipment (albeit 
perhaps imperfectly), can the maquette be said to contain properties of a work of art?  
Does the maquette not also exist and present itself in its createdness?  Could not a 
maquette (given a certain context) also be confused with a work of art in the same way 
that a prototype clock may appear to an outsider as being the finished product?  What 
meaning and value can be given to a maquette where no ‘finished’ piece is derived from 
it? 
 
Although I will now focus on a specific analysis of Moore’s maquettes, that analysis will 
also be of relevance to discussions of the nature of the creative process in general, as well 
as the role of classification in museum and exhibition displays.  What is central to the 
thesis here is the importance of intention on the part of the artist (explored via 
Heidegger’s notion of causality), and the reasoning that can lie behind curatorial decisions 
to use and define certain works-for-art in specific ways.  The implications of such 
curatorial decisions are developed in more detail across the following case studies.    
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Moore’s Maquettes 
 
In 2010, Tate Britain held a major retrospective on the life and work of Henry Moore.136  
Included alongside many of his best known ‘completed’ sculptures were numerous works 
used by Moore during the artistic process, such as maquettes, sketches and intermediary 
plasters (larger and more precise versions of the maquettes, which could be cast in 
bronze, or used as the starting point to ‘scale up’ into significantly larger ‘complete’ 
sculptures).  At the Henry Moore Foundation (hereafter referred to as the Foundation) in 
Hertfordshire, much of the Estate where Moore produced so many of his work has been 
conserved, including a studio brimming with maquettes, surrounded by the tools used to 
fashion them.   
 
Almost every book dedicated to reproductions of Moore’s work will include a multitude 
of preliminary works, often positioned adjacent to the works into which they were later 
‘worked up’.  Some books are dedicated almost entirely to the detailed descriptions or 
documentation of his artistic process.137  What did this process entail?  Did Moore 
consider the true creative act as taking place on paper, in the initial moment when three 
dimensional form is first rendered, or when the ‘complete’ worked up sculpture has been 
set in place?   
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In the 1930s, Moore began to move away from conventional sculpture, towards a more 
inventive style.  This ‘turn’ manifested itself in sketches, or more precisely 
‘transformation drawings’ that developed not from the human form, but from sketches of 
found objects such as shells, pieces of wood and animal bones that gradually evolved on 
the page into shapes that seemed to take on human characteristics.138     
 
During this period, Moore was still predominantly working through carving, and it would 
have been simply impractical for his ideas to evolve through such a time-consuming 
method of working.  When Moore said that “art tends to arrive at a true result through 
instinct”, he was referring to the genesis of the original idea, where the instinctive act of 
creativity can work its way through so many false starts and unsatisfactory attempts in 
order to arrive at a resulting artistic idea.139  This “through instinct” constitutes the 
journey by means of which the art is said to arrive, and yet the arrival, as all arrivals are, is 
both an end and a beginning.  Whether Moore deemed the results good or bad would 
determine whether this initial work would be developed and refined, left on the page, or 
the studio shelf.  The material used at this stage of the creative process, small scale and 
more directly capable of manipulation, has strong parallels with Fer’s description of 
Hesse’s ‘sub-objects’, which are “ruled by pure contingency” that makes them suitable for 
new ideas and works.140    
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Such drawings provided an outlet for Moore’s creativity that his chosen material would 
not offer him: 
 
When my sculpture was mainly carving I would be having many more ideas than I 
was able to carry out and I would get rid of ideas, if that is the right phrase, by 
drawing to prevent them from blocking each other up.  Often I would make pages 
of drawings of ideas.  On one sheet of paper there could be as many as thirty 
projects, such as Stringed Figures, all produced in a few hours.  One of them would 
hold my attention and I would think it was the best one.141 
 
Immediacy began to become increasingly important to Moore’s practice.  By the end of 
the 1930s he had shifted from mainly producing carvings, and had instead begun to work 
by modelling.142  In the early stages of his career, Moore created sculptures that were 
largely seen from limited angles, or ‘frontal’.  As he started to create works to be seen in 
the round, the importance of the medium in which he arrived at the initial artistic ideas 
changed.  Creating the early preliminary work for a three-dimensional piece would 
“require at least twenty or thirty drawings” whereas a maquette would allow far greater 
scope and faithfulness to the intended outcome.143  Moore explains that “The maquette 
is only three or four inches in size, and I can hold it in my hand, turning it over to look at it 
from above, underneath, and in fact from every angle.  Thus from the beginning I am 
working and thinking in three dimensions.”144  Here Moore makes explicit the working 
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and thinking by means of the maquettes, saying “I do not think in words, I think in 
shapes.”145 
 
The property of maquettes was, for Moore, so close to the potential ‘final’ piece as to be 
almost indistinguishable:  “When I make a small maquette, it is rather like an architect 
making a sketch for a small building on an envelope.  In his mind it is a full-size building.  
In the same way, with my small plaster maquettes, I am thinking of something much 
larger.”146  This statement indicates a process of classification on the part of the artist.  Its 
function is that of equipment, but the form of this equipment is dictated by its 
resemblance to potential works of art.  They are equipment in the service of the artist’s 
process of working, but their utility is determined by how they appear.  The viewer, 
therefore, may look upon the maquette in wholly different ways to the artist, but they 
both share a common ground; to judge, contemplate, and estimate the value of its 
appearance.  Again, this correlates closely with Fer’s comment on Eva Hesse’s 
‘studioworks’: “these small things seem to be halfway – the fraction may vary quite 
drastically of course – between things to make and objects to look at”.147  This highlights 
the confusion that can arise between the intentions of the artist, and the experiencing of 
works-for-art when assessed purely on their visual properties.  It also underlines the 
importance that curators and artists frequently attach to the necessity of emphasising the 
equipmental function of displayed material.     
 
                                                          
145
 With Henry Moore: The Artist at Work, p. 121. 
146
 Hedgecoe, Henry Moore, p. 266. 
147
 Fer, Eva Hesse: Studioworks, p.24. 
117 
 
The technique of working up maquettes into larger scale sculptures involved inflicting a 
lot of damage upon the models, with sections cut off and separated.  Until the end of the 
1950s, many of the maquettes from that decade were destroyed, often at the foundries 
during the enlargement process, but also through the lack of care with which they were 
handled.148  This ‘disposable’ function of the maquettes began to change as Moore 
increasingly returned to previous sculptures to either modify or re-size them.  By the end 
of the 1950s they had become valuable tools worthy of keeping due to their usefulness 
for potential future projects.  The maquettes originally used could be easily manipulated 
to experiment with the possible ramifications such changes would have.149 
 
Equally, the maquettes were invaluable in allowing multiple versions of the same 
sculpture to be executed.  Moore began to realise through experience that his projects 
were never necessarily completed.  Their function as equipment, however, remained the 
same, as this statement from Moore, reflecting on their role in his work during his career, 
makes clear: 
 
Sometimes I make ten or twenty maquettes for every one that I use in a large 
scale – the others may get rejected.  If a maquette keeps its interest enough for 
me to want to realise it as a full-size final work, then I might make a working 
model in an intermediate size, in which changes will be made before going to the 
real, full-sized sculpture.  Changes get made at all these stages.150 
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Any one of Moore’s maquettes, when taken in isolation from the established consensus 
of what constituted Moore’s finished pieces, could be seen on some level to meet the 
criteria of art as laid out by Heidegger.  Their createdness would appear distinct from any 
equipmental value or function.  The most telling distinction between the prototype and 
the clock, or the maquette and the finished work of art, would be in its purpose and 
execution, yet as Heidegger explains, it is precisely these elements that are hidden in 
equipment in its equipmentality, and in art as art.  The circumstances of creation, the 
details of the artist, and the process itself, would be quite unknown, allowing the “that it 
is” of the maquette to come to the fore.  Conversely, their apparent equipmental value is 
emphasised when displayed alongside numerous other maquettes inside a preserved 
studio, or when placed next to refined pieces derived from them.   
 
This shows the important role played by curators in providing a suitable context for 
works-for-art, placing them in studios, alongside clearly defined works-of-art, or 
surrounding them with explanatory material that helps tell a story about the creative 
process itself, rather than risk such works being misinterpreted as complete pieces.  Such 
storytelling is what David Carrier is alluding to when he says that “narrative sentences are 
the hidden scaffolding holding together the public art museum”.151  The implications of 
centralising the creative process within a gallery or museum setting are explored further 
in chapter five.  
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The Perry Green studios began to fill with maquettes sent back from the foundries, often 
in a damaged state.  It is likely that the prolonged exposure to his surrounding body of 
work, representing hours of effort culminating in the production of corporeal 
manifestations of his creative impulses, led Moore to look upon them with a more 
appreciative eye.  The shelves of his studio filled with maquettes began to resemble 
collections, retained for purposes that stretched beyond simple equipmental usage, and 
gradually the damaged models began to be restored.  When the Henry Moore Sculpture 
Centre was established in 1974 at the Art Gallery of Ontario (AGO) in Canada, an outlet 
and setting for this body of work that had been largely hidden from the public up until 
this point became available.152  Moore’s assistants carried out a conservation project of 
rebuilding the maquettes to their original forms from out of the bits and pieces the 
fineries had sent back, before the recreated models were shipped to the AGO in 
Canada.153 
 
This marked a significant step in the value and use of the maquettes, as for the first time 
they became elevated to the heights of warranting a public display without immediate 
recourse to ‘completed’ pieces.  Prior to this, it was far from uncommon for some of 
Moore’s maquettes and drawings to be exhibited as supplementary material (and in fact 
Moore had sold more drawings than sculptures by 1939).154  Now, however, through the 
endeavour to capitalise on Moore’s international renown, and Moore’s own desire to 
preserve and utilise the fruits of the early stages of his creative projects, a total of (to 
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date) 48 bronze and plaster maquettes have been given their own pride of place in a 
gallery setting at the AGO.  The very act of shipping them to Canada and ‘enshrining’ 
them within such a setting meant that they became transformed.  Whilst their 
subordinated role in relation to Moore’s complete works of art was still emphasised, the 
absence of such completed works served to highlight what Benjamin would call their 
auratic presence as actual works created by the artist.  Furthermore, their particular 
artistic qualities (both as part of a process, and as works in their own right) was 
promoted.  It is clear that the maquettes were not considered to be mere equipment of 
the level of nails, hammers, or chisels, but instead held (to borrow another term from 
Benjamin) an exhibition-value of their own.   
 
It is also important to acknowledge here the relevance of commodification – the concept 
developed from the work of Marx concerning the transformation of things of little or no 
apparent value into commodities to be exploited.  The preservation and use of Moore’s 
works-for-art described here, as well as similar preservations and uses of supplementary 
material in general, can be considered to occupy a prominent place within ongoing 
debates about commodification.  Do museums (and in this case, the artist) produce 
commodities out of the detritus of the creative process (or indeed, via the continued 
displaying of works of art no longer connected to their original context) so as to exploit 
otherwise redundant or valueless material?  Or is the use of such material or works a 
reflection of the values and interests of the time?155     
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Over the course of this thesis I will argue (particularly with reference to Adorno’s theory 
of enigmaticalness) that the value of supplementary material for museums and displays 
would be short-lived if there were not also significant public interest in the creative 
process itself.  When David Carrier, in Museum Skepticism: A History of the Display of Art 
in Public Galleries (2006) states that “the profits produced by making of commodities 
makes collecting possible”, he indicates the influence that public interest has on the 
archiving and displaying of supplementary material.156  The nature of this interest will be 
developed in chapters five and six.           
 
Three years after the formation of the ‘Henry Moore Sculpture Centre’ in Canada, the 
Henry Moore Foundation was established.  After this, the process of restoring maquettes 
became more thorough, with “each individual plaster also being photographed and fully 
catalogued”.157  Presiding over these events, Moore was able to increase massively the 
totality of his artistic production by producing numerous bronzes and plasters directly 
derived from maquettes themselves, propagating the importance of his creative output 
so as to extend over every aspect of his tactile involvement.  For some, this use of 
supplementary work was to have a negative effect on Moore’s reputation.  Chris 
Stephens, the editor of the catalogue that accompanied Tate Britain’s Henry Moore 
exhibition, exclaimed that “Moore’s work seemed to become increasingly over-familiar, 
an idea not helped by his eagerness to exploit sculpture’s potential for multiplication.”158  
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Fer highlights the problematic nature of evaluating the status of material derived directly 
from previously abandoned projects, stating that “casts and cast-offs come to be 
intimately related”.159  The issues of reputation and the proliferation of imagery will be 
explored in the next chapter, and these two observations reveal the levels to which 
supplementary material such as maquettes, and in particular here the numerous plasters 
and bronzes derived from them, were of a sufficient quality to increase familiarity (and 
even over-familiarity) with his work in general.   
     
The smooth, seamless surfaces of so many of Moore’s sculptures was a vital aspect of the 
aesthetic force Moore sought to convey, echoing the flawless composition of the natural 
objects from which he drew his inspiration.  Yet a consequence of such an end product 
was inevitably to sacrifice the physical evidence of involvement of the artist, which in any 
case was almost entirely absent in a real sense since 1964, when carvings were 
subsequently almost exclusively carried out by Henraux artisans at Moore’s behest.160  
Schopenhauer’s championing of immediacy becomes eclipsed by Heidegger’s notion of 
great art that emerges more clearly in the “that it is” of its createdness precisely when 
the artist and process recede into the background.    
 
Moore’s physical interaction with the surfaces and textures at his disposal was 
paramount to his vision of provoking experiences and feelings through form alone.161  As 
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Moore himself said, “tools are only an extension of your arms and hands”.162  Yet this 
involvement had become diluted to the point of being imperceptible in his more refined 
public output.  The use of his maquettes within the public arena, their elevated status 
through dedicated, permanent displays such as the AGO, and the ongoing conservation 
project carried out by the Foundation, allowed this involvement to be shared on a global 
scale.   
 
By bestowing a heightened value upon all stages of his creative output, Moore could 
seemingly have it both ways.  The labour of the artist, along with the idealised, 
immaculate end products, could be made available to all.  However, what this 
‘heightened value’ consists of remains ambiguous as long as the seemingly obvious 
separation between Moore’s sculptures, maquettes, and drawings is left unexplored.  
What is needed for a clearer understanding of the status of the supplement, and its 
relationship to works of art, is a more thorough investigation of the unique properties and 
distinctions between the different stages of Moore’s output.   
 
Causality 
 
This section introduces Heidegger’s notion of causality.  By comparing Heidegger’s 
approach to the work of art with his approach to the importance of causality for 
technology, I open up a new method of approach that is of value for re-interpreting and 
analysing different stages of the creative process.  This section is important for 
establishing not only the slippages that exist between categories of supplementarity, but 
                                                          
162
 With Henry Moore: The Artist at Work, p. 113. 
124 
 
also the ways in which material, form, desired outcome, and motivating inspiration 
become important factors in evaluating the different works produced by artists.   
 
Almost 2,400 years ago Aristotle offered his views on the art of his time:  “We often say of 
good works of art that it is not possible to either take away or add anything, implying that 
excess and defect destroy the goodness of works of art.”163 
 
The significance here is that of establishing an early historical understanding of art that 
exists as art prior to an apparent ‘achievement’ of that which is necessary to become 
‘good’.  Whilst excess may suggest for Aristotle that the work has been taken too far to be 
redeemed, its apparent defect implies, on the other hand, that the work of art, as art, 
remains capable of being improved -  of being added to in order to meet this ancient 
criteria for attaining its ‘goodness’ as a work of art.  In short, the designating of something 
as a work of art does not take place before it has been finalised, but instead applies to 
that which is still capable of improvement or decline. 
 
Such a distinction is important in providing a historical context for the following 
interpretation and employment of Heidegger’s understanding of causality.  Whilst 
Heidegger did not directly address the notion of preliminary and preparatory works that I 
am arguing fall between the ‘complete’ work of art and equipment, I consider his analysis 
of the instrumental to be crucial in elucidating its meaning and evaluation.  For 
Heidegger:  “Wherever ends are pursued and means are employed, wherever 
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instrumentality reigns, there reigns causality.”164  At the heart of Heidegger’s discussion 
of causality is not only the issue of how something may come to be, but the particular 
ways in which this coming to be is formed and manifested.   
 
The relevance of this distinction for the discussion of preliminary and preparatory work in 
this chapter, and for the thesis as a whole, is in understanding the degrees to which the 
work of art is or is not to be considered as art in the various stages of the creative 
process.  This means evaluating whether the work of art is a culminating point of a 
process, or whether it pervades the process itself.  Heidegger points towards a classical 
definition of four causes that underpin his own unfolding of causality: causa materialis; 
causa formalis; causa finalis; and causa efficiens. 
 
As with the notion of truth, Heidegger returns to ancient Greek language for an indication 
of the original force and meaning behind certain words.  For ‘cause’, Heidegger refers to 
aition, a word in which Heidegger attaches deeper connotations of “that to which 
something else is indebted”, as he emphasises other aspects such as interdependence, 
owing, and responsibility.165  It is this distinction that Heidegger seeks to clarify in his 
interpretation of causality as understood by the ancient Greeks.  Here, cause (or a 
number of causes) is not simply that which is responsible for producing a thing in itself, 
but is instead intimately bound with a process of bringing this thing forth, where: “The 
four ways of being responsible bring something into appearance.  They let it come forth 
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into presencing.”166  Understood in this way, the thing is not simply the end result of a 
cause (or causes) as mere effect, but is instead something that the causes allow to come 
about, to be brought forth.  In this sense, the thing is brought out of its concealed state, 
into unconcealment through the interdependent relations of particular causes. 
 
So how does Heidegger understand these four causes, and in what ways can they help to 
further this discussion of supplementarity?  Causa materialis refers to the materiality of a 
thing, and causa formalis refers to its form (or aspect).  The matter/form, hylé-morphé 
dichotomy is well known, and perhaps seemingly the least complicated elements of 
Heidegger’s reinterpretation of causality.  To use Heidegger’s terminology, the particular 
thing that is brought forth is indebted to this or that material, or a combination of 
materials (wood, clay, bronze), and this or that form (a cup, a clock, an abstracted 
reclining figure).  These causes are ‘co-responsible’ for allowing the thing to appear as 
what it is.  Already, this helps to emphasise a certain matter of individuality in different 
versions of a single form in Moore’s work.  The clay maquette may appear to be of the 
same form as a work cast in bronze, but it does not bring forth into unconcealment 
something identical to it.  The bronze material and the form/aspect cooperate in a 
different way to that of the same form made of clay.  The play of light and shadow of the 
bronze work occurs differently, and therefore emphasises or conceals different aspects of 
the work.  Equally, the clay maquette is better placed to retain evidence of the artist’s 
tactile involvement, leaving traces of fingerprints on the surface.  The matter influences 
the form/aspect itself in a way that shows the uniformity of form in the two works to be 
only nominal. 
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The third cause, causa finalis, is that of the end or telos, which is responsible for that 
which the combination of matter and form are co-responsible for.  It is this cause that is 
fundamental for Heidegger’s interpretation of Greek causality, and the one which he 
considered to be the most overlooked in his own time.  For Heidegger, this cause 
circumscribes in advance the ‘realm’ in which the thing will exist.  It is a ‘confinement’ not 
just to a particular role or purpose (a word Heidegger states is often wrongly attributed to 
telos), but to circumscribing a deeper meaning whereby: “Circumscribing gives bounds to 
the thing.  With the bounds the thing does not stop; rather from out of them it begins to 
be what, after production, it will be.”167  Heidegger understands this third cause not 
merely as that of anticipated purpose, but of the thing in its envisioned completeness, a 
completeness that contains within it the place or placing of the thing within a world of 
meaning and values.   
 
The fourth cause, causa efficiens, lies in the definitions going back to Aristotle, 
understood as that which brings about the effect that is the finished thing.  This would 
commonly be attributed to human influence, such as the skilled craftsman, however 
Heidegger rejects this classification.  Whilst he agrees that the fourth cause is that of the 
artist or artisan who gathers together the other three causes in order bring into 
appearance of the thing that the four are co-responsible for, he dismisses the notion of 
them being a causa efficiens.  Heidegger goes on to state that there is no known 
corresponding Greek word or Aristotelian doctrine that names it.168  Instead, Heidegger 
argues that the artist or artisan is responsible for the “that” and the “how” of the other 
                                                          
167
 Ibid, p. 8. 
168
 Ibid. 
128 
 
three causes, and where, pivotally, the bringing forth and resting-in-self take and retain 
their first departure.169  It is this bringing forth (poiēsis) itself that governs the four causes 
understood by Heidegger, and is closest to the sense of causa efficiens, albeit in a way 
that differs considerably from the one commonly understood.  Heidegger states that the 
four causes, as that which brings about the process of bringing forth (as inducing to go 
forward, or as an occasioning):  “Let what is not yet present arrive into presencing.  
Accordingly they are unifiedly ruled over by a bringing that brings what presences into 
appearance.”170   
 
The importance of Heidegger’s notion of causality for this thesis is twofold; It allows for a 
re-consideration of technology as being more than supplemental, where the material and 
technical approach is integral to what is produced or worked, rather than merely an 
interchangeable medium; and it allows for the importance of the creative process in 
preliminary and preparatory works to be more clearly identified and defined.    
 
As mentioned, Heidegger states that “wherever instrumentality reigns, there reigns 
causality”.  Having defined causality, Heidegger goes on to state that “instrumentality is 
considered to be the fundamental characteristic of technology”.171  He then goes on to 
say of technology that “the possibility of all productive manufacture lies in revealing”.172  
The notion of revealing is itself related to causality when Heidegger states that: “Bringing-
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forth comes to pass insofar as something concealed comes into unconcealment.  This 
coming rests and moves freely within what we call revealing.”173  As discussed in chapter 
one, Heidegger’s understanding of great art is of that which allows for the happening of 
truth as ἀλήθεια, as the presencing of truth in its unconcealment.  The revealing that is 
the coming to rest of bringing-forth as something concealed coming into unconcealment, 
forms, as it were, a crossover or meeting point of both art and technology.  Revealing is 
where the possibility of all (technological) productive manufacture lies.  Indeed, 
Heidegger further clarifies this by saying that “technology is a way of revealing”.174  The 
artistic process, too, is a way of revealing, as a bringing-forth that comes to pass through 
the unconcealment of ἀλήθεια.  Heidegger indicates a common ground for the artistic 
and the technological (by way of the occasioning – the inducing towards the presencing of 
a thing through causality) when he says that: “Bringing-forth, indeed, gathers within itself 
the four modes of occasioning - causality – and rules them throughout.  Within its domain 
belong end and means, belongs instrumentality.”175  The domain of bringing-forth, and its 
coming to pass as revealing applies to both art and technology as that which determines 
their cause and culmination.   
 
This ‘common ground’ of art and technology as revealing is an important claim of this 
thesis, as it not only provides a  way of reconciling these distinct areas of Heidegger’s 
work, but also offers a new avenue for locating the significance of the creative process.  
Whether considered from an artistic or technological perspective, the creative process is 
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at one and the same time a revealing.  This will be shown to be highly significant for the 
archiving/preserving, displaying, and reception of supplementary material, which in turn 
relates to contemporary debates on museum theory, art theory, and cultural studies in 
general.     
 
The ambiguity between art and technology is further emphasised when Heidegger turns 
to the Greek origin of the word technology – technē – with its dual connotations of 
craftsmanship and the arts of the mind and the fine arts.  It is neither possible nor 
necessary to undertake a discussion of Heidegger’s more detailed analysis of technology 
that would develop from this point.  However, this concatenation of shared concepts 
allows for an orientation towards their significance for art.  In the following description of 
the coming together of the four elements of causality in the revealing of bringing-forth (as 
poiēsis), I consider instrumentality, albeit described as the “fundamental characteristic” of 
technology, to also be a characteristic of the artistic process: 
 
Whoever builds a house or a ship or forges a sacrificial chalice reveals what is to 
be brought forth, according to the perspectives of the four modes of occasioning.  
This revealing gathers together in advance the aspect and the matter of ship or 
house, with a view to the finished thing envisioned as completed, and from this 
gathering determines the manner of its construction.  Thus what is decisive in 
technē does not lie at all in making and manipulating or in the using of means, but 
rather in the aforementioned revealing.  It is as revealing, and not as 
manufacturing, that technē is a bringing-forth.176    
 
Throughout ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, Heidegger often couples artisan and 
artist as if to emphasise the fact that they share in the bringing-forth of unconcealment 
through its revealing.  It is therefore no great leap to draw the conclusion that, as heavily 
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implied throughout Heidegger’s texts on art, that art is a bringing-forth as revealing.  It 
can also be inferred that art too is for Heidegger not merely a matter of manufacturing, 
and that the “finished thing” (the completed work of art) derives its manner of 
construction through the gathering together in advance of the aspect (form) and matter 
of the work of art with a view to its envisioned completedness.  In short, that which is to 
be brought forth by a work of art dictates the way in which that work comes to be, and as 
such necessarily resides over each stage of its creation.  Instrumentality emerges as a 
shared element of the artistic and technical processes, with a common ‘end’ (albeit 
determined in advance) of a revealing through bringing-forth into unconcealment of the 
concealed.  This notion of art, as determined in advance as that which governs its own 
construction, takes on a major significance in evaluating certain forms of supplementarity 
such as the maquettes, plasters, and bronzes produced as part of Henry Moore’s creative 
process. 
 
The gathering in advance of the four causes determining the manner of construction 
would seem to negate the possibility of spontaneity or malleability, yet this can soon be 
dismissed.  For example, whilst the material, form, and the envisioned finished ship as 
completed may determine the manner of its construction, it is common for adaptations 
to be made to a design as unconsidered problems are encountered, or when new 
requirements appear.  Heidegger is not implying that the revealing gathered in advance 
provides a perfect virtual model, but that in order for it to emerge in appearance, the four 
causes that refer to its fundamental properties must come together to induce its coming 
to be.  If certain approaches prove to be inadequate (e.g. a paper hull, a top heavy 
superstructure, or a poor shipbuilder) they will soon be revealed as such in relation to the 
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governing third cause of causa finalis (hence why it was prominent in Heidegger’s notion 
of causality).  This governing third cause dictates whether what is encountered in the 
construction is adequate or inadequate for the task in hand.  How can this then be related 
to the artistic process, and of supplementary material? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Henry Moore, 'Ideas for Sculpture: Transformation Drawing, Lobster Chair, 1932. Henry 
Moore Family Collection. Image Redacted. 
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To begin with, I will start with the example of one of Moore’s sketches of possible 
sculptures (see Figure 2).  Already the causa materialis and causa formalis appear to be 
completely distinct from that of one of his sculptures, being drawn in pencil on toned 
wove.  Yet a causa finalis is already governing the sketch by determining the manner of its 
possible construction, through a variety of possible works, each shaded to imply 
roundness to the depictions.  The causa finalis (albeit in a general form of sculpture at this 
stage) dictates the indication of form as outlined by the pencil.177  This outline is already a 
form (the execution of lines that imply shape and shading), whereas the matter (pencil 
and toned wove) is dictated by their suitability for allowing a quick series of ideas to 
become rendered in order to capture potential ways of realising the causa finalis of a 
potential sculpture.   
 
As discussed, Moore favoured the use of sketches as a way of capturing ideas (imperfect 
or undeveloped moments of causa finalis); what Christa Lichtenstern refers to as a 
“melting pot”.178  Yet as imperfect as this causa finalis may be, it nevertheless contains 
within itself the instigating force of art (as opposed to a ship or house).  The sketch could 
thus be divided up into four components: Causa finalis – the work of art intended as 
sculpture; the causa materialis – the paper and pencil that allows the immediacy of ideas 
in a way that can inform later construction; causa formalis – the suggestion of these ideas 
rendered through lines and shading (and in other cases, the addition of colour); and the 
skill of Henry Moore himself in gathering together the other causes.   
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The sketch is therefore to be understood not as an end in itself (as well may be the case 
for other sketches), but as a determined manner of construction that from a gathering in 
advance of causes receives its determination as such.  Yet this analysis appears not to 
account for any primacy of creativity or originality in the sketches themselves.  Surely the 
sketches contain within the fabric of their construction the original force of creative 
inventiveness in its most instinctive and unmediated form?  On the surface this would 
appear so, however, interpreted through Heidegger’s understanding of causality, the 
content of the sketches are already bound and in-formed by the causa finalis.  The causa 
finalis serves to bring-forth into revelation an unconcealment that is not that of a drawing 
or sketch, but that of a potential sculpture.  This is of course not to say that this medium 
cannot otherwise be the locus of a great work of art, but that in this case its 
instrumentality is contained within its genesis.   
 
Spontaneity may occur here only within and out of prior restrictions that bind the 
application of the artist’s ‘imagination’ to a governing set of requirements.  These may be 
the sculptural form, existing methods of display, and the restraints of potential 
construction, that delimit and curtail the extents to which spontaneity can be made to 
serve.  In this sense, the spontaneous is not immediate, but is instead already mediated 
by a bringing-forth that induces the particularity of apparent spontaneity.  Here, the 
spontaneous can be understood as the concentrated efforts of such a bringing-forth in 
accordance with an appropriate available medium.  This medium allows for particular 
combinations of multiple elements that are both suitable and relevant (relevant to the 
reigning bringing-forth itself), to be brought-together or gathered so as to be quickly 
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preserved or captured.  Such suitable and relevant elements are various influences drawn 
from a multiplicity of sources that are concentrated in accordance with this reigning 
bringing-forth.  They belong to the prior experiences of the artist.  In this case, for 
example, certain approaches to forms established through the consideration of natural 
objects, an understanding of the requirements of sculpture, an awareness of existing 
approaches to art such as Surrealism, and Moore’s own skills as a draftsman and sculptor.  
It is the combination of these prior experiences in accordance with the reigning bringing-
forth that gives rise to the new, and it is the availability of a suitable medium that allows 
for the capture of these combinations that bring forth the spontaneous.  The 
spontaneous does not appear out of thin air, but out of a concentrated thickness of 
influences derived from experience, that both combines and preserves them.  The 
unpreserved would in effect relate to the fleeting idea that remains as idea due to its lack 
of accordance with the reigning bringing-forth and/or the lack of a suitable medium for its 
preservation (of whatever duration).  In this interpretation, Schopenhauer is right to 
allude to a certain “rapture of the moment” that he champions in sketches and the 
original formations of artistic creativity, which can be understood as the most direct point 
of contact between the creative process and the bringing-forth itself.   
 
However, in this use of Heidegger’s notion of causality the lack of an “admixture of 
deliberation and reflection” that Schopenhauer associates with the “pure” work of art 
could be described as misgiven.  Instead, it is through a thorough series of multiple 
deliberations and reflections, albeit combined and gathered together in a unique way 
under the reign of a particular bringing-forth, that a concentration of experience takes 
place as spontaneity.  The spontaneous sketch could therefore be understood as the 
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birth, but not the conception of the work of art, and as such it represents only the earliest 
form of a work that already contains within itself the potential to grow and develop into 
maturity.  The conception takes place in the combination of experiences under the reign 
of the particular bringing-forth.  Its birth (as that which derives from this conception) 
relates to its sensual (aesthetic) appearance that represents the origins of its potential 
aesthetic development (albeit in ways that contain within themselves a pre-aesthetic 
conception governed by a particular bringing-forth).  The aesthetic therefore has both a 
referential relationship to a pre-aesthetic notion of bringing-forth, as well as a dynamic 
significance (as that which brings-forth its own requirements and receptions) that will 
together be developed further in relation to Gilles Deleuze in the following chapter. 
 
This application of Heidegger’s notion of causality reveals the particular intentions and 
considerations that can be at play throughout the creative process, and serves to show 
that works-for-art can be viewed as more subtle, complex, and valuable as cultural 
objects than a reduction to a supporting and functional status allows.  Equally, this 
example reveals the extent to which theories applied to art both structure and transform 
the interpretation of artworks and works-for-art, where a theoretical method of analysis 
such as this places particular emphasis on a work’s qualities that seemingly produces 
(rather than necessarily reveals) their value and status.  Yet the work itself is also pivotal 
to this transformation of value and status, with its mode of construction providing new 
areas of theoretical consideration.             
 
The sketch, as described here, is an instrument in the service of a causa finalis; it is this 
evidence of instrumentality that reduces and hinders the ‘purity’ of the “that it is” of the 
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‘finished’ sketch, and thus results in only a partial bringing-forth.  It is a ‘completed’ 
sketch, but its completion contains within itself a function that goes beyond it, and marks 
it a work-for-art.  This bringing-forth is as adequate to the guiding notion of potential 
sculpture, as a rough outline of something resembling a ship is adequate in bringing-forth 
the appearance of a functioning sea-going vessel.179  Nevertheless, the sketch is governed 
by another order of causa finalis which is that of a specific mode of art (a potential 
sculpture), which is itself ruled by a bringing-forth (poiēsis) into unconcealedness of a 
truth (as ἀλήθεια) of the would-be sculpture.  As such, it is brought into existence as a 
work-of-art (albeit ‘impurely’ in its ‘reduced’ and ‘hindered’ state) that is ‘impure’ 
precisely because of its evidently instrumental construction.  In short, the sketch is an 
artistic creation in its own right (with its own particular causality), whilst at the same time 
owing its coming-to-be to its instrumental role in the creation of another, more refined 
work of art.   
 
This is of significance for validating the use made by artists and curators of works that 
appear through the creative process, but which were not envisioned as complete works-
of-art.  Preliminary and preparatory works are distinguished from complete works by the 
degrees to which their construction has been dependent upon an instrumental purpose.  
However, the above analysis indicates how such a distinction in fact marks them as both 
works-for-art and works-of-art within a hierarchical system of classification that might 
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deem them to be of ‘lesser’ or ‘lower’ status in comparison to more clearly established 
works of art, rather than verisimilitudes of ‘actual’ artworks.  The issue of hierarchical 
classification is developed in chapter four.   
 
Context is highly significant in the evaluation and understanding of the vast majority of 
artworks.  One of Moore’s maquettes, for example, may be viewed hypothetically by 
someone with no prior knowledge of sculpture or Moore’s work, and considering the 
maquette in itself, the viewer may be forgiven for taking it to be a finished, completed 
piece.  In reality, there are a series of prior indicators that establish contexts and possible 
interpretation that play upon the maquette so as to emphasise its instrumental 
attributes.  Many of Moore’s works have titles that include ‘maquette’ or ‘working 
model’, along with accompanying explanatory texts.  In many cases they are displayed 
alongside completed pieces.  Yet of the many indications that establish interpretations of 
such works, perhaps one of the most significant factors in distinguishing preliminary or 
preparatory pieces from completed works is that of size. 
 
Another way of understanding Heidegger’s notion of causality in relation to Moore’s 
working process is in terms of a series of interconnecting causalities, wherein each series 
also interconnects with the others as part of a totality ruled by a primary bringing-forth.  
The sketch is of a different form (aspect), and involves different materials, so, as touched 
upon above, it could be seen to have its own causa finalis that gathers in advance these 
two causes with a view to constructing a finished sketch.  This sketch would be part of a 
series that makes up the construction of a ‘grand’ causa finalis of the primary bringing-
forth.  One benefit of conceiving Moore’s creative process in this way is that it helps to 
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account for the degrees of alterations, improvisations, and revisions.  The work, being 
brought-forth, is not fully formed and merely refined through the creative process, but 
instead guides and unites the different series of causalities in their combined efforts to 
bring the work forth.  Moore himself alludes to a sense of this pre-existing guidance 
which the different stages of the creative process are brought towards through the act of 
creation itself, saying that: “One of the things I would like to think my sculpture has is a 
force, is a strength, is a life.  It’s as though you have something trying to make itself come 
to a shape from inside itself.”180  
 
Elsewhere, Moore is clear in his view that the envisioned completed work, even if without 
a settled form or meaning, is at each stage understood as a large, ‘full-size’ sculpture, 
with the following quotation referred to earlier stating that “with my small plaster 
maquettes, I am thinking of something much larger”.  The maquette is not a copy of the 
drawing (as if only a mere refinement rendered in three dimensions), but is created 
through its own particular causes.  Even when referring directly to a sketch of potential 
sculpture, the four causes that bring forth the maquette converge in completely different 
ways to those in the corresponding series of causes relating to the sketch.  However, in 
both series of causalities it is the primary bringing-forth that rules over them.  Compared 
to the sketches, the initial maquettes enter into a closer proximity to the complete 
sculptures through their shape.  However, whilst the bringing-forth of the work may begin 
to be revealed more clearly, its four interconnecting causes remain distinct.  The causa 
finalis, in part receives its content from the primary bringing-forth of the complete work 
to be revealed.  It is nevertheless oriented towards an equipmental practicality that 
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allows for a more direct shaping, and as part of Moore’s own specific method of working 
that factors in (as has been seen) the longevity of a particular maquette’s appeal when 
deciding which maquettes will be ‘worked-up’ into complete works.181  This causa finalis 
is what dictates the matter and form, which in both respects differ in kind to that of the 
complete work.  Matter must be suitable for ease of use and malleability (as opposed to 
the high-quality material Moore commonly used for complete works); form, whilst 
potentially indistinguishable in shape, must again be in accordance with an equipmental 
function, and is therefore of a small scale.  The artist, Moore himself, gathers these three 
causes together in quite a different way to how he would when creating the finished 
work, and employs different skills and additional equipment in bringing the maquettes 
forth. 
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The initial maquettes emerge through four causes that whilst ultimately governed by the 
bringing-forth of the artwork as unconcealment (and in their own ways works-of-art), are 
predominantly marked by instrumentality.  This can be seen in Figure 3, where this small 
work in plaster, of 22cm in height, has visible thumb prints, traces of rough carving, and 
unrefined edges that contrast sharply with the highly polished monumental works.  
Moore’s method of using natural objects to develop his ideas is evident in the 
incorporation of a shell at the base of the dress, cast in plaster and made to suggest the 
contours of fabric.  This use of found objects emphasises the instrumentality of Moore’s 
maquettes, as the objects themselves are only suitable for direct use at a stage of working 
in small-scale.182  This interpretation and application of Heidegger’s notion of causality 
thus brings to the fore the fundamental distinctions between the maquettes and the 
complete works.  At the same time it provides a clue to any possible confusions or mixed 
interpretations between the two.   
 
In this section, I have provided a detailed analysis that offers a re-interpretation of what 
preliminary and preparatory works are.  This analysis suggests a new way for both artists 
and curators to understand how such material is neither entirely art-work nor art-
equipment, but has a unique existence that combines both.  The common ground of 
revealing derived from Heidegger’s philosophy, and shared by art and equipment, calls 
for a re-evaluation of the denigrated status applied to works-for-art within an artistic 
context, especially when that equipment is not defined entirely upon its use-value (such 
as a nail or paint brush), but also through its aesthetic value.        
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The Centrality of the Artist 
 
I will now address the ways in which Moore’s preliminary and preparatory works have 
been utilised as supplementary material.  Although I specifically address Moore, this 
section also has implications for understanding the appropriation of supplementary 
material in general, and the centrality of the creative process that is both asserted and 
emphasised within museum and gallery settings.  This section is therefore of relevance for 
studies into methods of display, the promotion of artists and their works, and the role of 
education in art.   
 
Having clarified my interpretation and application of Heidegger’s distinction between art 
and equipment, as well as developing my own use of his understanding of causality to 
open up the space between these two poles, I will now turn to the actual uses made of 
such material.  I show how the classical causa efficiens that Heidegger claims to be 
erroneously attributed to the artist or artisan, dominates the utilisation of such material.  
The primary focus will concern the ongoing efforts of the Foundation; in particular the 
work carried out at his former estate at Perry Green, which has continued to adapt his 
preliminary material in innovative ways since Moore’s death in 1986.  However, to begin 
with, I will return to the place that first raised Moore’s maquettes upon a pedestal for 
public consumption in their own right.      
 
The maquettes at the AGO remain among the biggest collection of Moore’s preliminary 
and preparatory works in the world to this day.  The AGO website describes how visitors 
can listen to audio recordings of Moore discussing his working process, as well as 
143 
 
engaging “the visitor in a variety of interactive activities” designed to educate as well as 
entice the casual attendee.183  Alongside this, visitors can also watch on video screens the 
transportation of, and subsequent setting up of one of Moore’s sculptures in Toronto.  It 
is significant that the emphasis here is on informing the visitor to the gallery.  First of all 
there is a certain assumption about the cultural education of the visitor that recalls 
chapter two’s discussion of Bourdieu and Darbel.  The employment of audio devices 
explaining the details of the artistic process, visual-historical documentaries showing the 
public of Toronto how a major public work of art came to be there, and other interactive 
elements of the gallery imply an active pursuit of what could be called the ‘less informed’ 
gallery goer.   
 
Such inclusions do not assume that the anticipated audience is culturally knowledgeable 
through simply letting them experience the work in its displayed form alone.  Instead, a 
number of additions are inserted so as to engage the visitor with the work within the 
gallery.  The maquettes are elevated to the height of occupying their own privileged 
position within an art gallery.  At the same time they are demoted to the level of 
educational material.  On the one hand, they are promoted as the culturally significant 
material produced by a world renowned artist.  On the other hand, their subordinated 
role as an element in the multifaceted stages of the artistic process is emphasised, as so 
indicated by the artist’s own voice-over. 
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The acquisition of the maquettes and plasters by the AGO represented a marked 
development in the reputation and corresponding significance of such works through the 
very fact that they were considered important enough or worthwhile to acquire in the 
first place.  As Howard S. Becker observes in Art Worlds: “What is not distributed is not 
known and thus cannot be well thought of or have historical importance.  The process is 
circular: what does not have a good reputation will not be distributed.”184  This quotation 
also illustrates the reciprocal nature of commodification, whereby the conversion of 
otherwise surplus material into commodities can create and further ongoing interest in 
such material.  Nevertheless, I maintain that without substance of some sort, the 
longevity of commodity-value will be short-lived.  This is discussed further in chapter six.     
 
It is important to consider how such works, brought forth through four causes distinct to 
those of completed works (albeit ruled over and ‘borne out’ of the primary bringing-forth) 
might be utilised in ways that are equally distinct to those of completed works, or in some 
cases crossing over with them.  I contacted David Wistow – Interpretative Planner in 
European Art at the AGO – to ask him how visitors to the gallery responded to the 
maquettes, and received this reply: 
 
Museums attract a wide variety of visitors with diverse interests.  Many visitors 
are fascinated by how art is made.  Our collection of maquettes communicates 
quickly and efficiently Moore’s creative process.  Their tiny scale is intensified by 
their juxtaposition with the full scale plasters which make up the bulk of our 
Moore holdings.  By consulting complementary photographs on view nearby 
visitors can track the process from the intimate moment of creation – when 
Moore sculpts the maquettes by holding it in his hand and cutting and gouging – 
to the more public moment when the large scale works are finally cast in bronze. 
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Some visitors prefer the immediacy of the maquettes and their domestic scale.  
Others respond more positively to the large plasters.185 
 
Wistow’s comments support the notion that the maquettes are primarily experienced as 
part of a larger project, and that the AGO emphasises their educational value, providing a 
visual guide to the process of creating art.  The maquettes and plasters, now given centre-
stage, are themselves supplemented by photographs and videos, as well as written 
material that either accompanies a work, or is included in leaflets.  The presentation is 
very much a case of highlighting the distance between the preliminary and preparatory 
works, and the completed works, whilst simultaneously capitalising on this very distance 
by offering the public a rare chance to go on a tour of the creative process of a famous 
sculptor.  Whilst such a ‘tour’ is ostensibly educational, I argue in chapter five that 
creative processes themselves have their own ‘enigmaticalness’ that gives a renewed 
cultural value to supplementary material. 
   
The issue of plasters and bronzes often derived directly from maquettes or working 
models brings to the fore a further complication of causality and ‘end’.  Such plasters and 
bronzes are in a sense crystallisations or acts of enshrining the predominantly 
equipmental maquettes and working models.  This process of drawing attention to 
‘equipmental’ pieces by re-casting them using forms more palatable to traditional 
cultures of display, echoes the transformative effects, noted by Fer, of Hesse’s test pieces 
being exhibited in glass cases that was discussed in chapter two.  It also shows a 
willingness by either Moore or the Foundation, to respond to theories of the archive (that 
would de-value maquettes by presenting them as support and equipment) by utilising the 
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properties of dominant methods of display to add value to otherwise supplementary 
material, literally casting them in a new light.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It would initially seem that such enshrining, being so tightly bound to the appearance of 
the maquettes they enshrine, cannot be so far removed from them.  However, a careful 
examination of the four causes reveals another quite distinct series.  In Figure 4, the form 
Figure 4: Henry Moore, 'Working Model for Stone Memorial', 1971. The Henry Moore Foundation 
Collection. Image redacted. 
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(aspect) of this maquette cast in bronze may of course be almost indistinguishable from 
clay or plaster versions, but distinct surface differences occur through the interrelation of 
light and a new type of matter.  Furthermore, the form may be drastically altered through 
scaling up.  The matter itself is entirely different, with bronze used for both aesthetic 
qualities and practical purposes of endurance, with the bronze surface reflecting light 
more sharply than plaster, which allows the shape and details of carving to be rendered 
more visible.  The causa finalis is altogether distinct, as it gathers together the form and 
material not in order to serve an equipmental function, but to be brought forth into an 
exhibition-value that includes multiplication and ease of distribution that distinguishes it 
from the large-scale complete works.  The artist, Moore, gathers together these three 
causes in a way that is again distinct from any preceding series of causality.  He employs a 
variety of different skills and techniques that at one and the same time reduce the 
maquette to its most equipmental function, whilst extracting from the maquette its most 
artistic qualities in order to bring them forth into a revealed state of appearance.  In most 
cases, Moore himself is not physically involved in this cause, but resides over it as a 
director as various other people assist in its construction. 
 
This adaptation of original material to produce new works, correlates with Rosalind 
Krauss’ comments on Rodin’s ‘The Gates of Hell’, constructed from fragments of sculpture 
left behind after Rodin’s death, and where: “It is, we could say, the product of a 
collaborative effort between the artist, artisan, and the physical properties of the 
material, but even that is too simple.”186  Whilst Rodin’s death caused Krauss to question 
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the validity of ‘The Gates of Hell’ as worthy of being attributed to him, Moore’s 
involvement in the re-casting of his maquettes makes the resulting works no less 
complicated. 
 
The primary bringing-forth itself is essentially diverted away from its ruling influence that 
governed the bringing into being of the full-scale sculpture, and instead a properly 
intermediary work appears that is closer in kind to the completed work than the 
equipmental work, but which at the same time exists as an enshrining of the latter.  As 
such, the plaster or bronze work is caught between these two poles of complete work 
and equipment – being neither equipmental in-itself (and existing as an end), whilst at the 
same time enshrining something predominantly equipmental (and thus bringing this 
equipmentality into appearance).   
 
William Pucker illustrates the ambiguity that can arise in evaluating such work when he 
says of Figure 4, ‘Working Model for Stone Memorial’ (1971) that “this nominally working 
model clearly stands as an autonomous and authentic work of art in its own right”.187  
This work cast in bronze brings to the fore the cutting and engraving that is indicative of 
the construction of a maquette in its less refined, less proximal adherence to the typical 
appearance of Moore’s complete works.  However, in bringing these qualities to the fore 
as an enshrining, the work transforms them by presenting them within a form that is 
considered an end in itself.  This formal presentation as end could be said to allow the 
cutting and engraving to resonate with historical sculptural approaches such as realism, 
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and the works of sculptors such as Jacob Epstein.  Yet at the same time, the reliance upon 
the predominantly equipmental work, as well as the title of ‘working model’ continues to 
emphasise its distance from a conventionally understood ‘completed’ work.   
 
Moore’s increased use of bronze and plaster versions of his maquettes, no doubt 
encouraged by their appeal to places such as AGO, also serves to complicate the content 
of the causa finalis of future maquettes.  Their potential development and distribution as 
bronzes and plasters could be said to exert an influence over Moore’s artistic process 
itself, whereby in some cases bronzes and plasters would become the primary envisioned 
object of bringing-forth.   
 
This concept of ‘enshrining’ given here has implications for studies into the use of bronzes 
in sculptural practice, and the wider issue of the re-casting of supplementary material in 
visual forms that further emphasise the crossovers and ambiguities between art and 
equipment.  To ‘enshrine’ is to convert and transform the overtly equipmental properties 
of a thing into a visual medium that more strongly accords with the prevailing standards 
of ‘complete’ works of art.               
 
The creation and displaying of Moore’s bronzes, plasters, and maquettes, constitute 
different forms and degrees of connection between Moore ‘the working artist’ and the 
resulting complete works of his creative process.  Such works are characterised by the 
‘trace’ of the artist in the creative process, and exhibited in ways that draws attention to 
the act of creation as much as what is created, distorting what is central to the ‘art 
experience’ when these works are displayed.  These smaller works are also valuable for 
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propagating the awareness of Moore’s work, as well as making it easier for galleries to 
claim ownership of parts of the sculptor’s output.  
 
At the centre of this ‘propagating’ was and is the Henry Moore Foundation.  The 
Foundation was established in 1977, primarily to impose some order over the chaotic and 
constant production of new works, as well as overseeing the lending of works to galleries 
and museums.  A clause in the Foundation’s Memorandum of Association states that it 
had been “established to advance the education of the public by the promotion of their 
appreciation of the fine arts and in particular the works of Henry Moore”.188   
 
This promotion of the works of Henry Moore, and Henry Moore as a creative practitioner, 
would take a variety of forms.  Alexander Davis was appointed to undertake 
comprehensive research looking into, and acquiring, all printed material on Moore.  After 
fifteen years of research, Davis, along with The Henry Moore Foundation, published ‘The 
Henry Moore Bibliography’ as well as establishing the Foundation’s on-site library.189   
 
The mythologising of Henry Moore the working artist had begun during the sculptor’s 
own lifetime.  The issue of ‘mythologising’ will be developed in each of the remaining 
chapters, and emphasises both the continuing influence of the ‘cult of the biographical’ 
addressed in chapter two, and also the extent to which this historical approach has 
developed, but at the same time repressed, the valuation and use that currently 
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dominates supplementary material.  As well as the Foundation’s continued purchasing 
and loaning of Moore’s maquettes, plasters, bronzes, and sketchbooks, a number of 
books and exhibitions took place that emphasised the centrality of Moore’s creative 
process.    
 
In 1968, the photographer John Hedgecoe provided the images that accompanied 
Moore’s autobiographical content in a book detailing most aspects of Moore’s 
professional life, showing photographs of the important places from Moore’s childhood 
and education, along with pictures of Moore working in the studio and overseeing the 
production of his larger works.190  Similarly, the book With Henry Moore was released in 
1978, consisting of photographs of Moore at work during the various stages of his 
creative process taken by Gemma Levine, and accompanied by comments from Moore as 
he talks about his inspiration and method of working.191  The brief introduction asks the 
question “how does a great creative artist go about his work?” before positioning the 
book within a larger historical context so as to emphasise its importance by adding:  “How 
much richer would art history prove if the same could have been done for Michelangelo, 
or Donatello?”192  This not only suggests that Moore is on a par with those figures, but 
that the significance of the artist’s working process is such that it was only the absence of 
the necessary means that prevented their working process being similarly recorded.  This 
point is of importance for the thesis as it draws attention to the notion that technological 
advancements in the distribution of publications, and emerging sociological interests in 
                                                          
190
 Hedgecoe, Henry Moore. 
191
 With Henry Moore: The Artist at Work. 
192
 Ibid. 
152 
 
artists themselves (charted in chapter two) have opened a new space for centralising the 
creative process. 
 
In 1984/85, the ‘Henry Moore Centre for the Study of Sculpture’ in Leeds organised an 
exhibition called ‘Henry Moore: Sculpture in the Making’ which was the first show to 
explore the relationship between his creative process and his inspiration.  Plasters and 
bronze casts which concerned the same form being rendered in different ways were 
loaned from the Foundation, along with maquettes and working models (again being 
alternative versions of the same idea), objects found in Moore’s studio, and Moore’s 
signature punch.193 
 
The inclusion of Moore’s signature punch shows the extent the organisers went to in 
order to focus the purpose of the show upon shedding light on the process over the 
product.  The show presupposed that there may be an interest in finding out what goes 
on ‘behind the scenes’ when an artist creates a work of art. The complicity of the 
Foundation, which, of course, being at the epicentre of Moore’s creative production, had 
access to an abundance of such material, meant that the ‘Henry Moore Centre for the 
Study of Sculpture’ was able to utilise the availability of material that in the case of the 
majority of well-known artists, was not generally accessible.  This is an important 
consideration within this thesis, as it highlights the way in which Moore and the 
Foundation’s preservation and commodification of his supplementary works made new 
approaches to exhibiting and interpreting such material, possible. 
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The maquettes, plasters, and working models were all far more transportable than the 
cumbersome full-scale sculptures, and as such the Foundation’s large collection was 
regularly in demand.  The practical properties of works devised as primarily equipmental 
would therefore become further utilised.  David Mitchinson – Moore’s former assistant 
and a key member of the Foundation – describes one of the problems that can arise from 
the misuse of their material, saying how: “Often it seemed that anyone who could lay 
hands on a few prints and a couple of working models considered that he or she had 
sufficient material to announce an ‘exhibition’.”194  
 
This exemplifies one of the pivotal issues regarding the complex status of preliminary, 
preparatory, and supplementary material.  There is always the possibility or risk that the 
distinction between work considered by the artist to be part of their creative process, and 
work they consider to be the culmination of this process, will be misunderstood and 
misappropriated either by the organisers of exhibitions, the viewing public, or both.  This 
underlines the responsibility contemporary curators have for ensuring that the context in 
which particular works have been produced is carefully attended to.  At the same time, it 
shows how such works can be ambiguous enough, and perceived to be of enough artistic 
value in themselves, to justify placing them on ‘centre stage’ in this way.   
 
Whilst the AGO display and the ‘Henry Moore: Sculpture in the Making’ show both 
ensured that the original function of the material was clearly indicated (and in fact 
specifically highlighted), it is possible for an exhibition to go ahead, as Mitchinson says, 
with only a handful of work that bears the name and the touch of the artist.  The artist 
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themselves would not necessarily consider them to be fit for the purpose of being 
presented in an ambiguous light that potentially implies the works on display are the 
‘finished products’.  But how relevant is this concern if there is a genuine interest in the 
‘products’ of their creative process?           
 
In 1984 one of Moore’s working models, ‘Working Model for Reclining Figure: Angles’ 
(1975-77) was lent to the Government Art Collection, and consequently put on display in 
Number 10 Downing Street.195  This shows the capacity for supplementary material to 
represent an artist even in one of the most prominent locations in the UK, which raises 
the question (explored in the remaining chapters) of how far sensitivities towards original 
intent extend when an apparently ‘lower’ form of work-for-art can be utilised in such a 
way.       
 
Preserving the Past and Educating the Present 
 
Henry Moore died at his home in Perry Green on 31 August 1986.  Though The 
Foundation had already put in a tremendous effort to promote the artist and his work in a 
way that would meet The Foundation’s mandate of advancing the education of the 
public, Moore’s death would mark the beginning of a period of even greater promotional 
intensity.  Whilst the production of new material had obviously reached an end, new 
tasks and challenges would become apparent.  Mitchinson refers to the sculpture 
assistants (of which he was one) taking on a new role as “sculpture conservators” after 
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Moore’s death.196  Even works on paper were provided with environmentally controlled 
conditions, underlining their archival importance.   
 
The members of the Foundation would have recognised the public interest in shows such 
as the one held by the Henry Moore Centre for the Study of Sculpture, which focused on 
Moore’s working process and inspiration.  It is therefore unsurprising that the Foundation 
would look to increase the publics’ exposure to such works by providing assistance in 
appropriate proposed shows.  In 1991, forty-two small works and four medium-sized 
works were displayed in seven regional galleries in the UK.  David Sylvester writes in the 
catalogue that accompanied the shows – ‘Henry Moore: Sketch-Models and Working-
Models’ - that “the small pieces were often the initial embodiment of an idea in sculptural 
form and were entirely modelled by the artist without the aid of assistants”.197  It is clear 
from this statement that Sylvester is referring to the initial manifestation of the creative 
idea and the lack of assistance when producing the work on show, as being positive 
attributes worth promoting so as to make a case for the material to be considered as 
having a significant value.  Sylvester recognises in the preliminary and preparatory works 
a value that appears adjacent to the ‘complete’ works.  He invites the public to consider 
this value, with special attention given to conception and materialisation, which is 
pointedly artist-centric instead of work-centric.   
 
This can be contrasted with the focus of the exhibition put on in 1996 by the Henry 
Moore Foundation and curated by David Mitchinson; ‘Henry Moore: From the Inside 
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Out’.198  There was also an accompanying book of the same title.199  Of all the exhibitions 
and shows that had focused on his preliminary and preparatory works, this was the 
largest - the focus being on the plasters, with Mitchinson explaining that: “Outside 
Toronto they remained far less known than the bronze casts that were made from them.  
They had seldom been exhibited or commented on in monographs or exhibition 
catalogues, indeed many that remained at the Foundation had never previously been 
exhibited.”200 
 
The theme for the show was ‘Ideas for sculptures’ which - like the ‘Henry Moore: Sketch-
Models and Working-Models’ shows – saw the organisers and curators attempting to 
make explicit the formation of the idea, from its first physical appearances, up to its 
ultimate ‘realisation’.  This is tantamount to saying that the drawings, plasters and 
carvings are all produced during the formalising of the idea, and can legitimately be 
contemplated as manifestations of the idea stage as it literally takes shape on its way 
(crucially only potentially) to the ‘complete’ piece.  To an extent this falls within the 
application of Heidegger’s notion of causality.  The crucial difference here is the emphasis 
of the idea deriving from the artist, whereas for Heidegger the artist is essentially a vessel 
(albeit one with a particular talent) through which the concealed is brought out into 
unconcealment.  Such a show emphasises the dominant, conventional view of the artistic 
process, and can be seen as a further example of the educational deployment of the vast 
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reserve of material at the Foundations’ disposal, as the ‘works-of-the-artist’ are given due 
attention. 
   
Both the exhibition and the accompanying book present the works as stages in the 
production of the completed works they promise, to which they ultimately defer.  Whilst 
they celebrate the value of the works as containing the ideas and their development on 
their way to the ‘complete’ sculptures, they nevertheless avoid losing sight of this 
hierarchy.  Indeed the three essays within the book - by Manfred Fath, Claude Allemand-
Cosneu and Catherine Ferbos-Nakov, and Ann Hindry – all focus on the centrality of the 
artist.  Whether writing about his overall career (Fath), his relationship to, and impact in 
France (Allemand-Cosneu and Ferbos-Nakov), or the meaning behind his ideas (Hindry), 
the value of the plasters and working models is assumed as a given, their place firmly set, 
allowing the discussion to swiftly move beyond them to issues of ‘greater’ significance. 
 
In addition to the essays, Henry Moore: from the Inside Out included plates of all the work 
of the exhibition, each accompanied by a short commentary from a variety of 
contributors.  Almost invariably these comments would refer to the idea behind the form, 
with the model capable of easily being substituted for the ‘complete’ work without 
troubling the consistency of the text.  When the maquettes, plasters and working models 
are addressed directly, it is for the most part in order to discuss the material used, or the 
technical procedure of working the model up to a more complete state.  A clear 
distinction is therefore upheld that separates the work of art from its equipmental and/or 
supplementary derivatives, in which the unifying element that dominates is that of the 
artist as causa efficiens – as the individual that is responsible for the work. 
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In the same year, practical concerns were occupying the members of the Foundation as 
they continued to develop Perry Green.   
 
The Bourne maquette studio (Figure 5), where Moore had worked until his health 
deteriorated in 1983, became one of the most significant areas of development.  
Mitchinson describes the restoration process: 
 
The inside rooms were photographed and each plaster maquette was identified 
and labelled before Woodward and Cooper removed everything, cleaning and 
making condition reports as they went along.  Once the studio was emptied, 
unnecessary external windows and doors were blocked, a new interior window 
was created to make viewing easier and prevent non-essential access, and the 
spaces were redecorated in their original colours.  Then came the task of returning 
all the contents.  Over three hundred little plasters were put back, with slightly 
more on view as the conservators had found some hidden in boxes and drawers.  
They were also able to restore a number of fragmented works and reassemble 
others whose elements had become separated.  The found objects were also 
Figure 5: Henry Moore's Bourne Maquette Studio, Hertfordshire, England, 2011. Image redacted. 
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cleaned, while others removed over the years for exhibition displays were 
returned.201 
       
There is an interesting dichotomy at work here.  The Foundation goes to great lengths to 
‘restore’ the studio, by reverting the colours back to the ones used originally, repairing 
damaged items, and generally cleaning the material and space.  At the same time, The 
Foundation quite transparently presents the studio as a more polished, public-friendly 
space, by adjusting or removing particular features, as well as displaying models that for 
whatever reason had been discarded by the artist in boxes or drawers.  In Figure 5, 
equipment, maquettes, and the contents of the table, are all laid out so as to render them 
more visible to viewers, suggesting a sense of order that is in sharp contrast to the 
presentation of Bacon’s relocated studio (discussed in chapter five).  The result seems to 
be caught between being an act of preservation, and being a display of Moore’s work, 
with the end product having more in common with an idealised museum exhibit.  The 
issue of the preservation or idealisation of an artist’s studio, together with what 
ramifications this has for considerations of de-mystification and mystification, will be 
explored in detail in chapter five.     
 
By re-presenting Moore’s studio in the way that they have, the Foundation were able to 
significantly heighten the availability of original works to the public.  This re-presenting of 
Moore’s studio encourages, at the same time, an evaluation of the studio’s contents as 
having cultural value, whilst clearly contextualising them as separate or merely adjacent 
to Moore’s complete works.  The proximity of such works-for-art to works-of-art, as 
produced and explored in the above re-interpretation and application of Heidegger’s 
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theory of causality, is hinted at in their continued preservation, whilst concealed within a 
context that pointedly connects them to a utilitarian function.  The maquettes and the 
studio itself are situated by the Foundation within a biographical and educational frame 
that dictates how they might be interpreted.          
 
There are a number of potential cultural and critical obstacles that need to be navigated 
when using the works of artists for educational purposes, and the Foundation approaches 
these difficulties in a variety of ways.  The status of the maquette - whilst promoted as 
being an important part of the overall project that carries with it the properties of 
nearness to the original idea, and the greater ‘imprint’ of the artist themselves, remains 
held at arm’s length when it comes to the authority of the esteemed artwork.  Something 
of the “domestic” nature (and by this I understand a certain informality and 
approachability) that maquettes are so commonly held to have, is hinted at in an 
educational project organised by the Foundation, in conjunction with Little Hallingbury 
School in 2010. 
 
Taking as its basis some of the working practices used by Moore, the project began by 
asking the pupils to choose an organic object.  Each visit to Perry Green would focus on a 
different area of Moore’s working process; printmaking, textile printing, creating a 
maquette, observational drawing, and context.  The ‘creating a maquette’ workshop 
involved pressing the found object into a clay mould, then pouring plaster into the mould.  
A maquette was then made which used the found object in some way.202  Whilst from 
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one point of view this could be said to trivialise the status of maquettes and preliminary 
works in general, from another viewpoint it also emphasises this often hidden yet 
dynamic involvement that constitutes several facets of the artistic process itself.  It brings 
it to the fore in a lively manner that sheds light on the individual roles and properties of 
the supplementary material displayed at Perry Green whilst simultaneously highlighting 
the fascination with the act of creating that exists from a young age, and which I will 
argue holds the key to the significance of the displaying of preliminary and preparatory 
works that is addressed and built up in the remaining case studies. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This brings this chapter back to the earlier discussion of Heidegger’s distinctions between 
art and equipment on one hand, and on the other his notion of causality that I consider to 
bridge this gap and provide a framework to bring that which blurs the boundaries 
between art and equipment into a richer, more detailed consideration in its own right.  
What I aimed to show earlier in this chapter was the complexity of the different series of 
causality involved in each stage of the creative process.  This included their 
interconnections, as well as their particular properties in relation to a (then) working 
artist, Henry Moore.  Heidegger downplays the prominence of the artist in the causality of 
the work of art by distancing himself from the classical understanding of the artist or 
artisan as causa efficiens.  He nevertheless situates the artist as one of the pivotal four 
causes that interrelate under the rule of a bringing-forth into a revealing of the concealed 
into the unconcealed, an unconcealment in which art is more purely able to presence 
itself in its createdness and as such allow the bringing-forth of truth as ἀλήθεια.  
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Heidegger’s specific concept of art as ἀλήθεια is not of itself pivotal to the present 
analysis of supplementarity, as this would imply aligning this discussion with a particular 
and contested philosophy of far-reaching implications.  Instead, the methodological 
approach to analysing supplementary material made possible by this concept becomes an 
invaluable method of opening up the complex nature of the status of the supplement.     
 
Technology is also defined by Heidegger as being a matter of revealing, and this shared 
attribute unites both art and equipment in a way that frees preliminary and preparatory 
works from being specifically considered in terms of either one or the other.  This chapter 
establishes a means of classifying such material, in a way that will be of use to artists and 
curators alike.  It is especially useful in carefully analysing the classification and use made 
of such material that can be made by the artist themselves, and whilst I do not claim that 
this analysis can be precisely applied to all practising artists, it provides a template for 
understanding what defines such supplementary material as ‘supplementary’.  The notion 
of ‘enshrining’ is introduced as a new way of considering the ways in which certain works 
are derived from previous works, with a particular emphasis given to the transformative 
effects that bronze castings have on the value and use of maquettes.  
 
The overarching question of this chapter – ‘what is the supplement?’ – remains largely 
(although not completely) dominated by what is in question, and how it is presented for 
interpretation.  Different categories of supplementarity (preliminary works, preparatory 
works, biographical material, and educational devices), in effect, form spheres that 
eclipse one another, depending on where the spotlight shines.  When the spotlight is cast 
on education, the other categories support this focus.  When the spotlight is cast on 
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preliminary works, the other categories illuminate rather than overshadow this 
consideration.  The direction of this spotlight is dictated by hierarchical classifications of 
works of art and supplementarity that, as addressed in chapter two, are in a state of 
perpetual historical fluctuation.  The supplement is whatever happens to be appropriated 
or framed as a support for a particular area of focus, but this analysis and application of 
Heidegger’s concept of causality, as well as the consideration of influences surrounding 
the interpretation of Moore’s work, serves to highlight how the status of the supplement 
is one that invites slippage and re-evaluation between notions of supplementarity, rather 
than being fixed in place.  For something to be used as equipment does not mean that it 
is only to be considered as equipment.  This complicates Fer’s notion of the ‘sub-object’ 
that “remains closer to a thing” by indicating how this use of Heidegger’s notion of 
causality can determine different qualities of both equipment and work within the same 
item of consideration.  Equally, for something to be considered a work of art does not 
mean that it cannot itself become supplementary (as explored in chapter five).      
 
As one of the four governed causes, the artist has a share in the control of the work of 
art.  It was shown how Moore’s maquettes functioned as potential complete works that 
Moore would enter into a reciprocal relationship with (that of a maquette holding a 
prolonged interest for Moore, and that of a maquette demanding Moore’s interest).  In 
contrast, the next chapter will address the opposite to this relationship by exploring 
supplementarity in terms of incompleteness, the lack of control or influence over its use, 
and corresponding issues of legacy and appropriation.  Connecting these issues, and 
furthering the discussion of causal series at different stages of the artistic process 
explored in this chapter, will be an investigation into the hierarchical classification of art.   
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Chapter Four: Hierarchy and Control        
 
The key question driving this chapter is - ‘how is the supplement classified?’ – which 
differs from the previous inquiry into the status of the supplement by addressing 
historically formed hierarchical classifications of works produced by artists.  It is not a 
question of what the supplement is that is discussed here, but of how it has been defined, 
and whether such definitions can themselves be questioned.  In this chapter I will 
complement the previous discussion with an exploration of incompleteness and the lack 
of control, or rather an appropriation of control in which the artist’s influence is 
diminished.  The issue of ‘incompletion’ will be unfolded in order to explore the ways this 
term can be understood in relation to different stages of the artistic process.  This will be 
in order to understand its possible evaluation and meaning, as well as to shed light on 
methods of appropriation where a conventionally ‘complete’ work of art is absent.   
 
In order to unpack these notions I will be looking at the work of the Italian architect 
Antonio Sant’Elia (1888 – 1916) who was associated with the Italian Futurist movement 
and who was killed in the First World War before any of his ambitious and distinctive 
architectural ideas could be constructed.  Sant’Elia’s reputation is based on a series of 
highly Modernist architectural drawings and sketches that became associated with the 
‘architectural wing’ of the Futurist movement.  Sant’Elia did not live long enough to 
construct any of his designs, but left behind a series of drawings and sketches of varying 
degrees of execution and quality, many of which continue to feature in publications and 
exhibitions on Futurism and modernity.  I chose to focus on Sant’Elia because of:  the 
significant distinctions between drawn or sketched proposals and the monumental 
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structures they proposed; the distinctions and relations between the various preliminary 
and preparatory works themselves; and the particular context and circumstances relating 
to the artist and his work that illuminate the issue of appropriation.  
 
As with the previous chapter, I address both the philosophical issues relating to the 
evaluation of the material in question, as well as discussing the ways in which this 
material has been used (in the past and the present) in order to develop further this 
exploration of supplementarity.  This will be accompanied by an exploration of the 
possible evaluation of his work, as well as an analysis of hierarchy in supplementary 
material in general.     
 
The elevated status of Sant’Elia’s works on paper that has resulted from the 
circumstances of his early death and association with the Futurists means that some key 
concepts can be derived from a discussion of his practice.  In particular, the artistic 
aspects of the creative process that can be identified in works even when those works 
were envisioned as part of a (potentially speculative) project.  This discussion of Sant’Elia 
also allows processes of appropriation to come to the fore through the absence of the 
controlling influence of the artist.  This does not mean that the use of Deleuze in this 
chapter merely illustrates or supports these practice-based concepts; instead, practice 
and theory provide foils for one another, where the relevance of each for this discussion 
of supplementarity can be better elucidated.  This chapter therefore provides an account 
of processes of classification and appropriation of use for studies into the formation of art 
history, and the history of Futurism itself.   
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Sant’Elia 
 
Sant’Elia’s architectural education tells a story of a fairly unremarkable student in most 
areas except drawing, where he excelled.  Certainly the scarcity of plans or sections in his 
works would suggest that the technical aspect of architectural design was far less 
appealing, and came to him less easily than the act of employing his imagination to create 
potential new structures.  There appeared to be a friction between the constraints and 
pragmatism of structural engineering, and the freedom of creating fanciful and vague 
ideas for buildings.  This is significant in understanding to what extent the drawings and 
preliminary sketches discussed here were intended to lead to plausible buildings; to what 
extent he would need to compromise the designs (and the bearing this had on his own 
ideas); and to what extent the material left behind can legitimately be classified as the 
preliminary work of an architect.  The discussion of Sant’Elia extends the analysis of 
classification in the previous chapter by explaining the degree to which intention on the 
part of the artist matters to those displaying and experiencing works.  Whilst the 
discussion on Moore focused primarily on the artist’s involvement in the classification of 
their works, this chapter makes use of an account of the artist’s background and working 
process to see to what extent works can be appropriated and ‘re-framed’ in different 
ways to their intended purpose, and how much this transformative approach might be 
justified.  As such, this aspect of the chapter will be of particular relevance for studies into 
curating and museum theory.    
 
The associative powers of an artist’s reputation in relation to the totality of their output, 
is magnified all the more when there is a shortage of existing material.  As Foucault 
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argued:  “Even when an individual has been accepted as an author, we must still ask 
whether everything that he wrote, said, or left behind is part of his work.  The problem is 
both theoretical and technical.  When undertaking the publication of Nietzsche’s works, 
for example, where should one stop?”203 
 
Foucault refers to the most extreme example, whereby a shopping list drawn up by 
Nietzsche would still ‘technically’ be the product of Nietzsche’s writing, but is clearly of a 
different type to his philosophical works.  What Foucault is alluding to here is a hierarchy 
of classifying authors and their products.  Such a hierarchy can be identified in the ways in 
which preliminary and preparatory works-for-art have been utilised, or in some cases 
ignored or poorly defined, giving rise to an ambiguous and confused lack of ordering that 
figuratively elevates Nietzsche’s shopping list to the same level as Thus Spake 
Zarathustra.204  With the work of Sant’Elia, this hierarchy of classification is problematised 
by the way in which his career came to an end.  Foucault’s question does not refer to the 
importance of authorship on the part of the author themselves, but of the importance 
given to it by those in a position to put certain material to use.  Such appropriation will be 
discussed at the end of this chapter, and more fully explored in chapter five.  For now, it 
has relevance in revealing what could be called an external aspect of hierarchical ordering 
that is brought to a thing produced by someone to which the term ‘author’ is applied on 
some level.  When the thing in question shares traits with that which the author is 
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renowned for as an author (a written list and the writer, the rough sketch and the artist), 
the attribution of significance may become confused.  As such, care must be taken in 
understanding how value and meaning is to be applied or discerned in a particular thing. 
 
Sant’Elia’s early works, such as Temple of Fame’ for the Monza cemetery, from 1912, are 
not particularly striking or distinguished from similar academic works of this era, however 
they can provide evidence of learned traits that assist with the interpretation of more 
celebrated works.  The influence of Sant’Elia’s education at the Academy of Brera, where 
the worms’-eye-view perspective was taught as a form of “romantic evasion”, can be 
traced in the pictorial rendering of the ambitious projects that would later cement his 
reputation.205  In this sense, Sant’Elia’s early works have an educational use that 
outweighs their value as works of art.  With his later drawings and sketches forming the 
cornerstone of his reputation and significance, these earlier works take on a retrospective 
value.  This occurs through their formal resemblance and relationship to the more 
revered works, and through the reputation of the author (and not of value in and of 
themselves).  This can be demonstrated by referring to the extensive collection of 
Sant’Elia’s work held at the Musei Civici di Como, consisting of 184 works on paper.206  Of 
these, the 26 dated (or estimated to date) from before 1912 (the point where Sant’Elia’s 
innovative style began to appear prominently) have rarely been loaned out for exhibition 
purposes.  Instead, it is the works most recognisably associated with Futurism that are 
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most in demand.207  This indicates a hierarchical ordering of value that has been 
established between museums and galleries looking to include samples of Sant’Elia’s 
works.  The works that are widely reproduced and circulated in books on Futurism are 
loaned out the most, followed by works from his dinamismi (which will be discussed 
shortly).  Despite all of the work in the Musei Civici di Como collection sharing the general 
traits of being original depictions, plans, or details of non-existent buildings produced by 
the same author, there is a clear divide in the levels of interest shown in loaning them.  
This is a division centred on period, style, and familiarity that through repetition only 
serves to reinforce it.  The implications of this for the thesis is that it shows how such 
material, ostensibly capable of being categorised as works-for-art, can themselves be 
further divided into material that provides an educational support (or supplement) for 
works that receive greater attention.  In order to clarify this issue of hierarchical ordering 
of Sant’Elia’s creative output, I will now turn to a former colleague and contemporary of 
Foucault’s – Gilles Deleuze. 
 
As discussed in chapter one, Deleuze, along with Guattari, stated that they did not believe 
in a system of the fine arts.  However, that is not to say that they did not have clear ideas 
of what would and would not constitute ‘art’.  During a lecture in 1987, Deleuze said that: 
“A work of art has nothing to do with communication.  A work of art does not contain the 
least bit of information.”208  By this, Deleuze did not mean that a work of art might not be 
appropriated by others who may find ways of rendering it informative in accordance with 
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their own interests or intentions.  Instead the work itself as work can never contain 
information or communication as a function or intended property.  Deleuze and Guattari 
see the work of art as “a being of sensation and nothing else”.  As soon as it is said to be 
informative, or capable of communicating something, it is not the work that is working, 
but something from outside being brought to it and appropriating it.   
 
It is in this sense that Sant’Elia’s earliest works can be understood.  The works 
themselves, being derivative, are in effect eclipsed by their capacity to provide 
information about the biographical development of Sant’Elia.  A commodity value is 
produced (in this case, historical and educational value) to make up for the relatively 
mundane quality of the works as art.  As such, and as opposed to Heidegger’s notion of 
causality, it is the classical causa efficiens that is elevated to a pedestal, whereby the 
prominence of the artist/author leads to value being attached to the material.   
 
Within the current analysis of a possible hierarchy of Sant’Elia’s work, it is thus designated 
as properly supplementary material, and therefore apparently of a ‘lower order’ 
subordinated to the works of art they serve to inform.  That is not to say that Deleuze 
himself would agree to such hierarchical classification.  Instead this shows that from a 
Deleuzian perspective the work of art itself is no longer being encountered, but that only 
an externally bestowed value (under the primacy of causa efficiens) is being attached to 
it.                  
 
Yet how does this hierarchy of Sant’Elia’s work apply to his finished architectural 
projects?  After all, would it not be appropriate for the measure of an architect’s abilities 
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to be the quality of the structures he actually made?  Of the two surviving structures 
erected according to Sant’Elia’s designs during his lifetime, the only building is the ‘Villa 
Elisi’ in Como (1912), which whilst having some mildly distinctive features, is for the most 
part rather conventional.  The other structure, the Caprotti tomb in Monza (1913), whilst 
hinting at a more inventive approach that would mark Sant’Elia’s revered works on paper, 
is primarily distinguishable as the only example of a complete piece, where the plans, 
sections and measurements still exist.  This makes the tomb of interest to scholars of 
Sant’Elia’s work due to the indication of his working method.  The ‘Villa Elisi’ is almost an 
anachronism in the body of work Sant’Elia left behind.  Whilst Sant’Elia’s academic 
drawings and sketches can provide indications of the development of the ideas that 
would lead to his more revered works, the ‘Villa Elisi’ represents the culmination and 
realisation of such formalist training.   
 
A reversal of what could be called a traditional hierarchical relationship between 
preliminary and preparatory works, and the completed or finished works, takes place 
here.  The completed works are of insufficient quantity to constitute the main point of 
reference in the assessment and evaluation of Sant’Elia’s output.  They are also of 
insufficient quality in relation to his most revered drawings and sketches to stake a claim 
as being the culmination of the ideas being developed in such ‘unfinished’ works.  In 
contrast to the work of Moore, the references to both of these completed structures 
represent the lack of control Sant’Elia had over his legacy, whereby early and largely 
compromised works would be given more attention than he would have ever anticipated.  
This was due to the significance they would come to have (albeit negatively) as 
indications of his architectural accomplishments.  Classification not only takes place 
172 
 
during or shortly after the creative process, but can also happen retrospectively, 
transforming otherwise complete works into supporting material; informative footnotes 
to accounts of an artist’s career.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Antonio Sant'Elia, 'Untitled (Dinamismi series)', 1913. Musei Civici di Como. Image redacted. 
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The Dinamismi 
 
This section addresses the issue of hierarchical classification through works by Sant’Elia 
that functioned as lexicographic sketches for potential projects, whilst also becoming the 
objects of detailed analysis in their own right.  The discussion shows how the 
circumstances surrounding these works influence the level of attention given to them, 
and consequently affects their interpretation and use.       
 
In the same year that Sant’Elia was commissioned to design the Caprotti tomb, he 
executed what are now considered to be some of his most startlingly original and inspired 
works.  The collection of drawings known as ‘dinamismi’ are small, minimal and in most 
cases clearly produced in a short space of time, with the quickness of the pen strokes 
evident throughout.  In Figure 6 it can be seen that instead of elaborate details, and 
dramatically coloured landscapes, this image consists of large empty spaces of white, 
enclosed by a few ruler-guided pen strokes that often carry on past the points where they 
intersect with one another.  The swift lines that exceed the edges create the illusion of 
speed, as if Sant’Elia was rushed and had no time to render the image more precisely.  
The lines encourage the eye to move quickly, as one glances rather than gazes at the 
drawings, leading to a sense of dynamism and movement unusual in architectural 
imagery.209  Da Costa Meyer notes the influence of Boccioni, and it is fair to consider the 
dinamismi as Sant’Elia’s first significant steps towards a style in line with the leanings of 
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Futurist contemporaries and associated practitioners.210  For such a simple and minimal 
drawing, it manages to contain a wealth of information.  This includes evidence of the 
influence of his peers, the beginning of his exploration of an inventive new cityscape, and 
the application of a technique that contrasts starkly with the conventional works that 
preceded them.   
 
Sanford Kwinter, in Architectures of Time, dedicates a chapter to evaluating Sant’Elia’s 
later works in terms of how they represented a changed attitude towards the relationship 
between art, time, and space.  Kwinter’s following observations on the dinamismi 
highlight how the influence of Futurism, the character of the author, and the expressing 
of an ethos, can be discerned within a few lines on paper:  “One is inevitably struck, when 
examining Sant’Elia’s sketches, by the extraordinary momentum of the draftsmanship, 
the obsessively precise freehand style with its swift, simplified yet deliberate lines, at 
once restrained and expressive, volatile and refined.”211  Their “obsessively precise” 
execution underlines the seriousness of the drawings, and consequently of the artist at 
the time of making them.  Their simplicity belies their importance to Sant’Elia, as instead 
of half-heartedly indicating a generalised form of an idea, the dinamismi represent a 
microcosmic stage of ‘completion’ – albeit one situated (at least in theory) at the 
beginning of a larger project.  The strokes in Figure 6 are not just suggestions or outlines 
for potential works, but capture a style, mindset, and moment of self-expression in a very 
specific way, utilising this minimal approach to expand the drawing’s capacity to invite 
speculation, and rendering the drawing an end in its own right.  As Kwinter notes, each 
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drawing consists of a dichotomy of techniques, whereby the level of control deployed 
allows the bold, overlapping, and generally more expressive lines to become more 
distinct, whilst avoiding slipping too far into the appearance of a ‘rough’ sketch.  It is this 
conscious blending of accuracy and haste that allows the dynamic qualities in Figure 6 to 
stand out as intentional, rather than as a result of an ill-disciplined or impatient 
draughtsman quickly scrawling ideas down on whatever happened to be at hand.  The 
qualitative content of the dinamismi is therefore rendered with a certain level of 
refinement which, coupled with their historical importance as his first major steps 
towards the style for which he would be remembered, causes them to occupy a high 
place in any hierarchical ordering of his works.  However, as I will show, it remains in a 
supporting, supplementary role.   
 
These were not drawings produced with the intention of building them, but were instead 
exercises in envisioning a new, modern world that fitted in with the ideology of the 
Futurist movement, and the developments of Modernism in Europe in general.  Luciano 
Caramel and Alberto Longatti emphasise this point, arguing:  “Sant’Elia was perfectly 
aware of the fact that his ideas could not be put into effect.  And this implies that these 
ideas were charged with innovative potential, and were meant to provide all-
encompassing answers, in the form of suggestive images, with great emphasis given to 
psychological and fantastical values.”212  If these drawings were never intended to be 
developed into finished structures, Petherbridge’s observation on architectural sketches 
emerging “partly out of an internalised and therefore unconscious identification with 
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inspirational genius and its signifying process” becomes problematic.213  The discussion of 
Heidegger’s notion of causality encourages a more subtle approach to the origins of the 
dinamismi, where they can be interpreted as entirely conscious efforts to create works 
that are ends in themselves, albeit works that contain within them the potential for 
further projects.   
 
For the most part, the buildings have no discernible function, though some are clearly 
intended to depict power stations.  The heights of the walls and the large plain areas 
suggest monumental structures, but minimal and simple ones as well.  Though there are 
several traits that have been carried over from his drawings from the previous year, the 
style of the dinamismi is altogether more vibrant and energetic.  Da Costa Meyer 
describes the drawings from 1912 as “invertebrate, and one has difficulty imagining the 
gloomy interiors as other than unlit, shaftlike caves”.214  Clearly they were not intended as 
the initial stages of an actual design that would require detailed interiors and an 
organised inventory of materials.  The dinamismi represent the crystallisation of his initial 
private ideas, where his imagination was able to operate freely without the restrictions of 
a brief, or with a view to meeting the expectations of an educational institute.  There is an 
apparently clear equipmental function; a polished, worked up series that formed a 
catalogue of architectural patterns, forms, and gestures that could be incorporated into 
later projects.  Llorenç Bonet acknowledges this purpose of the dinamismi when he 
observes that there is no attempt or “inclination to define clearly a specific use.  What we 
see instead are fragments, parts, volumes: the aim is to create a formal repertory that 
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serves as a basis for a language to build in concrete and steel”.215  This is emphasised in 
Figure 6 by the inclusion of a second, smaller depiction in the bottom right of this picture, 
which causes the smaller and larger depictions to resonate with one another as two 
captured ideas within the same creative act.  The same issue of distinction found in 
Moore’s transformation drawings seems to occur here.   
 
As with Moore’s drawings, the dinamismi are not entirely equipmental, but are produced 
under the governance of a causa finalis that dictates the matter and form, as well as the 
approach of the artist.  However, the causa formalis, and the causa finalis itself, are both 
brought forth in the dinamismi in ways that diverge significantly from a purely 
architectural function, and instead become more pictorially gestural as works in their own 
right.  Whilst Moore’s drawings invariably addressed issues such as shape, material, and 
lighting that all related specifically to their intended use as preparatory steps towards 
potential sculptures, the dinamismi consist of techniques that convey monumentality, 
minimalism, and speed all at once.  This occurs through the form of the lines, and an 
awareness on the part of Sant’Elia that these drawings were not merely functional.  They 
immediately place themselves within the borders of the emerging styles associated with 
Futurism.   
 
Furthermore, the perspectives used throughout the dinamismi situate the structures 
within a wider world.  They emphasise their implied existence as part of a larger city, 
rather than being isolated drawings focused entirely upon the outline of the structure, 
which would reduce them to merely abstract designs.  Placing them within a landscape, 
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no matter how minimally or simplistically rendered, assists in drawing in the viewer by 
allowing their imagination to project the works onto a speculative reality.  Kwinter 
situates the use of this technique historically when he observes that Sant’Elia deployed:  
“the borrowing of a device common to Nineteenth-Century painting, but just beginning to 
discover new modes of application in the nascent art of cinema: that of allowing the 
contents of a frame, no matter how spare or ‘innocent,’ to become fraught with whatever 
occurs or exists beyond it”.216 
 
Such a simple addition transforms the drawings from realisable design, to the fantastical, 
as a narrative is implied within which a particular building or structure is but one element.  
The lack of an indication of use, as highlighted by Bonet, only emphasises further their 
qualities as images that seemingly allow the imagination to speculate, rather than 
imposing intended functions and meaning onto the viewer.  At stake here is the blurring 
of the boundaries between art and equipment, and the problems this leads to in relation 
to classifying the works of artists into one of these categories.  This is a matter of concern 
for both artists and those who utilise the works of artists, because it has implications for 
how the creative process itself can involve the production of artistically valuable material 
throughout its different stages, and of how this artistic value is determined and 
consumed.  This leads to a development of my interpretation of Heidegger’s causality by 
way of Deleuze’s notion of the actualisation of ideas, and the significance this has for 
understanding completion, incompletion, and apparent hierarchical orderings in the 
creative process in relation to supplementarity.   
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Deleuze, Art, and Sensation 
     
In Deleuze’s philosophy, art, in a way that echoes Heidegger, is that which could be 
described as bringing forth or expressing that which can only be sensed.  However, for 
Deleuze this occurs by way of what he calls signs (discussed in chapter one).  Not all signs 
are art, but all works of art, or rather art that works, create a sign.  For Deleuze, the sign is 
akin to that which Kant discovers at the limit of the faculty of sensibility (the receptive 
capacity of the mind), in what Kant calls the sublime (“the sublime is that, the mere 
capacity of thinking which evidences a faculty of mind transcending every standard of 
sense”).217  At this limit of the faculty of sensibility, Deleuze locates signs, which as 
discussed in chapter one, he correlates with Plato’s second form of sensation (the 
thought-provoking).   
 
The significance of this is that the sign, the experience of which is grounded in sensation, 
becomes the basis of thought, established as an encounter with Difference itself (which 
Deleuze also calls (non)-being, or ?-being).218  In Deleuze’s thought, pure Difference 
underlies the unfolding and actualisation of the world, in opposition to classical thought 
going back to Plato that grounded all existence in the identical.  This was a pre-given 
unifying identical Being from which difference would only appear as the sub-dividing of 
the identical (the oneness of Being) into various classifications or categories.  In the 
classical model of thought going back to Plato, Difference would be subordinated to the 
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identical, resemblance, contradiction (or opposition), and analogy.  Instead, Deleuze 
formulates a philosophy in which Difference is that from which thinking is instigated, 
rather than merely being a formal division of a pre-given unity.  The sign is the encounter 
with difference (or with a differential relation of differences), and has two characteristics, 
which Smith describes thus: “The first is that the sign riots the soul, renders it perplexed, 
as if the encountered sign were the bearer of a problem.  The second is something that 
can only be felt or sensed.”219 
 
The sign as “bearer of a problem” alludes to both Plato’s second form of sensation, and 
Kant’s encounter with the sublime as a problematic experience (which Kant describes in 
terms of the mind’s inadequacy and incompetence when trying to understand the 
experiencing of the sublime).  The prominence of the problematic in interpretations of art 
has correlations with Adorno’s notion of enigmaticalness (which will be expanded upon in 
chapter five), in that it is the puzzlement itself (rather than any attempts at solving the 
puzzle) that gives it its force.  At first, these distinct but similarly ‘problematic’ encounters 
would seem to be at odds with Heidegger’s notion of ἀλήθεια, however as a temporal 
unconcealment of truth, ἀλήθεια (the driving force behind Heidegger’s notion of 
causality) also calls into question the fixity of meaning and reality, only momentarily 
providing the possibility of encountering a truth that remains closer to a feeling or sense 
than a clear revelation.  In all these concepts there is an encounter that lifts the one 
encountering ‘out of the everyday’.  As such, this discussion of the sign (and of these 
concepts as they are used throughout this thesis) can be situated within historical 
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concerns with sense-based encounters that have been frequently associated with the 
experiencing of art.  The present discussion is therefore of significance for studies of 
aesthetics and the relationship between the philosophy of art, art history, and the 
experience of art.       
 
As something that can only be sensed, the sign is an intensity of sensation that is 
experienced in a complex relationship between what Deleuze calls the virtual and the 
actual.  The virtual is understood as real but not actual, wherein it is the possible (as a 
multiplicity of intensities of difference), but is not potentiality (which would already be 
governed by actual limitations).  The virtual is ‘non-thought’, but non-thought in the 
process of becoming actualised.  He describes this movement thus:  “We call the 
determination of the virtual content of an Idea differentiation; we call the actualisation of 
that virtuality into species and distinguished parts differenciation.”220                
 
Differentiation could be described as the gathering together and distinguishing of 
differences or singularities (for example three different pitches of sound) from a virtual 
plane of multiplicities (for example, white noise in general) that forms a pre-actualised, 
imminent Idea.  The sign is produced through this differentiation as an intensity emerging 
from the differential relations (for example, a chord).  Differenciation on the other hand, 
is the distinguishing of these differentiated singularities (as intensities) into distinct 
elements that actualise the idea, where intensities become ordered, organised, and 
interpreted in consciousness as qualities (for example, musical harmony).  Deleuze (in 
reference to Leibniz) uses the example of the sound of crashing waves to show how 
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sensation can instigate thoughts and experience through a combination of the virtual and 
actual, by describing such a sound as being both clear and confused.  It is clear inasmuch 
as the sound is perceived all at once, yet it is confused insofar as the singularities of the 
sounds of each individual droplet of water are not themselves differenciated – that is, 
grasped and perceived clearly and distinctly in our mind.  As Deleuze argues further: 
 
These singularities then condense to determine a threshold of consciousness in 
relation to our bodies, a threshold of differenciation on the basis of which the 
little perceptions are actualised, but actualised in an apperception which in turn is 
only clear and confused; clear because it is distinguished or differenciated, and 
confused because it is clear.221       
 
Sensation is here not just something experienced, but the condition of experience itself.  
In opposition to Kant’s view of the encounter with the sublime as that which transcends 
“every standard of sense”, Deleuze formulates a transcendental differentiation of 
differences into intensities that as sensations become actualised and constitute the 
conditions of experience.222  It is the movement of different/citation that, for Deleuze, 
actualises the virtual, and precedes identification, opposition, resemblance, and the 
entire sphere of thought that since Plato had been held to precede difference.   
 
The relevance of this for the present discussion of supplementarity is in Deleuze’s 
determining of art as that which creates signs, which as the ‘being of the sensible’ is also 
the condition of experience itself.  In this interpretation, each work of art is at one and 
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the same time the condition and the being of a form of experience that can only be 
sensed, whilst what is sensed is necessarily received from the unsensible (the intensity in 
its pre-actualised condition as a differentiation of difference).  The work of art produces a 
sign that is encountered at the limit of sensibility, a sensation which occurs prior to any 
possible classification or identification.  This echoes Fer’s comments on Hesse’s studio 
works: “If they are prototypes, it is because they are not archetypes.  In other words, they 
are not universal and timeless, but leave us with a sense of a first encounter with things, 
the kind of encounter we had before we knew how to make sense of them.”223  This 
observation hints at the extent to which Deleuze’s notion of the sign can provide a 
renewed significance for works-for-art, where the encounter with the sign can be clearer 
and less compromised when faced with material that has not been immediately 
consumed within the historical values and apparatuses of the art system that determine a 
work as work.  Instead, works-for-art can (if the context allows) be more problematic and 
conducive of the type of pre-classified experiences Deleuze refers to.    
 
The sign is an intensity before it has been comprehended and organised in consciousness 
as a quality.  The sign always points to an “imminent Idea or differential field beyond the 
norms of common sense or recognition”.224  Whilst there are many ways of encountering 
a sign, it is the work of art that creates and maintains the sign as an intensity.  This is why, 
for Deleuze, no work of art can contain information, even if the work may be 
appropriated and put to use in a system of thought that is governed by identification and 
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classification.  The work of art and its appropriation (as something understood and/or as 
something that provides information of some kind) are in effect asymmetrical, and must 
not be confused with being two complementary sides of the same thing.  The capacity for 
a work of art to be ‘measured’ in terms of its ‘effectiveness’ becomes a matter of degrees 
of encountering intensity, of the force of the encountered sign.  If the composition of a 
work is too caught up in efforts to communicate (or indeed presented in a certain way 
that communicates) elements such as historical information, an adherence to academic 
standards, a narrative or a representation, the work is diminished and eclipsed by non-
artistic considerations.225  It may become concealed, or in the case of the most ineffectual 
attempts at creating works of art, may be unable to bring forth a sign at all.   
 
In this discussion, my aim is to reconcile any apparent discrepancies between art and 
equipment that were identified in chapter three, whereby the distinction becomes a false 
one when attempts are made to unite the asymmetrical.  Judgements of completion and 
incompletion fall on the side of identity, wherein identification dominates the 
perception/recognition of a work (and which gives rise to hierarchical classifications).  The 
work of art, however, is neither complete nor incomplete; its completion contains within 
itself an incompletion that is precisely the encountered problematic sign.  Deleuze aligns 
the work of art with the ontological question of Being (reawakened by Heidegger), that 
occupied continental philosophy in the Twentieth Century, in a question that I consider to 
lie at the heart of Heidegger’s notion of ἀλήθεια as the bringing-forth of a truth of Being, 
manifested and resonating in what Heidegger considers to be great works of art: 
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It must be remembered to what extent modern thought and the renaissance of 
ontology is based upon the question-problem complex.  This complex has ceased 
to be considered the expression of a provisional and subjective state in the 
representation of knowledge in order to become the intentionality of Being par 
excellence, the only instance to which, properly speaking, Being answers without 
the question thereby becoming lost or overtaken.  On the contrary, it alone has an 
opening coextensive with that which must respond to it and can respond to it only 
by retaining, repeating and continually going over it.  This conception of the 
ontological scope of the question animates works of art as much as philosophical 
thought.  Works are developed around or on the basis of a fracture that they 
never succeed in filling.226 
 
This unfilled fracture does not imply a failure of the work, but on the contrary, is the 
capacity of the work to be a work; to bring forth a sign.  Alternatively, the work is lost, 
obscured, eclipsed, or diminished when attempts are made to fill this work (such as its 
utilisation as information), or indeed when the work is insufficiently composed, and is 
unable to sustain the fracture/question.  Deleuze considers inadequacy to be a definite 
possibility in the attempt to create or compose a work of art.  Deleuze and Guattari state 
that: “The only law of creation is that the compound must stand up on its own.  The 
artist’s greatest difficulty is to make it stand up on its own.”227  If the work must rely on 
informative properties, or an association with a revered author (through the priority 
given to the author as a causa efficiens), it is no longer purely a matter of sensation.  It is a 
mixed composite of sensation and concepts of what it represents instead of what it 
presents.  So how would this apply to the dinamismi?  Are they capable of standing up on 
their own? 
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It is important to emphasise here the degree to which works of art are influenced by, and 
are an influence upon, the means of interpretation.  Philosophical and historical analysis 
not only shapes the way in which works of art are evaluated in a particular way, but is 
also guided by the qualities of works that are less or more appropriate for fitting into a 
philosophical or historical system of interpretation.  The use made here, of philosophical 
and historically emerging concepts, is therefore one of outlining the problematic nature 
of supplementarity, rather than rigidly defining it.     
 
The dinamismi seem to balance precariously between the asymmetrical positions of art 
(as a composite being of sensation) and preliminary material governed by a causa finalis 
of possible architectural structures.  The situation is made more complex due to the 
absence of completed structures that would in effect provide a conventional hierarchical 
ordering that would position the dinamismi more clearly as preliminary material.   
 
To approach the dinamismi from the perspective of Deleuze and Guattari is to ask 
whether they are composed as ‘beings of sensation’, “and nothing else” or whether they 
are mixed compositions in themselves that are incapable of ‘standing up on their own’?228  
Again the answer seems unclear.  As individual drawings, they appear to lack nothing.  
The gestures of the lines, the technique highlighted by Kwinter that places them within a 
fictional setting, and the simplicity of the compositions can all be said to be gathered 
together in a way that, though it has a resemblance to architecture, is nevertheless quite 
distinct.  These are not blueprints or refined architectural drawings, but appear closer to 
Sant’Elia’s tendency to utilise the visual language of architecture to create minute, 
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fictitious landscapes.  As such, they are not wholly comparable to the transformation 
drawings (see Figure 1) produced by Moore in the early stages of his working process.  
Despite sharing a lexicographic relationship with those drawings, the dinamismi are far 
more removed from the mechanics of architectural production than Moore’s drawings 
were from the sculptural process, as indicated by Da Costa Meyer’s description of the 
dinamismi as “highly romanticised”.229   
 
The form and matter in Moore’s drawings lent themselves more readily to development 
into three-dimensional pieces due to a minimal number of formal differences (shape, 
primacy of exteriority), and a greater degree of analogy.  With Sant’Elia’s drawings, 
however, the concerns dominating an architectural work’s causa finalis (and thus 
permeating the gathering together of the other three causes) would consist of factors 
such as the variety of material, the function, the scale, the location, and of course its 
entire interior construction.  The transformation drawings would therefore have more in 
common with an architectural blueprint, as preparatory works – as works preparing for 
something, and as it were already on the threshold of a project (no matter how vaguely 
defined).  In contrast, the dinamismi are before the threshold (in Latin – limen), and are 
properly speaking preliminary.  The preliminal is designated retrospectively when 
associated with a project that comes after it.  Whilst both preparatory and preliminary 
works are regularly gathered together and utilised as supplementary material, their 
distinction should be made clear.  The preliminary could be said to take place prior to the 
conscious preparation of a work of art.  The preliminary may well be perfected, refined, 
and developed into preparatory or ‘complete’ works, but of themselves they are not yet 
                                                          
229
 Da Costa Meyer, The Work of Antonio Sant’Elia, Yale, 1995, p. 68. 
188 
 
governed by a causa finalis that consists of the practical concerns of a grand project.  
Instead, they have a causa finalis concerned primarily with their own construction (even if 
this contains within itself the possibility of future development towards another causa 
finalis).  It is not yet part of a series as a causa finalis among several, but is simply open to 
becoming part of one.  The dinamismi are lexicographic as potential ideas for 
development (and as such, externally utilised – even if used by the same artist), but of 
themselves they are compositions of sensation that can be called works of art.  All that 
would remain would be to evaluate the degrees to which such works are capable of 
working as signs.  This is an important observation of the thesis, where preliminary works 
are specifically distinguished from preparatory works through the extent to which each of 
these modes of working constitute different concerns for the artist.  The preliminary work 
explores new ideas, whereas the preparatory work prepares new ideas for specific 
projects intended to lead to completed works of art.   
 
It is precisely here that the absence of completed architectural structures (produced by 
Sant’Elia in accordance with the style evident in his most recognised drawings and 
sketches) has a bearing on the evaluation of the dinamismi.  The dinamismi do not fill a 
gap left by the absent structures, but are able to bring forth their sign.  Works such as the 
dinamismi do not lack a composition that allows them to stand up on their own, but the 
artist is powerless to prevent the dominating effects of established hierarchical 
conventions that would reduce such works to a supporting role.  The absence of the 
structures does not reveal qualities akin to works of art in the dinamismi, but prevents 
them from being concealed.  However, the evaluation of the dinamismi, and their 
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exposure to hierarchical ordering, would still become complicated by the work that 
followed.   
 
The Città Nuova 
 
This section addresses the stages of ‘completion’ that can apply to supplementary 
material, where levels of refinement and ‘painterly’ qualities are applied so as to make 
certain works more ‘exhibition-worthy’.  This discussion will show how works that are still 
ostensibly supporting material move close to the criteria that would apply to completed 
works of art, whilst showing how the distinction is maintained.  
 
It was around the time of the dinamismi that Sant’Elia began to associate with a social 
circle of artists and architects who would hold discussions at various cafés, debating the 
direction of the arts and the current political climate.  This circle included, among others, 
Umberto Boccioni, Luigi Russolo, and Carlo Carrà, who were either part of, or soon to join, 
the Futurists.  Together they began to attend nights at the Famiglia Artistica, which Da 
Costa Meyer describes as an “anti-establishment association dedicated to the arts, music 
and literature”.230  This association was a major catalyst for the formation of the Futurists, 
providing the movement with its first opportunities for publicity, as well as some of its 
most important members. 
 
At this stage Sant’Elia was not part of the Futurist movement, but instead was one of the 
members of the Famiglia Artistica to found the Nuove Tendenze group.  It was as a 
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member of this group, and not the Futurists, that Sant’Elia would produce and exhibit 
what remains today his best known works.  On 20 May 1914, the first Nuove Tendenze 
exhibition began.  Featuring approximately sixty works by nine contributors (offering a 
mix of painting, sculpture, embroidery and architectural drawings), it was Sant’Elia’s work 
that was most prominent, consisting of a quarter of the exhibition’s total content. 
 
The power station drawings were more developed and pictorial versions of his sketches in 
the dinamismi (see Figure 9).  Though the function of the structure is clearer, they 
nevertheless continue to consist of only partial glimpses of buildings that disappear into 
ambiguous backgrounds of vanishing horizons and swirling skies.  The colours used also 
hark back to his work from a few years earlier, with fiery reds and oranges casting the 
structures in a dramatic light (what Caramel and Longatti describe as “an almost fairy tale 
touch”), emphasised all the more by the scenographic use of the worms’-eye-view 
perspective.231  The power plant drawings represent Sant’Elia at his most pictorial, 
developing the use of perspective as a dramatic devise.  In addition to the use of colour, 
the employment of perspective as a means of influencing the experience of Sant’Elia’s 
work also calls into question the extent and definition of ‘charm’ suggested by Kant.  Can 
perspective also be a form of charm used to embellish or support a work?  Can the design 
of a work, emphasised by Kant as its most important quality, also incorporate visual 
techniques specifically intended to win approval?  By creating fictitious worlds in which to 
place his ideas, his vision could be expressed almost unfettered by practical constraints.  
In an evaluation of his work that admirably looks to avoid buying into the myth that built 
around Sant’Elia following his death, Da Costa Meyer asserts that “his vision remained 
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two-dimensional: when he tried to translate it into a third, it became conventional, if not 
down-right banal.  In Sant’Elia the painter took over where the architect faltered”.232   
 
It is perhaps unduly harsh to lambast Sant’Elia’s attempts at producing three-dimensional, 
fully realised versions of his work, given his relatively young age.  That being said, perhaps 
one of the most potentially damning pieces of evidence of his architectural shortcomings 
recorded by Da Costa Meyer comes in the shape of the number of internal designs he 
produced, with Da Costa Meyer noting that “of the three hundred or so drawings 
currently attributed to Sant’Elia, only about ten show plans, and only three show 
interiors”.233  This certainly supports Da Costa Meyer’s assertion that Sant’Elia was more 
concerned with the general impression given by facades of undefined function, rather 
than spending time applying himself to what could be called the more practical side of an 
architect’s profession.  However, this also suggests that Sant’Elia (and consequently, his 
works of this period), had more in common with the creative practice of artists, than with 
the practical concerns of architecture.  The significance of this is in understanding how 
the status, classification, and interpretation of works can be heavily influenced by the 
position adopted by the interpreter.    
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Figure 7: Antonio Sant'Elia, 'Airplane and railroad station, 
with cable cars and elevators on three street levels’, 
1914. Musei Civici di Como. This work is in the public 
domain. 
Figure 8: Antonio Sant'Elia, 'Station for trains and 
airplanes', 1914. Musei Civici di Como. Image redacted. 
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The centrepiece of Sant’Elia’s contribution to the exhibition was a collection of works 
gathered together under the collective title of Città Nuova.  Executed precisely using ruler 
and compass, the series of pictures represented the peak of Sant’Elia’s efforts to arrive at 
a new style of architecture that freed itself from the constraints of historicism, and 
suggested a new type of city that would befit a modern Italy.  Figure 7 shows how the 
accuracy of the perspective had improved, as had the overall quality of the 
draftsmanship.  The scale of sketches such as Figure 7 also increased, as Sant’Elia grew in 
confidence and was keen to highlight the monumentality of his vision of the future.  The 
standard size of the vast majority of his works were A5 or smaller, whereas his most 
developed works for the Città Nuova were closer to A1 – underlying the conscious 
hierarchical ordering of prominence and importance.   
 
Far less stylised than the power station drawings (see Figure 9), the work constituting the 
Città Nuova such as Figure 7, did away with colour altogether.  The perspectives were also 
far more varied; including angles from above and to the side, which resulted in a more 
comprehensive and plausible suggestion of reality.  The trace of the visual language 
mapped out in his dinamismi is apparent in the works, however whilst the power station 
drawings saw Sant’Elia developing the pictorial qualities of that series of sketches, in the 
Città Nuova he focused on developing an apparently accurate rendering of his 
architectural ideas.  These works were full of innovative solutions to issues of space, 
transport circulation, public access and light.  The use of monumentality, emphasised by 
placing them within an imaginary setting, was again included.  These works (which would 
go on to form the mainstay of his posthumous reputation) were ultimately a more refined 
and formal depiction of what were still, in essence, fanciful works of the imagination.  The 
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neatness of lines in Figure 7, and the attention to detail in showing the interweaving 
elements that would make up a vibrant new imagining of a future urban landscape, belied 
the problems of realisation as dictated by the accessibility of resources, the scale of the 
workforce required, or indeed in the majority of cases, any indication of utility.  
Furthermore, the structures were depicted within general, non-specific locations, rather 
than alongside existing natural or man-made features.  This further characterised them as 
idealistic imaginings, rather than as proposed solutions or alternatives to existing 
architectural concerns. 
 
That Sant’Elia spent more time on the work in the Città Nuova than on any previous 
project, is evident from the number of preparatory drawings that accompanied most of 
the displayed sketches, as in Figure 8.  The inclusion of preparatory drawings in this 
context helped to support the notion that Sant’Elia was proposing a serious project that 
could potentially be realised.  The results were considered a great success.  As Da Costa 
Meyer says, whilst “the public had been used to futurist art for some time – and would 
therefore not be shocked by the tamer variety produced by Nuove Tendenze – futurist 
architecture was new and unprecedented”.234  Though there were other architects 
around at the same time working on similar ideas (including Mario Chiattone, who 
exhibited alongside Sant’Elia in the Nuove Tendenze exhibition), none of them were able 
to produce the combination of originality and dramatic monumental imagery that 
captured the imagination in the way Sant’Elia’s did.235  His stylistic preference for 
rendering his designs in settings that highlighted such implied grandness of scale meant 
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that works that could be as small as 75mm x 112mm would be able to imbibe the viewers 
with a sense of epic ambition.  The triumph of this impressive plan for a new urban 
landscape inevitably invited the attentions of Marinetti, who was happy to bring Sant’Elia 
into the fold of his Futurists as he looked to add a visionary architect to his armoury. 
 
The Nuove Tendenze exhibition highlights in a particular way, the slippages that can 
appear between hierarchical definitions of support-work and complete-work.  With 
preparatory works of varying degrees of execution displayed alongside highly stylised and 
romanticised depictions of ambitious potential architectural projects, the different stages 
of completion, support, preparation, and artistic merit become blurred and confused.  
The ‘complete’ large-scale Città Nuova drawings are executed with precision and in great 
detail, marking a culminating point of Sant’Elia’s works on paper.  Figure 7 has the 
appearance of a professional piece of architectural drawing, with great care taken to 
depict the perspective and intricacies of the depicted structure.  However, Figure 8, in 
addition to being far smaller, is hand-drawn, heavily worked, and expressive in its use of 
curved and bold lines that come together to produce a more artistic and stylistic vision.  
Yet at the same time their comparison with the dinamismi is not a straightforward 
distinction between undeveloped and more refined works.  Instead, the Città Nuova 
drawings diverge from the dinamismi in two ways that confuse the relationship between 
them.   
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Figure 9: Antonio Sant'Elia, 'Power Station', 1914. Musei Civici di Como. This work is in the public domain. 
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On one hand, the Città Nuova works, along with the coloured power station works such 
as Figure 9, advance the pictorial qualities through more detailed settings, and various 
techniques to create more imaginary scenes of fictitious structures.  In this respect they 
go further than the dinamismi in seeing the artist “taking over” from the architect.  Figure 
9 uses a fiery combination of red, yellow, and orange to create a dramatic ‘scene’, 
illuminated by its contrast to the white and lilac background.  The use of green to depict 
the smoke and clouds gives this work a striking visual effect which, instead of being 
merely ornamental (as Kant might claim), constitutes a significant part of its aesthetic 
impact.  Figure 9 represents Sant’Elia at his most artistic, producing an imaginative and 
unusual image, rather than purely using drawing as a method of conveying information 
about potential structural design.   
 
On the other hand, these works go further in the direction of functional depictions of 
realistic compositions.  In effect, the causa finalis is here more restraining than that of the 
dinamismi, governing the works by drawing them towards a more rigorous architectural 
end product.  The more architecturally consistent the works, the less capable they are of 
standing up on their own (insofar as they might be considered to be works of art), and the 
more compromised their composition of sensations become.  Instead of the work of art 
as a ‘being of sensation’ (as Deleuze understood), the Città Nuova works are heavily 
balanced towards an informational function as formal proposals for potential building 
projects.  Unlike the dinamismi, and the coloured power station works (which themselves 
are divided up into degrees of architectural accuracy and fantastical pictorial works), the 
Città Nuova works more readily affirm or bring forth their equipmental function.  This 
refers back to Deleuze’s claim that art contains no information whatsoever, where 
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whenever information becomes a consideration, the sensation of experiencing art 
becomes nullified.  The importance of this discussion is in the way in which it draws 
attention to the slippages and problems that are encountered when applying 
conventional hierarchical classifications to different stages of work that involve a wide 
range of specific concerns and forms of expression.   
 
There are clear visual distinctions between Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9, which are accompanied 
by distinct visual impressions or effects.  In Figure 6, the importance of drawing as a direct 
means of expression and reflection of the artist’s thoughts (as asserted by Petherbridge) 
is paramount.  Whilst Figure 6 can be interpreted as a source of information about 
Sant’Elia’s technical approach, it is also a creative work that has a distinct quality that 
combines a minimalist approach, and expressive use of lines to convey speed, and the 
suggestion of monumentality.  Figure 7 is predominantly equipmental, utilising Sant’Elia’s 
architectural education to produce a refined and accurate depiction of what is 
nevertheless still a highly original and ambitious project.  Architectural techniques are 
used to lead the viewer towards an interpretation of the work as being a functional and 
considered project, rather than fanciful speculation (the implications of Sant’Elia’s death, 
which curtailed any possible developments of such projects, is discussed in the last 
section of this chapter).  Figure 8 produces a very different visual effect to Figure 7, due to 
the heightened sense of expression.  At the same time, the level of detail in this 
preliminary work, and its use in the Città Nuova exhibition, emphasises its potential 
interpretation as a bridge between inventive expression, and architectural accuracy.  Such 
architectural accuracy is largely abandoned in Figure 9, with Sant’Elia’s artistic and 
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imaginative skills being employed to create a dream-like ‘vision’ or suggestion of the 
future, rather than a methodical plan to shape it. 
   
At all these stages, different aspects of Sant’Elia’s creative approach are identifiable and 
capable of being considered as individual works with their own unique qualities, as much 
as being various forms of supporting material.  Reducing such disparate works to 
conventional model/copy interpretations in which some are regarded as ‘higher’ or of 
more importance than others, is to gloss over their subtle and distinctive properties.  I 
now develop this challenge to the restrictive nature of the model/copy dynamic that has 
dominated Western classifications of works-for-art, through a discussion of Deleuze’s re-
interpretation of Plato’s concept of the simulacrum. 
 
Hierarchy and the Simulacrum   
 
As seen in chapter two, the classical view of creativity and those who create, as found in 
the writings of Plato, was largely disparaging.  Yet despite art’s eventual emergence and 
distancing from Plato’s damning verdict, another of Plato’s notions – the distinction 
between models, copies, and simulacra - continues to dominate Western thinking in ways 
that significantly affect approaches to, and interpretations of, works of art.  Generally 
speaking, the Platonic understanding of models, copies, and simulacra, is one of identity, 
resemblance, and falsity, and applies to all aspects of thought (such as morality, politics, 
and art).  There is an original (the Idea) that serves as a model or ground, and which is 
ideal and universal.  Ideal adherence to the model shares its identity (e.g. justice is just; 
virtue is virtuous), and as such they are the same.  In relation to the model or ground is 
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that which claims a resemblance to its identity.  Though it will never be identical to the 
model (being only particular, and not universal), the claimant (or an image) may be 
considered to be similar (in varying degrees of accord), and as such it is a copy.  The copy 
is a representation of the identity of the Idea, a secondary or imperfect copy of the 
perfect primacy of the model.  For Plato, another type of claimant exists that may attain a 
semblance of resemblance to the model, but which does so only falsely.  Such a claimant 
is the simulacrum, which despite having the appearance of a copy, is in fact lacking in any 
internal resemblance to it.  Deleuze summarises this by saying that: “Each well-grounded 
image or claim is still second in itself in relation to the foundation.  It is in this sense that 
Ideas inaugurate or ground the world of representation.  As for the rebellious images 
which lack resemblance, these are eliminated, rejected, and denounced as ungrounded, 
false claimants.”236 
 
It is this grounding of representation in relation to identity that permeates many 
approaches to art (by artists themselves, and by those who make use of it in some way).  
It has a particular significance for supplementarity when considering the hierarchical 
ordering of certain material produced in the creative process.  A completed work may 
become, from the perspective of museums and galleries, a model of sorts against which 
preliminary and preparatory works are compared and ordered in degrees of apparent 
similarity.  In this sense, the value of preliminary and preparatory works emerges out of 
their capacity to resemble the completed works, with galleries and museums often going 
to great lengths to find ways of connecting preliminary or preparatory material to 
‘masterpieces’.   
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The model-copy distinction can be illustrated in reference to Heidegger and 
Schopenhauer’s analyses of painting.  Such a process applied to Heidegger’s theory of 
causality still appears to be consistent, wherein that which is brought-forth into 
unconcealment serves as the model towards which the stages of preparation in the 
artistic process are derived from (as copies), and which make their claim for resemblance 
through gradual refinement.237  Each stage is then considered to be an imperfect image 
(or claimant) assessed in accordance with its resemblance to the overarching and 
instigating model.  Such an assessment would necessarily happen retrospectively when 
the model is already given in such a way as to make the assessments of claims possible. 
 
Conversely, the Schopenhauerian approach occurs at the other extreme, whereby the 
Idea (in a more apparent accordance with Plato) is essentially unreachable, and can only 
be represented/copied.  In both the Heideggerian and Schopenhauerian approaches, the 
Idea instigates the creative process.  However, whilst in the Heideggerian formula it is a 
force that assists in pulling the creative process towards the emergence of ἀλήθεια, in the 
Schopenhauerian approach, as in the Platonic approach, the Idea is represented in an 
increasingly removed process where “the inspiration cannot last until the painting is 
complete”.238  This is why Schopenhauer considers the initial stages of a painting to have 
primacy over the subsequent stages of refinement.  For him, refinement is not a matter of 
edging closer to the Idea, but of moving away from it in ways that make it more palatable 
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to the representational expectations of the time.  In the Schopenhauerian approach, the 
creative process moves from a close resemblance to the Idea, towards simulacra that in 
some way retain the image of the Idea, but none of its content (or at best become 
vaguely similar copies of the Idea).   
 
Deleuze, however, looks to elevate simulacra to a level that exposes what he considers to 
be the false primacy of identity from which difference (and therefore resemblances, 
similarities, or false semblances) occur, in favour of an originary difference from which 
identity, resemblance, similitude, and semblance are falsely derived.239  Such an 
interpretation would transform the hierarchical relationship between preliminary, 
preparatory, and completed works.  The differences in each stage would be elevated to 
levels wherein the singular differences of every form of work produced at each stage 
would no longer be considered in terms of its accordance with an overarching model or 
Idea, but would instead be apprehended in its own right.  Deleuze argues the case for the 
two positions of simulacra: 
 
Let us consider the two formulas: ‘Only that which resembles differs’, and ‘only 
differences can resemble each other’.  These are two distinct readings of the 
world:  One invites us to think difference from the standpoint of a previous 
similitude or identity; whereas the other invites us to think similitude and even 
identity as the product of a deep disparity.  The first reading precisely defines the 
world of copies or representations; it posits the world as icon.  The second, 
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contrary to the first, defines the world of simulacra; it posits the world itself as 
phantasm.240 
 
Differences of resemblance here fall under the accordance of a candidate or image to an 
unobtainable Idea or model.  The Platonic formula asserts that the only differences to be 
found in the world are those that distinguish degrees of resemblance in relation to the 
primacy of the Idea or model, where identity is determined by an approximation to a 
model.  In this mode of thought the preliminary or preparatory work, whether 
understood as working towards an instigating bringing-forth, or conversely, as deriving 
from an inspirational idea, is still understood in terms of an accordance of resemblance.  
Sant’Elia’s creative output (as well as Moore’s sketched ideas for sculpture, and 
maquettes) would therefore be understood as supplementarity, supplementing his 
efforts to reach the model that (whether progressively or regressively) situates them as 
hierarchically defined copies. The significance of this is in providing a framework within 
which the dominant historical perspectives concerning models and copies can be shown 
to influence the hierarchical classification and distinction between ‘complete’ works and 
their supporting material.    
 
Alternatively, where the only resemblance is between differences themselves (where 
differences resemble each other through being related as differences), it is disparity itself 
from which analogy and resemblance are falsely derived.  This occurs via efforts to 
attribute shared qualities that accord with an assumed model of identity that establishes 
resemblances and proximal similarities.  As has been seen, such qualities only appear in 
actualised experience as part of an ordering of consciousness that effectively makes sense 
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out of unsensible intensities existing in a pre-actualised (or un-differenciated) state in a 
virtual plane of multiplicities.  In short, simulacra in Deleuze’s interpretation would no 
longer be bound to a resemblance falsely attributed to differences as understood in terms 
of various qualities that resemble or differ from one another only by degrees of similarity 
or dissimilarity in relation to given identities or models.  Instead, they would be 
encountered in terms of difference itself.   
 
The preparatory sketch exhibited alongside a refined and well executed drawing as part 
of Sant’Elia’s Città Nuova ‘project’ (such as Figures 7 and 8), would no longer be 
considered as merely an initial stage in a hierarchical order of adherence to a model 
against which it would be measured and compared.  Instead, it could be interpreted as an 
event in itself, where its Causa finalis is unshackled from any subservient connection to 
an order of similitude to that which it may be brought towards, or derived from.  It would 
be apprehended in itself as that which is brought forth through its own necessity, under 
its own particular conditions and actualised virtualities.  This is what Deleuze is referring 
to when he says that “the non-hierarchised work is a condensation of coexistences and a 
simultaneity of events”.241  Each stage in the artistic process would be no longer governed 
by an end or an originary inspiration, but would itself become something potentially 
capable of producing signs to be encountered.  Each stage would be able to be 
experienced as a new difference that appears through its own combination of differences, 
where an effect is produced that is quite distinct from other works that appear under 
their own conditions.   
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Smith describes the Deleuzian understanding of art by saying that “rather than 
functioning as their totalising or unifying principle, the work of art can only be understood 
as the effect of the multiplicity of the disconnected parts”.242  The so-called preliminary or 
preparatory sketch produces a sign that is from a certain perspective less intense or 
effective than an established ‘complete’ piece – or in the case of Sant’Elia – a more 
refined and presented drawing or sketch (that utilises traits such as size, precision, 
colourisation, and/or pictorial composition).  However, this does not mean that it should 
immediately be considered as subordinated to it through orders of resemblance.  Instead, 
the effect of the produced sign should be encountered in itself, by raising the preliminary 
or preparatory work beyond its assigned status as a supporting piece or a mere copy that 
precedes or derives from that which it is said to represent.  It then becomes a simulacrum 
that affirms its internal lack of resemblance to any such model in order to come forth and 
be experienced in itself.243  Its particular mode of existence within an apparent 
hierarchical ordering of works becomes a dynamic (rather than subservient) force that 
affirms a singularity that is unconcealed (instead of subsumed or obscured) through its 
very relation to such a hierarchy, where: “By simulacrum we should not understand a 
simple imitation but rather the act by which the very idea of a model or privileged 
position is challenged and overturned.”244   
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The internal dissimilarity in the conditions of that which might be taken, under the 
governance of representation, (whether applied by the artist themselves, or externally) to 
be a claimant looking to claim a resemblance to an Idea or model that comes before or 
after its production, becomes instead a difference in kind that allows it to break free from 
its grounding in a hierarchical order.  When a plate was discovered hidden beneath the 
ink version of one of Sant’Elia’s Città Nuova pieces, its own particular qualities could be 
emphasised, despite having originally had a supporting function that resulted in it being 
concealed from the public.245  Similarly, a drawing of Sant’Elia’s, found to have been 
executed on the back of a shopping list is not deemed, in this notion of simulacra, to be of 
lesser value in relation to works produced on traditional supporting material.  Instead it 
can be considered to have its own unique qualities, ones which, I might add, poetically 
and literally bring together the two sides of the problem of the oeuvre described by 
Foucault earlier.246 
 
By employing Deleuze’s concept of the simulacrum as a difference to be encountered in 
itself, the hierarchical ordering of preliminary and preparatory works breaks down in 
favour of a series of differences, each produced through the composition of distinct 
components under individual conditions.  The problem of completion or incompletion in 
relation to theoretically unrealised architectural projects becomes a matter of externally 
annexed consideration in relation to the appropriation of the various works under a 
hierarchical model that remains governed by identification and similitude (the Platonic 
model-copy relationship).  Here, on the other hand, each ‘stage’ of the series becomes a 
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series of interconnecting signs, albeit of varying intensities that are ‘sensed’ by viewers or 
spectators that are themselves more or less receptive to receiving and/or interpreting 
these signs.  These signs are able to resonate with one another through differences of 
differences, rather than through comparisons of adherence to an apparent overarching 
model or Idea.   
 
Heidegger’s understanding of Causa finalis is effectively raised to the level of that which 
brings forth an unconcealed truth (as ἀλήθεια) in each so-called stage of the artistic 
process, whilst breaking away from a dominant bringing-forth that would limit and bind 
them to a subordinated unified progression towards itself.  Even the clockmaker’s 
prototype, though not a being of sensation due to its practical function, would come forth 
as a unique simulacrum that differs internally from the finished clock.  The 
Schopenhauerian hierarchy would also be dissolved, whereby each apparent deviation 
from the inspiring Idea would appear as a difference in itself.  It would no longer be 
understood in terms of a determined order, but instead would see the inspiring Idea 
incorporated as a part of various compositions, each appearing under uniquely 
determined conditions.  This illustrates how Deleuze’s notion of the simulacrum ‘re-
positions’ works-of-art and works-for-art in a way that calls into question historical 
debates concerning hierarchies of form.  In contrast, where the stages of hierarchical 
ordering are instead elevated to that of Deleuzian simulacra: 
 
No series enjoys a privilege over others; none possess the identity of a model, 
none the resemblance of a copy.  None is either opposed or analogous to another.  
Each is constituted by differences, and communicates with the others through 
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differences of differences.  Crowned anarchies are substituted for hierarchies of 
representation.247 
 
Supplementarity becomes only a nominal and artificial term in relation to what are called 
preliminary and preparatory works, yet such works have been (and continue to be) 
appropriated in accordance with a hierarchical series since Sant’Elia’s death in 1916.  The 
final section of this chapter will address the uses made of such works.                           
 
The Appropriation of the Supplementary 
 
This section addresses the issues of appropriation and commodification that, in contrast 
to the highly controlled uses of Moore’s output, capitalised on Sant’Elia’s work in ways 
that re-framed its significance through a systematic process of myth-building.  This 
section is importance for the thesis because it highlights a variety of forms of 
supplementarity in which the artist has no control.  This serves to distinguish forms of 
supplementarity such as works-for-art (that as discussed above, may be re-assessed in 
relation to works-for-art), from other forms of supplementarity that enforce or challenge 
historical classifications of works for specific purposes.    
 
In June 1914, Sant’Elia joined the Italian Army.  Just over two years later, in October 1916, 
he was shot and killed whilst taking part in the Battles of the Isonzo; he was twenty eight.  
What followed in the years after Sant’Elia’s death was a systematic process of 
glorification and distortion of his character, his intentions and his achievements.  During 
his lifetime, Sant’Elia had already begun to slow his production of works - especially ones 
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that conformed to the Futurist ethos – and was potentially moving further away from the 
Futurist movement, both politically and socially.  In death, he could be celebrated as a 
great martyr of their cause, a puppet figure above which Marinetti pulled the strings.248  
 
Marinetti was well known for his skill and willingness to use a wide range of techniques to 
promote both himself and the Futurist movement he led.  As Cinzia Sartini Blum explains:   
 
In order to ‘sell’ the futurist program of aesthetic renovation and national 
reawakening, he assimilated the persuasive systems of political propaganda and 
industrial advertisements: inflammatory and hyperbolic rhetoric, signposting, the 
distribution of leaflets, and a massive use of the media for promotional 
purposes.249        
 
Even in Sant’Elia’s lifetime, the Manifesto of Futurist architecture, widely considered to 
be written by Sant’Elia (and certainly there were large sections where he was 
unquestionably the author), was re-worded (most likely by Marinetti himself) so as to 
utilise rhetoric more in keeping with the aggressive, confrontational style of other Futurist 
literature.250  With Sant’Elia dead, the path was clear to exaggerate the significance of his 
work, his death and his political views.  The fact that he was with the Socialist Party 
mattered little to Marinetti and his associates, nor did it concern them that none of his 
work had been made during Sant’Elia’s time with the Futurist movement.  His last words, 
“men, tonight we shall sleep either in Trieste or in paradise with the heroes” became 
famous as a speech of patriotic bravery, despite none of the witnesses to his final 
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moments recalling any such utterance.251  In October 1921, following the request of the 
local authorities, his body was returned to his home city of Como, only for the ceremony 
to be hijacked by the Fascists as an opportunity to reinforce the idea of his martyrdom in 
the name of the nation, with a militia squadron even being named after him.  The 
Futurists were also present, with Russolo delivering an impassioned speech, no doubt 
extolling Sant’Elia’s dedication to his country, and to the right-wing leanings of the 
Fascists.252 
 
It was the start of an increased drive to see Sant’Elia inexorably associated with the 
Fascist Party, with streets and squares being named after him in the region of Lombardy, 
as if to highlight the reward of posterity for those who serve their country.  The painter, 
Mario Bazzi, made a picture called ‘The Death of Sant’Elia’ which cast the architect in a 
romanticised setting, surrounded by the mournful and adoring troops that he had 
commanded.  Marinetti and his fellow Futurists were desperately trying to impress upon 
Mussolini that their movement could take the responsibility of a new state-approved art, 
and Sant’Elia became their unwitting posthumous standard-bearer.  The Futurists wrote 
article after article extolling him as the inventor of modern architecture, a claim that 
wildly exaggerated the extent of his influence.  Some even went as far as to speak of 
‘Santelian’ architecture, as if the handful of drawings and sketches amounted to the 
foundation of an epoch that cast its shadow over all that followed.253 
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In 1933, Sant’Elia’s work featured prominently in the Fifth Triennale in Milan.254  The 
Triennale had become established as an important showcase of contemporary modern 
design, and had previously included works from the Dessau Bauhaus, and furniture made 
by Van Der Rohe.  The Triennale was considered to be a major show of international 
significance, with the emphasis primarily on new works in the field of design.  Yet not only 
was Sant’Elia’s work selected a full twenty-three years after his death, it would also 
receive its own dedicated exhibition within the show, with the drawings and sketches 
provided their own room.  This year saw an increase in activity by the Futurists devoted to 
sustaining and extending the ‘legend’ of Sant’Elia.  Marinetti and Mario Del Bello 
produced a booklet entitled Breviaries of Martyrs and Heroes, which spoke in pious terms 
about the sacredness of Sant’Elia’s work, primarily as a beacon that lit the way for 
architects such as Le Corbusier.255  This year also saw the authors praising the significance 
of Sant’Elia’s manifesto, which, almost certainly having been heavily edited by Marinetti, 
amounted to him promoting much of his own views from behind the mask of his fallen 
associate.   
 
Marinetti and the Futurists were masters of self-promotion, and from 1930 they had 
produced several magazines that included articles glorifying their work, their ideology and 
their suitability for being the official state art.  Their primary architectural magazine, 
Futurismo, changed its name in 1933 to Sant’Elia, possibly to capitalise on the recent 
exposure that his work had received within the respected setting of the Triennale.256  In 
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the publications, they attempted to start the ‘Movimento Italiano Sant’Elia’ claiming 
Sant’Elia to be the originator of Fascist architecture, and called upon people to continue 
his projects, or at least to carry out their own under this umbrella title.   
 
That the name ‘Sant’Elia’ had become little more than a byword for modern Fascist 
architecture can be clearly seen by the Sant’Elia magazine’s efforts to permeate the very 
means of production used in construction.  The magazine advertised, among others, 
‘Sant’Elia stones and marbles’, ‘Sant’Elia ceramics’ and the more general ‘Sant’Elia 
Materials’.257  This allowed companies to associate their product with a name that stood 
for nationalistic modernity, whilst at the same time allowing the Futurists to reinforce 
their presence, even if only loosely in name, with contemporary building projects.  ‘Brand 
Sant’Elia’ represented the culmination point that had been driving the Futurist efforts of 
preserving and embellishing the myth.  Caramel and Longatti acknowledge Marinetti’s 
manipulation of Sant’Elia’s work and reputation, stating that: “Marinetti’s interpretation 
of Sant’Elia’s work was neither confused nor over-ambitious, rather it obeyed the logic of 
an appropriation strategy, all to the advantage of the reproposal and redefinition of all 
the futurist theories.”258  
   
Three years earlier, the Futurists had organised the largest show ever held of Sant’Elia’s 
work.  The ‘Onoranze a Sant’Elia’ took place in Sant’Elia’s hometown of Como, and was 
held under the patronage of no less a figure than Mussolini himself.  By that stage, the 
fabricated link between Sant’Elia and fascism had been set in stone, with typical patriotic 
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and hyperbolic speeches from Marinetti taking place in front of a gathering of many of 
the most prominent Fascist Party members of the day.  It was at this event that Marinetti 
suggested that one of Sant’Elia’s designs be chosen to be constructed as a First World 
War memorial.  At that time, Como did not have one to commemorate the dead, so the 
suggestion was greeted with enthusiasm by the local authorities, and was soon 
commissioned.259 
 
Marinetti and fellow Futurist Enrico Prampolini selected a sketch from 1914 as the basis 
for the project.  The building depicted has much in common with some of the 
architectural traits that emerged when executing the dinamismi, as the main, 
monumental structure emerges from the steps and angled walls that flank its sides.  It is 
impossible to know what function Sant’Elia envisioned for this building, as he rarely gave 
titles to his work, or supplied any interior plans.  If anything, the drawing’s ambiguity lent 
itself more easily to the task of being made into a monument, as taking the sketch on 
form alone, the one characteristic that stands out is its implied monumentality.  Marinetti 
was insistent that this would be a Futurist project from start to finish, and had Prampolini 
design the plans for the monument.  Prampolini, a painter and scenographer, had little 
difficulty in rendering Sant’Elia’s rather flat sketch into a sharper, more rounded drawing; 
however he was inexperienced when it came to the more formal requirements of interior 
plans and dimensions.  Marinetti reluctantly handed the project over to the architect 
Giuseppe Terragni.  Commenting on the finished result (see Figure 10), Da Costa Meyer 
remarks that “needless to say, it bears hardly any resemblance to Sant’Elia’s work of any 
period, or even to Terragni’s, and is more expressive of the elegant taste of Milan’s 
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Novecento”.260  Whilst the finished monument inevitably involved a compromise 
between the original sketch and the realised structure, I would disagree that it hardly 
bears any resemblance to Sant’Elia’s work.  Seeing the monument, it immediately brings 
to mind Sant’Elia’s idiosyncrasies and unique style.  That Prampolini and Terragni 
removed the side windows and other additional details only goes to make the monument 
more reminiscent of the simple forms of the dinamismi, and is unquestionably the best 
indication of what Sant’Elia’s more experimental and ambitious work, transferred from 
idea into corporeality, might have looked like.  This discussion of the Como War memorial 
recalls the problematic nature of Rodin’s ‘The Gates of Hell’ as argued by Krauss, where 
multiple authors can be discerned.  Unlike that example, the Como War memorial is not 
claimed to be a work by Sant’Elia, which changes how it can be interpreted, whilst 
remaining a work that complicates the identification of authorship that at the same time 
calls into question the degrees to which a work might be classified as a supplement or an 
extension of an artist’s ideas. 
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Figure 10: Giuseppi Terragni, 'Monument to the Fallen', 1933. Como, Italy.  
Used with permission of © Klaus Bergheimer 
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The Como war memorial represents an important and curious quasi-annex to Sant’Elia’s 
work.  By this I mean that in a body of work as sparse as his, and with no significant 
structures of his own completed, the war memorial has by default become the solitary 
standing structure that comes closest to embodying Sant’Elia’s more progressive visions.  
As such, it warrants inclusion in any analysis of Sant’Elia’s drawings and sketches (having 
been developed from one such sketch), but must at the same time be distinguished from 
his body of work.  Here the curious nature of the Como war memorial should be 
apparent, whereby the one ‘completed’ work that could potentially serve as the 
representative that provides shape and potential reality to his preliminary and 
preparatory works, is not his.  Neither is it entirely Prampolini’s or Terragni’s.  Instead it is 
a chimerical work of architecture in which their primary influence, and the instigator of 
the overall form, was no longer alive in order to contribute to the final outcome.  The 
memorial both preserves and distorts the memory of Sant’Elia by offering an imperfect, 
compromised, and idealised version of one of his sketches; one that allowed one of his 
ideas to at least in part come to fruition, but at the price of receiving many stylistic 
additions that prevent the monument from even only outwardly providing a relatively 
faithful rendering of his intentions (if indeed he ever intended to build it).  The Como war 
memorial can be understood within a traditional hierarchical ordering in terms of a 
Platonic simulacrum that bears a resemblance to Sant’Elia’s work, but inevitably lacks any 
internal correlation to it.  On the other hand, if it were to be understood as a Deleuzian 
simulacrum it becomes something unique in itself, where Marinetti, Prampolini, Terragni, 
and Sant’Elia all have some share in the produced construction, with none (including 
Sant’Elia) taking precedence over the other.      
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In all these cases of appropriation it should be remembered that the work exhibited, 
reproduced, or referred to as the ground of Sant’Elia’s reputation (however much 
exaggerated) was, and remains, understood as preliminary or preparatory (in the 
conventional sense of the words).  The works were made to serve the notion of Sant’Elia 
as a ‘visionary’ cut-down whilst defending his country, and thus unable to see his grand 
ideas reach fruition in erected structures.  The suggested or proposed structures depicted 
in the drawings and sketches become ‘virtually’ complete works to which the preliminary 
and preparatory works serve as supplementary material – albeit as supporting works that 
become ‘elevated’ in status (in reference to a conventional hierarchical ordering) 
precisely due to the ‘unrealised’ status of the completed works.  In short, the ‘unrealised’ 
works became the ‘object’ (albeit an imaginary one) of appropriation that in turn raised 
the status of the preliminary and preparatory works to that of clues or indicators in a way 
that they never would have, had the structures been successfully built (or indeed, if their 
practical limitations had been exposed as unrealistic for whatever reasons).261  Through 
the mechanisms of their appropriation, these works stand in for the unrealised structures 
(and thus reach a greater significance), whilst at the same time that which they stand in 
for ensures that they remain categorised as supplementary material of a lower 
hierarchical order.  As such, they do not obtain the elevated level of simulacra that can be 
appreciated in themselves, in accordance with Deleuze’s view.  They therefore become 
unconventional works within a conventional hierarchical ordering, where a perceived 
overarching causa finalis (the completed structures) dictates their apparent functional 
role.  At the same time, the causa efficiens claimed by Heidegger to be falsely attributed 
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to the artist, is employed in its classical sense as a way of nevertheless attaching 
significance to these works as bearing the trace of the hand of the artist (and therefore 
standing in as evidence of his genius). 
 
The use that Marinetti and his colleagues made of these works therefore elevates them 
to a higher status than would usually be afforded to what would be conventionally 
recognised as preliminary and preparatory works.  However, it is not an elevation that (as 
with Deleuze) would allow these works to break free from any supposed subordinated 
relationship to a model.  This appropriation is politically motivated (the focusing upon a 
potentially progressive and modernised Italy as alluded to in the works).   
 
By including Sant’Elia’s works in prominent exhibitions several years after Sant’Elia’s 
death, the value of the works changes considerably from that of material indicating 
ambitious potential projects, to that of historically valuable works.  These works would 
have a marked increase in their auratic quality (the term coined by Benjamin to refer to 
the importance of the hand or trace of the artist, as discussed in chapter one), where they 
are no longer purely speculative, but become presented as artefacts and signposts of a 
lost visionary.   
 
On the other hand, the auratic importance of the actual drawings and sketches was 
countered by a variety of techniques that in effect supplemented and developed the myth 
of Sant’Elia as a visionary.  The ‘Movimento Italiano Sant’Elia’, the booklet ‘Breviaries of 
Martyrs and Heroes’, and the renaming of the Futurist architecture magazine to Sant’Elia, 
all became forms of supporting and perpetuating the supposed importance of Sant’Elia’s 
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later works (of which the only physical evidence was the collection of drawings and 
sketches he left behind).  This in turn served to heighten the significance of these 
drawings and sketches, as that around which such glorification could take place (via the 
attributed significance of that which they alluded to).  Furthermore, the use of 
technological reproduction made it possible to widely distribute images of selected 
drawings and sketches by Sant’Elia under the banner of Futurism.  This served to utilise 
these works in a way that was simultaneously both supplementary, and by elevating them 
to a higher hierarchical level of significance as visual promotions of Sant’Elia’s work.262  
These reproductions in books, newspapers, and articles, influenced their public reception 
by presenting them on the same scale and medium as reproductions of historically 
considered ‘complete’ works.  This highlights the important role of technology in shaping 
the way works are perceived, engaged with, and consumed.   
 
To this extent, it can be seen that Adorno’s concerns regarding the appropriation of 
technological reproducibility were justified when considered from the point of view of 
Fascist manipulation.  Sant’Elia’s name, his vision (as depicted by his drawings and 
sketches), and even his fabricated last words were made to serve a political cause that 
Sant’Elia, in death, had no control over.  In this respect the use made of Sant’Elia’s work is 
at the opposite end of the scale to the highly controlled use of Henry Moore’s own 
preliminary and preparatory works. 
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At the same time the technological reproduction of Sant’Elia’s work can also be seen to 
have transcended (at least to a large extent) its political appropriation over the course of 
time.  The fanfare surrounding Sant’Elia’s life and work propagated by the Futurists 
inevitably died down following World War Two and the end of Mussolini’s reign.  
However, Da Costa Meyer points to the influential architectural critic Reyner Banham as 
having played a key role in continuing, at least in part, the perpetuation of the myth of 
Sant’Elia’s contribution to modern architecture.  Da Costa Meyer shows how Banham, 
writing in 1955, traces the lineage of modern architectural design back to Sant’Elia, 
praising the originality of his ideas and dismissing the absence of plans or sections by 
saying how “the evidence of Sant’Elia’s abilities has, I suspect, simply been lost in the 
inevitable attrition of time”.263   
 
Thus the over emphasised importance of his contribution to modern design, as 
purposefully carried out by the Futurists, found its rhetoric picked up by Banham at face-
value, and broadcast on an international level.  As discussed in chapter two, MoMA 
played a pivotal role in establishing a new notion of modern art, and exaggerating the 
importance of historical artistic movements around or recently before its creation.  As 
such, the historical significance of Futurism became crystallised.  The results of this 
crystallisation were to be (and continue to be) numerous studies and books dedicated to 
the movement, and included in the reproduced imagery remain to this day reproductions 
of those of Sant’Elia’s works that relate most evidently to Futurism.  Such is the shadow 
cast by Futurism over Sant’Elia that a small number of his drawings and sketches (usually 
taken from the dinamismi or Città Nuova works) are regularly included in publications on 
                                                          
263
 Da Costa Meyer, The Work of Antonio Sant’Elia, p. 206. 
221 
 
Futurism (despite these works being produced before he became a member), whereas 
the number of English language books dedicated to Sant’Elia himself can be counted on 
one hand.  Though not a household name, Sant’Elia retains a mythical status composed of 
echoes of Futurist propaganda, and the romanticised notion of a genius killed in battle 
before being able to bring his visions to fruition.  As Paul Goldberger wrote in a 1986 
review of the ‘New York Times’ of the show ‘Antonio Sant’Elia: Drawings’ his:  “name has 
the power of legend among architectural students” and goes on to describe him as “a 
prophet...an artist-architect who issued a clarion call to the glories of modernism, who 
wanted to proclaim the potential of Twentieth-Century technology to remake the 
world”.264  The show in question was the first retrospective to be seen in America, going 
to six museums in total (including the Yale Art Gallery), and such a review highlights how 
the myth of Sant’Elia had been well and truly set, and as such tended to lead the way in 
place of the technical or creative properties of the work. 
 
The use of digital archiving should also be acknowledged here.  Rather than being utilised 
to promote the availability and engagement with Sant’Elia’s works, digital technology has 
been used by the Musei Civici di Como as a reference point for constructing a database of 
Sant’Elia’s works for the purpose of organising future displays.  This suggests that digital 
technology as a form of supplementarity often remains in an entirely supportive role that 
is geared towards the promotion of original works.    
 
This section draws attention to the importance of forms of supplementarity that 
appropriate an artist’s life and work in a particular way, in order to establish or 
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perpetuate the ways in which such work might be interpreted.  It is therefore of 
importance for considerations of the implications that embellishments and distortions of 
an artist’s output can have for how their work is classified, and therefore received. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter addresses the question – ‘how is the supplement classified?’ – through a 
careful study of two aspects of Sant’Elia’s works on paper:  the classification of works-for-
art, where the possibility of a more complex interpretation of the artist’s output is 
argued; and the classification of such works that is shaped and influenced by specific 
forms of supplementarity that are applied by ‘outside’ forces.   
 
This chapter further highlights the problematic status of the supplement explored in 
chapter three, whilst extending this study into the different forces at play in classifying 
what is conventionally defined as supplementary material.  The question of the 
classification of the supplement is shown to be framed by philosophical, historical, and (in 
this case) political approaches that come to bear on the work.  Hierarchy emerges as both 
a problematic and dominant influence upon the classification of the supplement.  
Historically established modes of situating preliminary and preparatory material in a 
lesser relation to complete works of art, is identified as a significant factor in interpreting 
the ways in which such material is both interpreted and utilised.  This historical position is 
also challenged by Deleuze’s theories of the ‘sign’ and his re-interpretation of Plato’s 
concept of simulacra, which brings into question an approach to the prominence of 
identity that has dominated Western attitudes towards the hierarchical distinction 
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between model and copy.  Deleuze’s conception of art as ‘sign’ suggests the possibility of 
works produced by an artist to be engaged with in terms of the sensual experiences they 
induce, rather than attributing value to their status in comparison to other forms of art.  
Deleuze’s interpretation of the simulacrum, which emphasising differences over ordered 
similarities, provides theoretical support to the claim of this thesis that works-for-art are 
more complex and deserving of greater consideration than is predominantly the case 
today.  This provides a new framework within which supplementary material that falls 
into the category of ‘work-for-art’ can be re-considered, where the historically 
hierarchical distinction between model and copy is called into question.  This is explored 
through a careful consideration of examples representing different types of Sant’Elia’s 
works on paper (dinamismi, preparatory sketches, architectural drawings, and fantastical 
depictions) that are each shown to have distinctive qualities that do not correlate with 
conventional hierarchical classification.  Causality (identified in chapter two as an 
important focus of this thesis) is expanded upon to emphasise the significant role that the 
creative process itself has for an understanding of why the supplement can and should be 
re-considered. 
 
This chapter also makes use of the distinctive conditions influencing the use made of 
Sant’Elia’s creative output, to highlight the forms of supplementarity that can be applied 
to (rather than identified in) an artist’s work.  This is important for emphasising the 
implications of the different categories and applications of supplementarity.  Myth-
building, carried out under a wide range of approaches explored in detail in the final 
section of this chapter, are shown to be exercised under specific conditions, whilst having 
significant implications for how an artist’s output is categorised and received.  In 
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particular, the ways in which specific works are elevated in importance above others, the 
extent to which contingent factors influence how works may be displayed, archived, or 
lost, and the way in which aspects of works may be eclipsed by other qualities due to how 
they have been historically promoted or discussed.  In this respect the chapter is of value 
for both revealing and understanding the ramifications of appropriation and 
commodification of available material in a way that is only apparent when viewed from a 
position where the retrospective analysis (such as the re-consideration of a Modernist 
artist’s work) becomes possible at a later date.  The implications for the philosophy of 
technology are considerable, as stages in the creative process are shown to go beyond a 
simple equipmental use, and become capable or being interpreted as concentrated 
results of creative invention.  
 
The unique circumstances surrounding Sant’Elia’s work makes him invaluable as the 
subject of a case study within this present discussion, as both the conditions of his 
working process, and the exploitation of his output after his death, bring to the fore 
considerations that are pivotal for an analysis of how the supplement is classified.        
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Chapter Five:  Biographical Material, Aura and Enigmaticalness 
 
This chapter is concerned with the importance of the supplement.  Why, in what way, and 
to whom is the supplement important?  In the previous chapters, the status and 
classification of the supplement have been explored by addressing the different forms of 
supplementarity – preliminary works, preparatory works, biographical material, and 
educational devices – revealing their specific differences, and the slippages of meaning 
between them.  I have also shown how these slippages are dictated by different ways in 
which such forms of supplementarity are brought together, emphasised, or pushed into 
the background.  The uses of supplementary material not only change the ways in which 
such material is interpreted, but also influences the works of art they may be made to 
support. 
 
The question of why the supplement can be argued to be important could therefore be 
claimed to be dependent upon context.  For example, preliminary works become 
important for scholars of artists’ techniques, whereas historians of artists may place 
greater significance upon biographical material.  Equally, curators may see the 
importance of both preliminary works and biographical material in providing an 
opportunity to present works of art in a new way that might appeal to the public.  
However, whilst all these claims may be held to have validity, in this chapter I argue that 
supplementary material can itself emerge as culturally important, due to the emphasis it 
gives to the creative process, and the effects of this shift in emphasis on the experience, 
study, and practice of art.  
 
226 
 
The main focus of this chapter will be the former studio of the painter Francis Bacon 
(1909-1992), which was removed from its original location in Kensington in 1998, and 
reconstructed in the Hugh Lane Municipal Gallery of Modern Art in Dublin.  Through a 
careful consideration of Benjamin’s notion of aura, and Adorno’s concept of 
enigmaticalness, I argue that Bacon’s relocated studio illuminates the cultural importance 
of supplementary material.   
 
7 Reece Mews 
 
Bacon had lived and worked at 7 Reece Mews in Kensington for thirty-one years.  Due to 
Bacon’s apparently chaotic working process, the studio space became filled with various 
books, photographs, newspaper clippings, and abandoned canvases, as well as an 
accumulation of materials such as brushes and paint.  Following Bacon’s death, the studio 
was left largely untouched.  The heir to Bacon’s possessions, John Edwards, made the 
decision that the studio and its contents should be preserved for posterity.  It soon 
became apparent that the location of the studio did not lend itself to receiving a steady 
stream of visitors, with little room for more than a couple of people to enter at any one 
time.  With its steep and narrow staircase, and cluttered studio space, 7 Reece Mews 
could not have been more unsuitable for public access.  Furthermore, these restrictions 
would inevitably put the preservation of the contents at risk.  From a pragmatic point of 
view, the studio needed to be relocated if it was to reach a wider audience.  Having tried 
unsuccessfully to win the support of London’s Tate Gallery, Edwards eventually reached 
an agreement with The Hugh Lane Gallery in Dublin (in the country where Bacon was 
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born).  The first items arrived in September 1998, and on the 23 May 2001 the 
reconstructed South Kensington art studio was finally opened to the public.   
 
The reconstructed studio itself is made up of much (though as will be discussed, not all) of 
the studio content (consisting of over 7,000 individual items), as well as the walls.  The 
studio is effectively boxed in, with a window providing a single viewing or observation 
point.  Located outside this room, the original stairs from Reece Mews have been placed 
beneath a Perspex cover.  Three other spaces are dedicated to Bacon; a micro-gallery, an 
exhibition room, and an audio-visual room.265  During the reconstruction process, each 
individual item in the studio was photographed, documented, and digitally added to a 
database considered to be the most comprehensive of its kind.266  Importantly, this digital 
database is not made publicly available online.  Despite its thorough documentation of 
the studio’s contents, the database’s primary function is that of facilitating the potential 
use of the contents in future exhibitions.  Instead of providing virtual access to the 
contents of Bacon’s studio that could ‘take the place’ of the experience of the original 
works, digital technology is used to share information about objects that may be deemed 
worthy of display.  This shows the extent to which ‘the original’ is still being prioritised 
over the copy.          
 
Studios and former places of residence have been preserved in different ways, and to 
varying degrees, such as the attempts to recreate a faithful version of Delacroix’s last 
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home and studio.267  Another example is Edvard Munch’s studio in Oslo that has been 
utilised not as a fixed museum, but as a place for contemporary artists to produce 
projects inspired by Munch’s work.268  There are numerous factors behind such 
preservations.  The work may be left to the State (as in the case of Brancusi’s atelier), or 
saved by the efforts of others who recognise or imagine a need to protect a site they 
consider to be of cultural relevance (as with the former homes of Delacroix and 
Rembrandt).  Bacon himself attached little sentimental value to the fate of his studio, 
having encouraged Edwards to renovate the home they shared together instead of 
keeping it as a shrine.269        
 
Whether bequeathed or ‘rescued’, the act of preserving the spaces of celebrated figures 
(something that is not limited to the art world, as can be seen in places such as the Freud 
Museum in London, and the Franz Kafka Museum in Prague) is an important modern 
phenomenon.  Pierre Bourdieu, writing in 1993, highlights the relative peculiarity of the 
practice of celebrating the lives of artists, where: “There are in fact very few other areas 
in which the glorification of ‘great individuals’, unique creators irreducible to any 
condition or conditioning, is more common or uncontroversial.”270  Both Bourdieu, and 
Howard S. Becker in Art Worlds, developed sociological interpretations of the creative 
industries in which a multitude of factors are found to be at play in establishing and 
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maintaining the reputations of individual artists.  Bourdieu shows how the reputation of 
artists is never truly fixed, but must constantly be re-established in order to withstand 
new developments that threaten to usurp established tastes and styles, saying that: “The 
literary or artistic field is a field of forces, but it is also a field of struggles tending to 
transform or conserve this field of forces.”271   
 
The project to reconstruct and preserve Bacon’s Kensington studio must, at least in part, 
be understood in this context.  Painting as a serious art form was by the 1990s in decline, 
with the most successful artists working in media such as video art, or installations.  
Multi-media had become established as a norm of contemporary practice, whereas 
painting was increasingly considered to be an exhausted and dated medium.  The 
possibility of preserving the studio within a museum setting would provide some form of 
protection for Bacon’s legacy by placing it within a context that, as Benjamin would say of 
the work of art, ‘arrests’ time.  By housing and emphasising the auratic quality of a work, 
or in this case, a studio, the museum effectively insulates and preserves Bacon’s legacy.  
The intended permanence of the display provides longevity to the preservation of his 
reputation.  This act of preservation implies a cultural significance for that which is being 
preserved.  This implication in turn underlines the value of his paintings, as the products 
of an artist whose studio is capable of warranting preservation. 
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Figure 11: Francis Bacon's reconstructed studio, Dublin City Gallery The Hugh Lane, Dublin, Ireland. This photo 
of Dublin City Gallery The Hugh Lane is courtesy of TripAdvisor.  
www.tripadvisor.ie/LocationPhotoDirectLink-g186605-d187624-i124021230-
Dublin_City_Gallery_The_Hugh_Lane-Dublin_County_Dublin.html#119670866 
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The relocation of Bacon’s studio (Figure 11) is a matter of display as displacement.  
‘Display’ is derived from the French word ‘despleier’, which in turn is derived from the 
Latin ‘plicare’, which means to fold (more literally, to fold inwards), with the assigned 
prefix, ‘dis’, making ‘displicare’ – to unfold – or to fold apart.  It lends itself to this current 
discussion through the connotations of a display bringing forth through a process of 
unconcealing and demystification, rather than statically existing in mere objectivity.  To 
display is to place something within a context where what is displayed is encouraged to 
appear, and to be seen.  The studio or residence, when conserved in its original location, 
is not so much a matter of display, but of inviting, of providing an opportunity to come 
and see what already came to exist without any concern for future audiences.  By 
agreeing to assist in the relocation of Bacon’s studio, the museum or gallery would be 
actively choosing to display the studio, to make the claim that what was to be displayed 
would be worthy  of display.  This is an important point as it highlights the way in which 
the relocation of Bacon’s studio re-presents it in a very specific way that can be 
distinguished from the conservation of studios or houses in their original location.  What 
remains, what is lost, and what is transformed in this re-location, opens up Bacon’s studio 
to a detailed analysis of the cultural importance of supplementarity.   
 
To display the contents of an artist’s studio is inevitably to become involved in the issue 
of aura.  In 1992, Bourriaud stated that: “Sacredness is making a comeback, here, there 
and everywhere.  In a muddled way we are hoping for the return of the tradition of 
aura.”272  Yet whilst he may have been referring to the new ways in which the 
‘sacredness’ of works of art were manifesting themselves through a greater emphasis on 
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the importance of audience participation as the event of art, it at the same time implies 
that aura had never disappeared.  Instead it was continuing as a force to be contended 
with, and ready to reappear in (then) new developments in art.273   
 
To display the contents of an artist’s studio asserts that the contents already have a value 
that makes them worthy of display.  This value is derived from their association with a 
particular artist.  An act of commodification takes place, where the studio as display 
produces value that extends to, and supports the artist’s work, which itself gave value to 
the studio.  The displayed studio is the extreme form of the emphasis of biographical 
content in assessing the cultural value of an artist and their work.  At the same time it 
represents a crossover of apparently distinct fields, wherein human history and art history 
meet.  Christopher Whitehead explains this conventional distinction:  “In general, art 
museums tend not to collect and display historical artistic material, or the personal 
effects of human remains of artists and others, such as patrons, who operated within the 
artistic field at a given time.”274 
 
In an email conversation with Whitehead, I asked him whether cases such as Bacon’s 
displayed studio might suggest that over time traditional distinctions between art, 
archaeology, and art history could become problematic.  Whitehead replied: 
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‘Elevating' biographical objects 'to the level of display' complicates the prescribed 
focus of the art museum (i.e. the 'artwork'), but it could be seen to work within 
well-worn art historical/aesthetic discourses of the artist as a special, often 
visionary, individual.  It is notable that when artists' possessions are displayed the 
artists in question tend to be consecrated, to use Bourdieu, and perhaps there is 
some kind of fascination (which such displays encourage) with their possessions as 
relics, or objects that have been touched by and used for greatness.  This is also 
surely the hinted possibility of connection between contemporary visitors and 
long-dead individuals, whose overwhelming cultural and historical significance (as 
people whose creations transcend historical and cultural specificity and reflect an 
a temporal human condition) can be humanised through a display of tools they 
used, the letters they wrote or the spaces they inhabited.275       
 
This possibility of ‘humanising’ historical figures who have been presented as culturally 
significant or somehow ‘special’, highlights a contradictory double movement that 
appears in the act of displaying Bacon’s studio.  It is one that formed the object of much 
consideration and concern for both Adorno and Benjamin, in which the viewer is both 
drawn closer to the human behind a work, whilst at the same time distanced all the more 
by this ‘drawing near’.  Occupying the division between the two is aura.    
 
Aura 
 
On one hand, the displayed studio seems dominated by aura, of its deep association not 
only with that of the absent figure of the artist, but of the quasi-mystical sense of 
creativity itself.  On the other hand, it seemingly demystifies the studio by drawing 
attention to the everydayness of much of its contents, and providing information about 
techniques and inspiration relating to Bacon’s work.  The displayed studio and its 
contents could be described as both a mystifying and demystifying scene of creativity 
itself.  In my interview with Barbara Dawson, the Director of the Hugh Lane Gallery who 
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oversaw the project of relocating Bacon’s studio, she spoke of the studio as Bacon’s 
“engine room”, emphasising its pivotal role in fostering the production of his works.276  
Brian O’Doherty further emphasises the auratic quality of the studio in its intertwined 
relationship with Bacon and his works: 
 
Now preserved in Dublin’s Hugh Lane Gallery, Bacon’s studio carries such a whiff 
of presence that you can hallucinate the large, restless, reputedly dangerous 
animal inside as you peer through the door and window.  What happens to this 
room when it is frozen in museum time?  How does it illuminate Bacon’s art?  It 
becomes emblematic, circulating a low-grade energy among artist, persona, 
studio, and work, enough to sustain the myth it begot.277 
 
In this respect the studio brings forth its auratic quality, and further mythologises the 
artist as causa efficiens by extending the creative process beyond matter, form, and 
intention.  It does this by incorporating the array of additional material gathered together 
by the artist in his efforts to create works.  It is a matter of distances.  Bacon’s displayed 
studio brings to light the intricately interwoven issues of the maintenance and loss of aura 
that concerned Adorno and Benjamin in different ways.  In the five or six decades since 
their main texts on this subject, it is apparent that the auratic, and conversely the loss of 
aura, continues to be problematic.  When Caygill, in reference to this debate, says that “it 
was the development of the technology of reproduction which enabled the category of 
the authentic to emerge and lend authority to the original work” it could also be added 
that a certain ‘clamour’ for aura appeared within the field of cultural production.278  With 
the decline of aura in the ever-increasing flow of reproducible imagery (which in the 
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digital age of instantly uploadable video and still imagery has been pushed to an 
extreme), the idea of the original takes on a new significance as a rare and valuable 
quality, contrasting vividly against a backdrop of disposable, and therefore ephemeral, 
material.  The inessentiality of reproducible imagery gives a renewed meaning to the 
essential – to essence.  Benjamin appears to suggest a supplementary role for aura itself, 
in relation to the essence of a thing, when he says that “the ornament is much more the 
distinguishing characteristic of authentic aura, an ornamental envelopment in which the 
thing or essence lies secure as if sunken in a case”.279  Benjamin’s use of the word 
‘ornament’ brings to mind its use by Kant (which Benjamin was no doubt aware of), 
concerning that which affects the experience of a work of art, whilst not being intrinsic to 
it.  In a hypothetical hierarchy of the auratic, a preserved studio endowed with the trace 
of the artist, and wrapped up in a biographical value that extends to the totality of the 
studio’s contents, becomes the rarest, and (from a certain perspective) the most 
profoundly auratic artistic material.  On the surface, such material appears to resist 
reproduction.  As Benjamin says: “Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is 
lacking in one element: its presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place 
where it happens to be.”280  Whilst the displayed studio is not a work of art in any 
conventional sense, it both embodies and emits presence through its biographical 
content.  At the same time, it makes a claim for the authority of the author, whose 
creative essence lies ‘enveloped’ in an aura as ornament.  
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The prominence of the artist is asserted over any reproductions of Bacon’s work that 
might threaten to dissolve this authority in the temporal usefulness of imagery.  Here 
aura and reproduced imagery enter into a reciprocal relationship.  In the digital age, 
Bacon’s works are accessible at the press of a few keys – available as screensavers on 
phones, or to be printed out at home.  The multiplicity of imagery expands the reach of 
Bacon’s reputation, reducing the distance to the surface content (if not the size, texture, 
weight, and place) of his works.  At the same time, the more this non-auratic use of 
Bacon’s work expands, the more the peculiar characteristic of aura increases in the 
original works.  Bacon’s displayed studio intricately supplements both the original works 
and the reproductions by becoming, as it were, the hub of the auratic.  In this sense, it 
continues to be an “engine room” that anchors the authority of the artist in a time and 
place both despite and because of a displacement that allows it to be displayed.281   
 
The studio itself is not entirely impervious to reproducibility either.  In 1985, Bacon was 
the subject of a South Bank Show documentary that featured interviews with Bacon 
inside the studio at 7 Reece Mews, and is now freely accessible in its entirety on YouTube.  
In 1993, the biography The Gilded Gutter Life of Francis Bacon was released and included 
a colourful reference to Bacon’s studio as being a “magical cave of old paintbrushes, 
easels and canvases, newspapers, and copies of Paris Match, all be-spattered with paint” 
as well as a photo of Bacon in (as the accompanying caption describes) his “famous, 
chaotic studio”.282  In 1998, John Maybury directed Love is the Devil: Study for a Portrait 
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of Francis Bacon, in which a superficially faithful representation of the studio features 
prominently, characterising the real studio and projecting a semi-fictitious narrative 
upon/within it.283  Also in 1998, the photographer Perry Ogden was invited to take a 
series of photographs of the interior of 7 Reece Mews, including areas that were not 
eventually relocated, such as the bedroom and kitchen.  These photographs were 
released in 2001 in the book 7 Reece Mews: Francis Bacon’s Studio.284  In each case, 
imagery of the studio (whether literary, documentary, fictitious, or photographic) is 
reproduced.  By the time the displayed studio opened in 2001 it had already been 
reproduced in various forms in ways that both familiarised and mythologised it.  As David 
J. Getsy remarks:  “the studio itself has become Bacon’s most recognisable image”.285  Far 
from dissolving or usurping the auratic content of the displayed studio, these cases of 
reproduction emphasise the distance between the studio and its various forms of 
reproductions.  At the same time they assert the call for reproducibility by revealing it to 
be of a value worthy of reproducibility in various forms.  Benjamin, speaking of the cult 
image, explains that: “True to its nature, it remains distant, however close it may be.”286 
 
By being displaced, and displayed, Bacon’s studio is placed at a distance.  The properly 
equipmental value (in the sense Heidegger understood) of paint brushes, newspapers, a 
dirty sink, and jars of paint thinner are, by being displaced, removed from their 
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‘readiness-to-hand’ and unconcealed in their ‘presence-at-hand’.287  Their ‘use-value’ is 
reduced and closed off within a distancing carried out by the act of displaying, which at 
the same time cloaks the studio contents in the aura of the artist, where a radiator is no 
longer a mere piece of equipment for heating a room, but becomes incorporated into the 
world of the artist.  What is present is the very presence of the past that preserves the 
past only in order to say that “that world is no longer”.288  The content, as that which 
brings forth the ‘pastness’ of this past world, constitutes an irretrievable and 
unapproachable distance, which heightens its auratic presence the further that world 
appears to be.  Understood only in consideration of the artist and ‘pastness’ of the 
creative act, supplementarity would always represent death.289  Yet at the same time 
such evocations of past worlds fold the past and the present together.  Barbara Dawson 
alludes to this sense of the past made present when recounting her first glimpse of the 
studio in Kensington, saying that: “When I put my head round the door I felt as if I had 
stepped into a time-tunnel.”290 
 
This notion of aura depends upon the classical understanding of the artist as the causa 
efficiens.  Buren perpetuates this interpretation of the artist as all-important, and 
romanticises the significance of the place of creativity when criticising the reconstruction 
of Bacon’s studio:  “it was the reality of the work, it’s ‘truth’, its relationship to its creator 
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and place of creation, that was irretrievably lost in this transfer”.291  Without the 
prominence of the artist in a causal consideration of the work of art, the studio and its 
contents appear to lose their auratic value from the point of view of its relevance as that 
which supplements works of art.  Dawson underlines this issue when she says of the 
studio contents that “essentially it’s just rubbish” and that its cultural significance is 
something applied to it, in accordance with certain prevailing attitudes operating within 
the field of cultural production.292  Becker would call it a world populated by a series of 
‘art worlds’ consisting of “people doing things”.293  Heidegger, Adorno, and Deleuze 
would not apply the same level of significance to the studio and its contents.  Heidegger’s 
anti-humanist approach meant that he was not at all concerned with individual artists, 
but with the unconcealment of Being that happens to appear through art.  Adorno 
“wanted to know what the cultural objects were saying despite their creators’ intent”.294  
Deleuze’s philosophy of Difference meant that he was concerned with pre-individual 
‘assemblages’ of multiple forms and forces that shape creators as much as creative acts, 
rather than finding value in materials based on a hierarchical ordering dominated by the 
identity of the artist.  These different positions, both curatorial and philosophical, 
highlight how interpretations of the studio can be framed by both the priorities of their 
respective projects, and properties of the studio that emerge as areas of consideration.  
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The perceived auratic quality of the studio encourages a use for it within a gallery setting.  
It is the possibility of a window onto the (past) ‘mysterious’ world of the artist, described 
by Getsy as “ultimately voyeuristic and somewhat exploitative entertainment”.295  The 
notion of a window onto another world is literally enforced by making the small window 
attached to the reconstructed studio the single means of viewing its contents.  The 
window underlines the distance between the viewer and the studio, heightening the 
sense of voyeuristically looking in to a secret, private realm (not unlike Duchamp’s Étant 
donnés).  It is the value given to the biographical connotations of the studio and its 
contents that first produces its auratic quality and provides it with an apparent cultural 
significance.  This section therefore highlights how aura is produced through the assertion 
of value given to particular objects, by institutions or individuals, whereby the historical 
connotations of such objects both bridges a gap, and emphasises a distance.  This is 
important for the thesis due to how it shows that the presentation of material can 
foreground their qualities in ways that insist upon interpreting their associative (and 
therefore supplementary) value, at the expense of other qualities.  I now discuss how 
such a presentation can in fact inadvertently lead to another interpretation of 
supplementary material that transforms its cultural value.  
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Enigmaticalness 
 
Theodor Adorno, in a very different way to Benjamin, is sensitive to the effects of aura as 
it appeared in relation to works of art, ‘fixed’ within the artificial context of museum 
settings.  He echoes the general sentiments of Heidegger (who speaks of the work’s 
transformation into ‘object-value’) in his criticism of the losses inflicted upon works of art 
once they are incorporated within museum settings, saying that: “Museums and 
mausoleums are connected by more than phonetic association.  Museums are like the 
family sepulchres of works of art.”296  However, he also recognised that such a setting 
produced a new way of evaluating works, whereby museums have “transformed works of 
art into the hieroglyphs of history and brought them a new content while the old one 
shrivelled up”.297  This ‘hieroglyphic’ quality of works of art signified for Adorno their 
essential ‘enigmaticalness’, as enigmas that work as works through their ‘enigmatic’ 
nature.  Despite this, the works change within the museum setting into hieroglyphs of 
history, where they become the enigmas of the past.  For Adorno, this is not meant in a 
wholly negative sense, but reveals how even within a context of the historical, they can 
still retain their essential enigmaticalness. 
 
It is the efforts to unravel this enigmaticalness that for Adorno constitutes the greatest 
difficulty and obstacle to art (efforts such as those discussed in the ‘interpretation and 
display’ section of chapter two).  In a manner that correlates in part with Deleuze’s notion 
of art as that which produces ‘problematic’ signs, and which remains art only to the 
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extent that it produces a sign, the perceived understanding of a work (as guided by the 
mechanisms of the culture industry) deprives it of the essential enigmaticalness that 
makes it a work.298  Adorno argues: 
 
The better an artwork is understood, the more it is unpuzzled on one level and the 
more obscure its constitutive enigmaticalness becomes.  It only emerges 
demonstratively in the profoundest experience of art.  If a work opens itself 
completely, it reveals itself as a question and demands reflection; then the work 
vanishes into the distance, only to return to those who thought they understood 
it, overwhelming them for a second time with the question ‘What is it?’  Art’s 
enigmaticalness can, however, be recognised as constitutive where it is absent: 
Artworks that unfold to contemplation and thought without any remainder are 
not artworks.299    
 
The work of art, for Adorno, must therefore retain its enigmaticalness, not in the sense of 
a problem too difficult to resolve, but in the sense of a work that remains enigmatic 
precisely in its resistance to becoming a problem.  As an enigma, the work of art may 
invite understanding, but this is not the same as posing a problem.  The more a work is 
apparently understood, the further its essential enigmaticalness becomes concealed.  As 
such, it is the drive to understand the work of art that Adorno recognises as that which 
places its essential enigmaticalness in danger.  This recalls the historical accounts ranging 
from Vasari, The Goncourt Brothers, MoMA’s ‘evolutionary’ layout, to the present day, 
where various methods of supplementarity have been employed to guide interpretations 
of artworks. 
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It is precisely this drive towards understanding that Adorno sees as one of the 
mechanisms of what he and Horkheimer call the ‘culture industry’.  In opposition to the 
aesthetic experience of a work that engages with its essential enigmaticalness, the culture 
industry reduces works of art to commodities there to be understood.  Works of art 
become incorporated into a popular notion of ‘culture’ that can be consumed by a visit to 
a museum as much as a coffee can be consumed in a café.  Instead of enigmas, works of 
art become entertaining riddles, where various efforts are made to provide helpful hints 
and clues in the form of leaflets, guides, and wall-mounted information about context, 
such as those that were the subject of analysis for Bourdieu and Darbel.  For Benjamin, 
the age of technological reproducibility was welcomed as a potential way of breaking with 
the cult-value and auratic presence of institutionally ‘protected’ museum works in order 
to encourage a dynamic and temporal use-value in art.  For Adorno, technological 
reproducibility had instead made art accessible to a largely indifferent mass audience, 
and therefore a matter of potential political and market exploitation.  Benjamin 
optimistically looked towards a potential mobilising of the masses by exposing them to 
high art that would encourage critical thinking.  Adorno, however, feared the 
appropriation of art as a method of encouraging the opposite by reducing art to a 
commodity value, and depriving it of its essentially complex enigmaticalness.  The 
reduction of art to the status of commodities to be understood was to be what Adorno 
and Horkheimer would term the deaestheticisation of art, where, as Kaufman puts it, the 
culture industry would be “designed to inculcate conformism rather than critical 
agency”.300  It would intentionally turn away from the auratic in art, which carried with it 
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the connotations of a lost or fading historical significance tied up in its enigmaticalness, 
instead encouraging “culture’s straightforward, affirmational repetition of a consequently 
unchallenged reification”.301  In this sense, aura in historical works is understood by 
Adorno to be an indication or echo of engagements with existence that encourage a 
critical relationship with the present.  As such: “The intentional abandonment of aura 
leads to a failure even to register negatively – through vexed attempts to create or access 
aura – the crucial modern phenomenon of aura’s loss (or at least its apparent loss).”302 
 
For Adorno and Horkheimer, aura in art was not to be considered as necessarily negative, 
but instead retained a sense of enigmaticalness (as alluded to when speaking of the works 
of art in museums as hieroglyphs of history).  This encouraged critical engagement over 
the placation of riddles presented as understood, and supported by the means of 
(apparently) understanding them.  Here I arrive at a key point in this thesis.  From 
Adorno’s perspective, supplementary material would be essentially demystifying 
inasmuch as it would support works of art by shedding light on such things as the 
technical construction of work, the formation and development of ideas leading towards 
works of art, their ‘madeness’ (ϑεσει), and the biographical circumstances of the artists 
creating works of art.  Supplementarity would, in all its forms, fall on the side of 
deaestheticisation, where “its unmistakable symptom is the passion to touch everything, 
to allow no work to be what it is, to dress it up, to narrow its distance from the 
viewer”.303  By its very nature, supplementarity would appear to interfere with the ‘being 
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what it is’ of the work of art.  The displaying of maquettes in Moore’s former studio might 
narrow the distance between the viewer and the creative process of the large-scale 
sculptures that developed from them; the explanatory text might be seen to ‘dress up’ 
the work in a historical context that offers a background to the artist’s motivation and 
intentions; the biographical material might establish a field of influences or an insight into 
the artist’s personality.  Yet in all these examples it is important to state that it is the use 
made of such material, and not the material itself, that Adorno criticised.   
 
I consider Adorno himself to offer a way of salvaging supplementary material from its 
apparent consignment to mere apparatus in the service of the culture industry (a term 
that perhaps more than ever remains applicable in contemporary society).  Adorno 
considered that museums withered original properties of the works they house (through 
their efforts to compile collections of historical works of art for contemporary enjoyment) 
whilst at the same time providing those works with a “new content”.  At the same time, I 
consider what is here collectively called supplementary material to carry with it a dual 
function that on one hand provides methods of supporting established works of art by 
assisting in the furthering of knowledge that elucidates the creative process (as opposed 
to just extending knowledge of established works of art), whilst on the other hand 
allowing the opportunity for such materials to be brought forth as cultural objects in their 
own right as a result of the centrality of the creative process that their employment 
instigates.  They would then be capable of being evaluated, not in a deferential 
relationship to an artist or completed works, but as cultural objects which themselves call 
for a more thorough analysis.     
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Carol Duncan, describes the notion of ‘the liminal’ experience created by the sanctified 
setting of museums and galleries, where:  “zones of time and space in which visitors, 
removed from the concerns of their daily, practical lives, open themselves up to a 
different quality of experience”.304  It is my view that supplementary material experienced 
in such a concentrated setting, rather than being fixed in an educational or demystifying 
role in relation to works of art, themselves become opened up to new levels of 
significance.  Supporting works, biographical material, and educational devices are 
typically intended to un-puzzle the works they ostensibly support.  However, the very act 
of displaying such supplementary material elevates the apparent importance of the 
creative process itself, emphasised by the ‘liminal’ state of experience in the viewers that 
the environment of museums and galleries encourages.  The apparatus of demystification 
itself becomes mystified and enigmatic, re-framing works of art as themselves 
supplementary to the experience of the creative process.   
 
The inclusion of supplementary material alongside established works of art can therefore, 
in my view, completely transform what is being experienced.  Every explanatory text, 
framed preparatory drawing, encased sketchbook, or displayed paintbrushes, only serves 
to centralise the creative process, displacing the centrality of the works of art, and making 
certain forms of supplementary material of more significance as a result.  The gallery or 
museum setting, so often encouraging a reverential approach to its contents, illuminates 
the mystified and enigmatic nature of the creative process that is brought to attention 
through the use of supplementary material.  I therefore disagree with Daniel Buren’s 
interpretation of Bacon’s relocated studio, where he argues that: “Such a studio gives us 
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an idea of the personality of the artist and surprises us with the state of his studio, but 
that is all.”305  The implications of displaying Bacon’s studio, and other forms of 
supplementary material, are far greater and disruptive to conventional modes of 
experiencing art than Buren’s interpretation suggests.  That Tate Britain’s Francis Bacon 
exhibition (2009-10) dedicated one of eight rooms to Bacon’s ‘Archive’ (consisting of an 
abundance of material loaned from The Hugh Lane) supports the view that 
supplementary material is increasingly regarded as being of great interest to the public, 
and the complex ramifications of introducing such material into a major retrospective 
cannot be easily dismissed.    
 
That is not to say that such an interpretation of supplementarity would easily coalesce 
Adorno’s views on art.  In fact he is quite clear in saying that what gives a work of art its 
enigmaticalness is its radical break with the ordered world of things.  This break at one 
and the same time reveals the enigmaticalness of this ordered world, just as it apparently 
offers a solution, where: “Art becomes an enigma because it appears to have solved what 
is enigmatical in existence while the enigma in the merely existing is forgotten as a result 
of its overwhelming ossification.”306  However, this ‘ossification’ lies at the heart of the 
incorporation of this current interpretation of supplementarity into schemata that would 
involve both aura and enigmaticalness.  ‘Truth content’ for Adorno appears in an artwork 
as a challenge to the ossified organisation of the world, whilst at the same time 
presenting the possibility of confronting and improving this established order.  It is not 
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the revelation of an absolute truth, but always a particular revelation of the 
enigmaticalness of the world that at the same time contains within itself the possibility of 
a way out (which is why it is an enigma, and not an inevitably insoluble mystery).  It 
reveals a puzzle whilst simultaneously inviting (challenging) the viewer or listener to solve 
it, thus revealing a mystery to be demystified.  As Adorno says of the artwork: “The zone 
of indeterminacy between the unreachable and what has been realised constitutes their 
enigma.  They have truth content and they do not have it.”307  Adorno seems to leave no 
room for supplementarity (or indeed Schopenhauer’s primacy of the creative idea) in this 
working of art when he says:  “Of all the paradoxes of art, no doubt the innermost one is 
that only through making, through the production of particular works specifically and 
completely formed in themselves, and never through any immediate vision, does art 
achieve what is not made, the truth.”308  
 
This ‘truth’ in its enigmatic revelation that at the same time invites a resolution, only 
becomes more enigmatic when the passing of time makes any notion of possible 
resolution more obscure and indecipherable (its becoming hieroglyphic).309  This produces 
an auratic quality that is fundamental in engaging critically with the otherwise ossified 
world of ‘mere’ existence.  For Adorno, the “truth content is not external to history but 
rather its crystallisation in the works”.310  Yet this opens up a possibility for 
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supplementarity that allows it to step out from beyond its incorporation within the 
culture industry.  Whether an entire studio, an architectural sketch, or a maquette, the 
supplementary material is already in an open-ended relation to enigmatic works of art.  It 
can therefore never be completely ossified in the forgetfulness of the everyday.  Only the 
reduction to mere cogs in the machination of the culture industry would threaten to turn 
such material into everyday items.  However, their use as supplementary devices actually 
maintains their preservation as objects (or collections of objects) that retain a relation to 
enigmaticalness (with varying degrees of intensity), not just to the works of art they are 
said to supplement, but to the process itself.  This is an important observation of the 
thesis as it emphasises the extent to which the archiving of material can allow new areas 
of consideration and cultural importance to appear, in what Steedman refers to as the 
“mad fragmentations that no one intended to preserve”.311  Supplementary material may 
have been preserved as a support for complete works, but I assert that unintentional 
implications of the archiving of these works can be identified.  When the use of 
supplementary material is no longer considered as potentially detrimental to the works of 
art they are intended to support, or as purely educational devices, their value as the 
means to consider the enigmatic act of the creative process begins to emerge.        
 
These works reveal the stepping out of possible ossification in order to construct a puzzle.  
As such, the displaying of such works may take its initial inspiration from the culture 
industry’s efforts to reduce the art experience to a simplified matter of problem solving.  
At the same time, the displaying of such works preserves a variety of influences, choices, 
material constraints, and prevailing ideologies of the time that may not have even been 
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perceived by the artists themselves, yet endure as enigmatic works in their own right.  
The emphasis such works give to the creative process only serves to highlight further their 
enigmaticalness, as embodiments of the act of creation.  These works are neither 
completely ossified, nor conventionally recognised as complete works.  As the examples 
and motivations of supplementarity themselves become historicised, their evaluation 
becomes exposed to new interpretations that are no longer sutured to their original 
intended uses.  Instead they allow other qualities embedded within them to come forth.  
As Benjamin says: “Every image of the past that is not recognised by the present as one of 
its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably.”312  Images of the past may be 
recognised as a concern of the present (such as in its use within the culture industry), 
however that is not to say that their preservation does not preserve other attributes or 
potential revelations contained within those images.                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
312
 Walter Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’. In Illuminations, London: Fontana, 1992 [1940], 
p. 247. 
251 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Francis Bacon, 'untitled', circa 1960s - early 1970s. Dublin City Gallery The Hugh Lane, 
Dublin, Ireland. Image redacted. 
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My assertion that the educational use of supplementary material can lead to a subversion 
of its intentions by reflecting focus away from works of art, and onto the creative process 
itself, might appear to devalue the importance of the, specifically educational, function 
that such material can provide.  However, it instead re-casts this use of educational 
approaches, by paradoxically turning demystification into a process of strengthening the 
enigmatic qualities of supplementary material that ‘embodies’ the act of creativity.  The 
display of Bacon’s studio allows a focusing upon the enigmatic creative process (via the 
association of aura), and the educational or supplementary content.  As Barbara Dawson 
discussed with me, there are “a number of facts that can be gathered from the studio 
contents” – where the fingerprints on photographs can reveal their use as reference 
material, where found newspaper clippings of figures can be related to depicted postures, 
and where a careful analysis of the layers of paint splatters can indicate “his increased 
confidence in working in different ways”.313   
 
Such facts can be utilised with justification in the development of an awareness of 
Bacon’s working process, and of his influences and techniques.  The displayed studio 
during its relocation and reconstruction, as it were, offers up or unconceals formerly 
concealed information that may well be put to use in ‘understanding’ Bacon’s art.  
Indeed, the discovery of preliminary and preparatory drawings reveals that Bacon was 
being economical with the truth when he said that he always worked directly onto the 
canvas.314  Figure 12 is a preparatory drawing made by Bacon using blue ballpoint pen on 
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the front end paper of one the many books found in his studio – and is one of many 
examples of Bacon using this approach.  In contrast to Sant’Elia’s dinamismi drawings (see 
Figure 6) there is no evidence of precision or a controlled gestural draftsmanship.  
Instead, the looseness of the pen strokes, coupled with the ready-to-hand nature of the 
material drawn upon, suggests that this was produced as a quick guideline for 
composition.  The drawing in Figure 12 lacks the visual impact of the paintings that saw 
Bacon become established as one of the great colourists of his time, however it has 
importance for art historians, and historians of Francis Bacon, as it provides evidence that 
Bacon’s paintings were not always produced on canvas in a direct act of expression and 
creative inspiration, but could sometimes be mediated.      
 
Far from dismissing its value, I would argue that the enigmaticalness of the process itself 
is brought into view more enigmatically as a result of such discoveries.  Such information 
only appears to obscure enigmaticalness if it is assumed that it leads to a concrete 
understanding of the work, or is put forward as providing such an understanding under 
the influence of the culture industry.  The presence of aura in the displayed studio 
emerges out of the developments in technological reproducibility that led to a new 
significance of the authentic, where, like the work of art in the museum, aura appears 
with a new content.  This content can at the same time provide knowledge and 
understanding of Bacon’s creative process whilst further illuminating (and not obscuring) 
the enigmaticalness of his works.  As Paul Ricoeur says, “the most valuable traces are the 
ones that were not intended for our information”.315  By way of its biographical content, 
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the auratic quality of the displayed studio appears, and at the same time aura in its new 
content supplements Bacon’s art through new information.  Together aura and 
information emerge side by side in order to encourage, and not obscure, the enigma of 
his art.  This section is of great importance for the objectives of the thesis as it not only 
addresses the inductive (rather than purely reflective) value that the use of biographical 
material in art museums and galleries can provide, but also has implications for the 
evaluation of works-for-art.  In the previous case studies, works-for-art were shown to be 
highly problematic in terms of their status and classification in distinction to recognised 
works-of-art.  This section provides a way of re-considering such problematic issues 
within a framework that allows works-for-art to be separated from a deferential 
connection to works-of-art - not in a theoretical context (such as the ones derived from 
Heidegger and Deleuze) - but in an actual and palpable experience of these works.  In this 
way, such forms of supplementarity become culturally significant as products of creative 
processes that encourage a consideration of (rather than a resolution to) the enigmatic 
act of creativity itself.  
 
Mystification and Demystification 
 
Instead of aura being an integral element of a work’s enigmaticalness that comes forward 
‘of its own accord’ in the aesthetic experience, the culture industry turns it into a 
commodity or a characteristic to be pointed out or artificially constructed within contexts 
that emphasise the history and age of a work of art.  Adorno refers to this as the 
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phenomenon of aura becoming ‘bad’ when it is “instituted and simulated”.316  Adorno 
goes on to say that “aura is gulped down along with the sensual stimuli; it is the uniform 
sauce that the culture industry pours over the whole of its manufacture”.317  But is 
Bacon’s displayed studio also to be understood as part of this phenomenon of ‘bad’ aura 
in the service of a modern form of the culture industry? 
 
There is no question that Bacon’s studio has been ‘instituted’, and that the sense of 
presence associated with the artist is emphasised at The Hugh Lane studio.  The 
educational use of the studio and its contents is openly promoted through the supporting 
literature, and the digital database.  The three rooms that focus on different aspects of 
the studio explain their relationship to Bacon’s work.  The Hugh Lane’s website provides 
details ranging from the relocation process, the biography of the artist, videos, the 
various art material, the books found, and even the furniture.  There is also an entire 
section of the website dedicated to explaining Bacon’s life and works for children.  This 
provides information about the artist’s life, his technique, his former home, and the 
relocation process, but does not discuss any of Bacon’s works.318  Regarding the latter, 
this is a logical omission given the content, but it is important to note how the studio 
space and the project of relocation itself becomes an object of value and interest in its 
own right.   
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Yet does this ‘instituting’ necessarily need to be considered negatively?  At once both 
mystifying and demystifying, the displayed studio should be understood not as 
constituting two opposed and contrary poles, but as the locus of a complex synthesis in 
which the distinctions between the ontic and ontological become blurred.  Whilst a work 
of art may be displayed in a certain way that encourages nothing but distancing, the 
displayed studio operates in a way that pushes both closeness and distance to a point 
approaching indiscernibility.  The negative possibility of this ‘instituted’ aura only appears 
if understanding is taken as an end; where what is demystified is held to apply for the 
totality of the creative process and the works that appear.319  Yet in all the explanations 
surrounding the displayed studio at The Hugh Lane, there is an underlying mystique.  The 
displayed studio, and supplementary material in general, bring forth and reinforce aura.  
This occurs even if initiated or appropriated in the service of the culture industry, under 
artificial or simulated conditions that would attempt to engender a deaestheticisation of 
the experience of art.  For Adorno, in opposition to Benjamin, aura is an essential element 
in art that is intrinsically connected to art’s enigmaticalness, where: “Aura is not only – as 
Benjamin claimed – the here and now of the artwork, it is whatever goes beyond its 
factual givenness, its content; one cannot abolish it and still want art.  Even demystified 
artworks are more than what is literally the case.”320     
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Figure 13: The inside door of Francis Bacon's studio, Dublin 
City gallery The Hugh Lane, Dublin, Ireland. Image 
redacted. 
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Such mystification and demystification is intricately involved in a movement of (to use 
Heidegger’s very specific meanings) concealment and unconcealment, where the factual 
givenness (the ontic) and the ontological quality of aura are effectively co-present within 
the experience of art.  Figure 13 shows Bacon’s paint-covered studio door, wryly 
described by Bacon as the only abstract painting he ever made, and by Dawson as “itself a 
work of art”.321  This image encapsulates the enigmaticalness of the creative process, 
existing between a state of biographical/informative value, and a physical embodiment of 
the romanticised notion of the chaotic act of creation itself.  The door (as all doors are) is 
between the outside and inside, letting in, and keeping out.  The studio door is both 
unusual and familiar, art and non-art, both evidence and mystery.  This movement of 
mystification and demystification in relation to Bacon’s studio will now be explored by 
addressing the main stages of its existence from its original use as a studio, through to the 
re-constructed and preserved studio that exists today. 
 
The site of the working studio had, first of all, an appeal to Bacon himself.  A quotation 
from Bacon on one of the walls of the Hugh Lane Gallery as you approach the studio 
emphasises this: “For some reason the moment I saw this place I knew that I could work 
here.  I am very influenced by places – by the atmosphere of a room.”  Already there is a 
form of aura at work here in Bacon’s own understanding of its suitability, where the 
intangible quality of ‘atmosphere’ is a governing influence.  Yet at the same time a series 
of ontic considerations would have played a necessary part, such as the location, the size, 
the available facilities, and the light source.   
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The working studio itself is, as evidenced by Figure 13, intimately involved in the creative 
process.  In this consideration of Bacon, two forms of mystification/demystification 
operate on either side of the canvas, which serves as the point of contact between the 
two.  Bacon fills the studio with various materials that themselves oscillate between 
equipment and presence.  An example of this is that of a fragment of a photograph that 
was copied and made into one panel of a triptych.  Unusually for Bacon, this panel did not 
feature any figures (it was also the only painting to feature the studio contents).  During 
the extensive analysis of the studio content in the reconstruction, it was discovered that 
this photograph was itself a section taken from another photograph shot thirteen years 
earlier that included Bacon’s deceased former lover George Dyer.  The fragment takes on 
a poignancy through its auratic quality of bringing forth or evoking the dead via their 
representation (here Benjamin’s own admittance of the auratic quality of photographs of 
the deceased is apparent), itself absent in the fragmented section.  The fragment would 
be used as part of Bacon’s equipment as a visual reference to be represented, whilst at 
the same time carrying a trace of presence and aura (that of the missing figure of Dyer) 
which becomes concealed from a viewer - through these degrees of separation - in the 
final painting.322  Instead of concealing or obscuring the enigmaticalness of what is 
otherwise a non-descript painting, the analysis of the studio contents actually demystifies 
this formerly mystified auratic significance that had previously been evident only to Bacon 
himself, whilst opening it up to a new possibility of public interest that is wrapped up in 
the mystification of romance, loss, and melancholy.  This illustrates the degree to which 
enigmaticalness can be induced in supplementary works that are ostensibly used to draw 
attention to demystifying information.  
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In combination with the artist’s memories (themselves intimately caught up in the things 
he surround himself with in a mutual process of forgetting and remembering), the studio 
contents become equipment, and in effect already fill the ‘blank’ canvas (itself an object 
within the studio) as the available forms of inspiration that may potentially be used.  In 
Deleuze’s study of Francis Bacon’s creative process, he explains that: 
 
The painter has many things in his head, or around him, or in his studio.  Now 
everything he has in his head or around him is already in the canvas, more or less 
virtually, more or less actually, before he begins his work.  They are all present in 
the canvas as so many images, actual or virtual, so that the painter does not have 
to cover a blank surface, but rather would have to empty it out, clear it, clean it.323 
 
This is supported by Bacon himself who said that: “I like to live among the memories and 
the damage.”324  The contents of the studio themselves are constantly evaluated in terms 
of the possibilities they offer, in what Petherbridge refers to as the “premeditated 
disorder” of the studio that provides creative inspiration.325  Their value as equipment or 
as presence dictates their preservation, or their abandonment during the occasional 
cleaning of the space.  Furthermore, the material of most value to Bacon would often be 
the least capable of being preserved, due to the manner in which Bacon worked, where 
“as a rule Bacon treated with the least respect those sources he found most useful”.326  
This highlight an important issue of concern for supplementarity, whereby, as with 
Dürer’s initial sketches made directly onto wood, the destructive act of the creative 
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process is often overlooked, potentially causing the prominence of certain forms of 
preserved material to be overstated.  Preserved material that might be interpreted as 
demystifying the creative process, might themselves be responsible for further mystifying 
the reality of how an artist works, with the most valuable works-for-art becoming most at 
risk.  This has implications for the philosophy of technology as it emphasises the distorted 
importance that can be attributed to the remainder, with the value of material not 
necessarily reflected in their capacity to be preserved.            
 
The excavation brought moments of revelation that would be difficult, if not impossible, 
to obtain were the studio maintained and preserved in its original location.  It is in this 
respect that the process of relocation takes on its own particular significance.  At this 
stage, the studio becomes an excavation site that revealed its own challenges and 
requirements from the team of conservators and archaeologists that was brought in.  The 
archaeologists were “briefed on the vision for the studio” by Dawson and her team, and 
careful plans were drawn up to carefully remove and catalogue each item (which itself 
brought forth the possibility of compiling the digital database).327  Practical decisions 
needed to be made about what could and could not be preserved, whilst additions were 
made to prevent damage to other areas, such as the paint-spattered walls that were 
covered in three layers of protective facing.328  In total, the excavation took two weeks to 
completely remove the studio contents, walls, ceiling, and floor.   
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The reconstruction was a creation of a copy rendered more complex by being constructed 
from the material that constituted the model.  Like the Temple of Isis at Philae in Egypt, 
which due to the threat of being submerged was removed and ‘rebuilt’ brick by brick on 
Agilka Island (even to the extent that trees and plants were relocated), the constructed 
‘studio’ at the Hugh Lane Gallery is in no way the same as the original.  Just as the Temple 
of Isis had a particular relationship with the stars above it, and the play of shadows 
resulting from its position in relation to the sun, the place of the studio/shrine had an 
aura that could not possibly be replicated, wherein its removal irrevocably transformed it.  
It is difficult to imagine more contrasting settings for Bacon’s studio than the unassuming, 
slightly dingy-looking London flat located above a garage and accessed via a back alley, 
and the grandiose, pristine appearance of the Hugh Lane Gallery.  The displayed studio 
becomes a simulacrum – not in the derogatory sense understood since Plato – but in the 
Deleuzian manner of something distinct, in which its internal difference can instead be 
affirmed.  In this respect, it becomes a distinct simulacrum that has its own relationship to 
Bacon, his working process, his paintings, and the original studio.  It is, to borrow a term 
from Heidegger, a de-struction that simultaneously destroys and constructs, and through 
this de-struction, information is unconcealed, and new notions of aura are brought forth.  
For example, seven empty bottle of the solvent carbon tetrachloride were found during 
the excavation.  Since Bacon’s death the dangers of this highly toxic solvent were brought 
to light, and resulted in it becoming banned.329  When understood within the context of 
Bacon’s respiratory problems that in part contributed to his death, these empty bottles 
take on an ominous aura of their own that would not have existed during their use within 
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Bacon’s working studio.  However, this singular significance is nevertheless mystified by 
the auratic presence of the totality of the displayed studio.    
 
The displaying of the studio also becomes a creation that emerges in its own right only 
through acts of mystification that in certain cases can themselves reveal content.  As 
Dawson conveyed to me during our interview, “a certain idealisation is inevitable” such as 
the removal and archiving of the otherwise unseen material beneath the surface of the 
items covering the floor (replaced by polystyrene), which makes this material accessible, 
whilst concealing an alteration to the content of the original studio.330  Perhaps more 
dramatically, a large number of empty champagne bottles were removed from the studio 
and not included in the display, which significantly alters the way in which the artist and 
his creative process is presented. 
 
It becomes apparent that there are two prominent forms of value to be discerned in the 
studio content: information, and the auratic.  The two converge in the displayed studio.  
Newspaper clippings provide information about global events that indicate the context of 
his studio around the time of his death, but might be considered to be of a lower 
hierarchical value (in terms of cultural significance) in comparison to the newspaper 
clippings that feature underlined sentences comparing Damien Hirst’s work to Bacon’s.331  
At the same time, the presentation of both within a context that seemingly insulates 
them from their ‘everydayness’ as familiar items, and displays them instead as objects 
removed from their conventional use-value, allows them to take on an aura that 
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demystifies formerly mystified intangible qualities.  The displaying of these objects, and 
the sense of aura emitted by them (via their relation to Bacon) illuminates them in a way 
that designates them as objects of a world that is past.  This allows them to emerge in 
themselves out of an ontical use-value that would otherwise conceal them.  As Heidegger 
argues: 
 
To experience the closest is the most difficult.  In the course of our dealings and 
occupation it is passed over precisely as the easiest.  Because the closest is the 
most familiar, it needs no special appropriation.  We do not think about it.  So it 
remains what is least worthy of thought.  The closest appears therefore as if it 
were nothing.  We see first, strictly speaking, never the closest but always what is 
next closest.  The obtrusiveness and imperativeness of the next closest drives the 
closest and its closeness out of the domain of experience.332 
 
It is precisely the removal of these objects not only from their everyday context and use, 
but also, crucially, from their place within what was once an artist’s studio in Kensington, 
that allows this closeness to become demystified through their presentation and 
accessibility, but mystified by, isolating and drawing attention to, that which has gone 
unnoticed.  This closeness, perceived negatively, is akin to the ossification of existence 
that Adorno sees as the backdrop against which the enigmaticalness of works of art are 
illuminated (whilst also illuminating this backdrop).  The disruption of the aura of the 
studio and its contents through its relocation maintains a trace of its original aura in 
relation to the now past world of the artist.  At the same time, the transformative effects 
of the studio’s removal from its original context (both geographically and in its use-value) 
allows a demystification of what would otherwise remain obscure and distanced.  This 
occurs by shattering the ossifying effects of that which is merely maintained or enduring 
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in a particular place.  The displayed studio, is freed from a sense of equipmentality by 
separating it from its original function, and thus becomes more enigmatic and puzzling.   
 
The importance of this discussion for the thesis is that it addresses, in detail, the 
significance and ramifications of displaying material that goes beyond a casual 
consumption of what is placed on view.  To display is to displace something from its 
original context, whilst simultaneously inviting a sustained and concentrated 
consideration of its value.  Displaying and detailing at one and the same time demystifies 
the displayed content by allowing a closer scrutiny and engagement, whilst mystifying it 
by drawing attention to its particular peculiarity, and inviting a questioning of otherwise 
unconsidered aspects of everyday life.  To relocate and display a sculptor’s maquette, an 
architect’s sketch, or a painter’s studio, is to illuminate it by isolating it from its original, 
concealing function (to refer back to Heidegger).  Only this illumination does not provide 
clarity, but instead mystifies the displayed content all the more by allowing such a 
complex and mysterious aspect of the human condition (the act of creativity) to be frozen 
in place.  The ‘everydayness’ of Bacon’s studio contents only serves to exaggerate the 
distance between the familiar objects and their proximity to an enigmatic process of 
creativity.            
 
However, as long as the role of the artist is upheld as the causa efficiens of the work of 
art, the displayed studio remains utilised and consumed in terms of its biographical 
significance as supplementary material in a way that dominates any alternative 
evaluation (even if it maintains the possibility of such an alternative).  The classical 
hierarchical ordering of the stages in the creative process that dominates the 
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contemporary field of cultural production in a way that permeates discourse, ensures the 
way in which the studio and its contents is predominantly understood, at least initially.  
When O’Doherty says of studios that “as residues, they are what we might call para-
creations, footnotes to the departed painting”, he immediately reduces them to a lesser 
value within the creative process, as ‘footnotes’ to the main text of the works of art.333  
Yet O’Doherty also reveals an increased interest in the unique role of the studio itself, and 
an appreciation of them as ‘para-creations’.  This interpretation begins to bring them out 
of a classical hierarchical ordering that would have them signify only a supporting and 
entirely subservient role as sources of ontic data.  Such data would merely be 
incorporated in an understanding of works of art that, for Adorno, represented the 
corrosive influence of the culture industry in obscuring enigmaticalness.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The key considerations of this chapter have been to show the ways in which aura can 
manifest itself, the problematic nature of biographical material when used to supplement 
the work of an artist, the subtle interrelation of mystification and demystification, and the 
emerging importance of Adorno’s concept of enigmaticalness as a way of re-considering 
supplementary material. 
 
Just as Adorno asserts that the mechanisms of galleries and museums can re-position 
works of art into hieroglyphs of history that maintain in some respect their 
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enigmaticalness, so too can the drive towards understanding works of art further 
emphasise that which is essentially unknowable in them.  Instead of being opposed, the 
ontic and the ontological may be drawn towards each other to the point where they 
converge, where biographical content can in effect bring distance closer as distance.334  
This chapter emphasises the importance of the act of display itself, which, by way of 
displacement, allows the content to be considered in a new way.  The importance of the 
context and environment of art displays, shown in chapter two to have been historically 
shaped so as to encourage a reverential approach to the cultural significance of artists 
and their works, itself becomes a key consideration.  Within such an environment, the 
inclusion and educational function of supplementary material, was shown to be capable 
of shifting the emphasis away from considerations of works of art, towards a greater 
emphasis on the creative process itself. 
 
This shift in emphasis induced by supplementary material has implications for the 
philosophy of technology, whereby forms of equipment and supporting material, 
displaced from their utilitarian role, become artefacts of cultural importance worthy of 
archiving and display due to their importance as enigmatic traces of the creative process.  
The creative process itself is revealed as becoming centralised as an inadvertent outcome 
emerging from the hierarchical classification of historically determined supplementary 
material, which ensured its preservation and availability through its auratic and 
educational valuations. 
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Over the course of this chapter I show that Bacon’s relocated studio brings important 
issues of display, displacement, aura, education, the creative process, commodification, 
and mystification into view, allowing for a detailed analysis of their implications for 
supplementarity.  
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Chapter Six:  Boundaries, Limits and Ambiguity 
 
This chapter develops the discussion of supplementarity in terms of the difficulties that 
arise when the material being used for display and public consumption traverses multiple 
‘categories’ that are at once potentially of the plastic arts, literature, historical artefacts, 
or all/none simultaneously.  The concerns of the previous chapters – the slippage that 
appears between the status of works-of-art and works-for-art, hierarchical classification, 
appropriation, and the emphasis that biographical and other supplementary material 
gives to the creative process - will be brought together by addressing the ‘work’ on paper 
of Antonin Artaud (‘work’ being a problematic term that will be developed throughout 
this chapter).  In this chapter, supplementarity emerges as both a form of 
institutionalisation, and a means of challenging entrenched and established approaches 
to the creation, interpretation, and displaying of art.     
 
Artaud’s works on paper provide an opportunity to explore cultural objects and materials 
that were produced through a conscious effort to confront conventional distinctions 
between work and support, between process and completion.  The use made of these 
works on paper has involved a concern for the biographical context in which they were 
produced.  Of paramount importance is the mental health of Artaud and the resonances 
this might have for the ‘legitimacy’ of his work.   
 
Artaud’s creative ‘method’, meant that the biographical details of his life, his literary 
works, and his drawings and sketches are often interwoven.  As such, Artaud’s own 
written commentary on his work will be used throughout this chapter in order to explore 
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his confrontation with representation, and of the dominant conventions of creative 
practice of his day.  This chapter has implications for studies of the relationship between 
mental health and the classification of artworks, theories of the archive (and responses to 
archive theory by artists), and the philosophy of technology (both for the creation and 
displaying of works).   
 
This chapter is divided into three sections.  It will begin by addressing the issue of mental 
illness, and the extent to which this can be discerned as a relevant factor of consideration 
when assessing Artaud’s work.  The second section will address Artaud’s work itself – the 
process of creation, its problematic status, and its reception.  Derrida’s concept of the 
parergon and his interpretation of Artaud’s ‘subjectile’ will be explored in relation to the 
key ideas discussed in the preceding chapters, as well as Artaud’s own writing.  The final 
section will address the ways in which Artaud’s ‘works’ have been critically received and 
used since his death.  
 
‘Artaud’ and Negative Supplementarity 
 
Throughout his life, Antonin Artaud (1896 – 1948) adopted several different creative 
roles: actor, poet, playwright, film maker, theatrical director, and artist.  Today he is 
perhaps best known for his book The Theatre and its Double, which contained his 
proposal for a ‘Theatre of Cruelty’.  As a figure in art history, he is more generally known 
as a former member of the Surrealists, before being expelled by André Breton in 
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December 1926.335  He is also known for a brief career as an actor, and as a prolific writer 
and poet.  He was a well known (if marginal) figure in Paris during the last years of his life, 
with many key cultural figures of the city offering sympathy and support following 
Artaud’s internment in various mental institutions.  This, along with his erratic public 
appearances and the aggressive nature of his written or spoken works, established his 
reputation in France as an eccentric or ‘mad’ figure.  Since his death in 1948, aspects of 
his works have received serious and prolonged critical discussion by major philosophical 
commentators including Deleuze, Derrida, and Maurice Blanchot.  There have been two 
major exhibitions of his work: ‘Antonin Artaud: Works on Paper’ (1996-97), and 
‘Exposition Antonin Artaud’ (2006-07), whilst Artaud’s works on paper have featured in 
numerous exhibitions across the world. 
 
From his earliest writing, his acting, his concepts for theatre, and then finally his ‘works 
on paper’, Artaud constantly battled against the ‘insincere’.   In his now well known 
correspondence from 1923-24 with the editor of the Nouvelle Revue Française, Jacques 
Rivière, Artaud sought to respond to the rejection of his poems by addressing the 
problem of the creative act itself.  This included the ways in which the creative act is to be 
evaluated, asking the question “Do you think a poem which is faulty but which has fine 
and powerful things in it can be considered to have less literary authenticity and power of 
action than a poem which is perfect but without great inner resonance?”336 
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As the correspondence unfolded, Artaud exhibited an extraordinary and passionate 
investigation and questioning of his own creative impulse.  A telling remark hints at the 
lack of distinction between himself and his ‘works’: “Although I can very well judge my 
mind, I can judge the products of my mind only insofar as they merge with it in a kind of 
blissful unconsciousness.”337  Such was the level of this reflexive analysis that Rivière 
chose to publish their correspondence in the Nouvelle Revue Française – including one of 
Artaud’s poems.  This in itself is a curious example of an ambiguous status appearing 
through the use of supplementary material.  Having failed to have his poems published in 
Nouvelle Revue Française, Artaud eventually succeeds in having a poem – ‘A Cry’ – 
published, though within a context of self-criticism and debates with Rivière over the 
nature of writing a poem of sufficient standard to be published in the first place.  This 
poem, ‘A Cry’ becomes a supplementary devise within the context of letters that 
themselves originally appeared as supplements to the unpublished poems.  Blanchot 
highlights this very curiosity and paradox by asking: “Was Jacques Rivière aware of the 
anomaly here?  Poems which he considered inadequate and unworthy of publication 
cease to be so when supplemented by the account of the experience of their 
inadequacy.”338   
 
Writing in 1968, Gilles Deleuze interprets Artaud’s comments in this correspondence as a 
confrontation with the same ‘dogmatic image of thought’ that he himself opposed: 
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Artaud did not simply talk about his own ‘case’, but already in his youthful letters, 
shows an awareness that his case brings him into contact with a generalised 
thought process which can no longer be covered by the reassuring dogmatic 
image but which, on the contrary, amounts to the complete destruction of that 
image.339  
 
Deleuze’s comment supports the view that long before Artaud’s incarceration in the 
asylums, he was considered already to be entering into a critical relationship with the 
process of creativity.  This gives weight to any discourse on his later works that might look 
to downplay the significance of Artaud’s mental state.  It also underlines an academic 
acknowledgement of Artaud’s confrontation with conventional approaches to 
representation and creativity beginning to appear in France in the 1960s (Derrida’s essay 
on Artaud, ‘La Parole Soufflée’ was published in 1965).  As such (and especially in the 
work of Deleuze), Artaud is not just an example of someone who challenged conventional 
attitudes to thinking and creativity, but is also an influence on such philosophical and 
historical developments.  This point is important in emphasising the levels of Artaud’s 
relation to - or at the very least, a strong accord with - the development of some of the 
key ideas of Deleuze and Derrida that have been or will be discussed here.  This also 
highlights the interaction between theory and practice which is of particular importance 
here, as it shows how the concepts and implications of supplementarity discussed in this 
chapter emerge out of a combination of art practice and philosophy.      
 
In 1937, following a period of increasingly erratic behaviour, fuelled in part by his drug 
addiction, Artaud was committed to a mental institute, where he remained for nine years.  
The first part of Artaud’s internment was at the asylum of Sainte-Anne, before being 
                                                          
339
 Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, p. 147. 
274 
 
diagnosed as incurable and sent to the asylum at Ville-Evrard.340  It was here that Artaud 
returned to his ‘spells’ which will be discussed more fully in the second section of this 
chapter.  Of relevance here is how the messages in these spells indicated both Artaud’s 
awareness of his situation, and his internalisation of his diagnosis, where: “I am in an 
Insane Asylum but this dream of a Madman will become true and will be implemented by 
Me.”341   
 
In 1943, Artaud was moved to the asylum at Rodez, directed by Gaston Ferdière.  
Ferdière, a former Surrealist poet, granted Artaud more comfortable conditions.  
However, this would prove to be the dawn of perhaps the most disturbing chapter of 
Artaud’s life, as Ferdière instigated a series of fifty-one electroshock therapy sessions. 
 
The stigma of mental illness, unsurprisingly, firmly attached itself to Artaud following his 
release from Rodez.  On 13 January 1947, Artaud ‘performed’ at his first appearance since 
1937 at a benefit evening in his honour (to celebrate his return to the capital after Rodez) 
at the Vieux-Colombier in Paris.  His old adversary/friend, André Breton, in a reluctant 
reply to a request to pay homage, delivered a speech that was full of barbed compliments 
that drew attention to his own misgivings about Artaud’s mental wellbeing: “The real 
tragedy is that society to which we are less and less honoured to belong persists in 
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making it an inexpiable crime to have gone over to the other side of the looking glass.”342  
This supposed position of Artaud’s on the ‘other side of the looking glass’ would only have 
been reinforced by the subsequent performance Artaud put on, which deteriorated into a 
“wild improvisation, constantly shattered by cries, screams, and savage gestures”.343 
 
The validity of his creative output, in the light of the judgement of his mental capacities 
by the doctors that had overseen his stay in the asylums, was already in question.  The 
doctor who had administered the electroshock sessions, was unequivocal when pressed 
on his own views on the continued interest in Artaud, saying that: “The studies of Artaud 
seem to be multiplying, which is something I find regrettable.  Artaud had no message to 
communicate, never had.  He was a distinguished paranoiac with absolutely extraordinary 
delusions of grandeur and persecution.”344 
 
Was he ‘sane’ when he was allowed to leave Rodez?  Was he ever anything more than an 
unconventional personality who had the misfortune to be caught up in an unsympathetic 
institution?  Dr Latrémolière’s comments, though undoubtedly biased, do little to 
encourage a positive interpretation:  “All my life I’ll remember my friend Ferdière 
admitting to me ‘If I’d known what was to come, I’d never have let him leave Rodez.  I 
regret it infinitely’...”345  
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Figure 14: Jakob Mohr, ,,Beweiße” (proofs), Inv, No. 
627/1, © Sammlung Prinzhorn, Universitätsklinikum 
Hiedelberg. 
Figure 15: Antonin Artaud, 'The Projection of the True Body', circa 1946-1948. Centre 
Georges Pompidou, Paris, France. Image redacted. 
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How is it possible to distinguish, for example, between Artaud’s combination of writing 
and drawing during and after his incarceration, and ‘works’ to be found in Hans 
Prinzhorn’s collection gathered together from patients from psychiatric hospitals 
between 1890 and 1920?  Jakob Mohr was represented in the collection with a 
drawing/text that bears striking resemblances to the electronic effects of machines - 
together with a gestural usage of text that seemingly represents electronic currents being 
transmitted from a body via a machine (see Figure 14) -  that are found in some of 
Artaud’s last large drawings, such as Figure 15.346 In both examples, the pages are filled 
up with words and imagery that wrap around depictions of human figures (Artaud in 
Figure 15, and possibly Mohr in Figure 14).  Neither are conventionally beautiful works, 
with both consisting of unorthodox depictions of activity and force being transmitted 
from one figure to another.  Yet the information available about Artaud, and the lack of 
information about Mohr, transforms their places in art history.  Is it simply the case that 
Artaud, having already established a significant reputation within the creative circles of 
Paris, was deemed worthy of having his own work received in a favourable light due to 
the existence of an audience?  Would the graphorrhea and fantastical imagery produced 
in art therapy sessions that can be found in the Prinzhorn collection suddenly be 
considered to be of a ‘higher’ status were it to transpire that the authors were in fact 
established and respected artists?  This comparison highlights the importance of 
classification and biographical information for not only supplementing works of art, but 
also for distinguishing them.  The ‘negative’ supplement emerges as a supporting 
framework that heavily emphasises an aspect of a work (for example, being produced as 
therapy within a psychiatric hospital), over its aesthetic or pictorial qualities, whilst also 
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stigmatising a work of an established artist by centralising the conditions (both historically 
and mentally) from which the work appeared.   
 
Artaud’s ‘comeback’ appearance to commemorate his return to Paris following his 
release from Rodez, is a testament to the interest that still existed in him, with nine-
hundred people filling the Vieux-Colombier (and many more turned away due to lack of 
room) for the event.347  If his ‘works on paper’ are to be held in higher esteem than, for 
example, a drawing from the Prinzhorn collection that seems to share similar formal, 
creative, and technical properties, it is precisely because Artaud’s ‘works’ form part of the 
existing totality of his ‘oeuvre’.  This had allowed Artaud to establish a reputation in the 
first place; a reputation immersed in an awareness and reaction to the creative and 
political climate of his day.  His biographical past, and the reputation gained in it, meant 
that it was impossible for these ‘works’ to be received by his contemporaries in an 
anonymous manner, detached from any preconceptions or familiarity with Artaud’s 
previous creative efforts.  This was despite the conditions or motives behind Artaud’s 
‘works on paper’, and any apparent similarities with recognised works of the insane.  Yet 
as Breton’s “looking glass” comment implied, the shadow of madness, regardless of any 
justification, made it harder for Artaud’s words and works on paper to be considered 
‘untainted’.  
 
Derrida, in one of his three essays on Artaud – ‘La Parole Soufflée’ – senses a problem in 
attempts to reject or counter clinical diagnosis, saying that: 
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At the moment when criticism (be it aesthetic, literary, philosophical, etc.) 
allegedly protects the meaning of a thought or the value of a work against 
psychomedical reductions, it comes to the same results through the opposite 
path: It creates an example.  That is to say, a case.  A work or an adventure of 
thought is made to bear witness, as example or martyr, to a structure whose 
essential permanence becomes the prime preoccupation of the commentary.348              
 
Any defence (or indeed a psychiatric diagnosis) necessarily exploits, reshapes, and distorts 
a work (or the mental state of its author) in order to bolster its own internal logic and 
methodological approach.  It becomes a case of negative supplementarity, where the 
contest only determines where the place of the supplement will lie.  Madness (or its 
suggestion) floods and saturates biographical material.  As long as madness must be 
contested at all, its outcome will only ever result in one of two scenarios; either the work 
supplements, attaches to, supports madness; or madness supplements the work as that 
from which the work should be experienced in spite of.  On one side there are comments 
like Dr Latrémolière’s.  On the other there are comments such as the following from 
Margit Rowell, in the catalogue that accompanied Artaud’s first major international show 
Antonin Artaud: Works on Paper, at MoMA in New York in 1996, where: “His illness, 
although it helps to explain his exacerbated sensitivity, his visionary insights, the patterns 
and functions of his expression, and the prodigious abundance of his oeuvre, is not the 
key to his genius.”349  As Derrida elaborates throughout ‘La Parole Soufflée’, and ‘Cogito 
and the History of Madness’, the very notion of madness makes certain presuppositions 
about what would constitute reasonable thought.350  Instead of allowing a work to ‘be a 
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work’, any clinical reduction or critical defence inevitably causes the work to become 
embroiled in certain ideologies, certain dominant and ensnaring notions of thought that 
are projected onto it, and which fix it in place as a ‘case’.  At the same time as Rowell 
distinguishes madness from the “key to his genius” she implies that the reverse is even a 
possibility that must be refuted.  Furthermore, she lists five reasons why his 
(unquestioned) illness supplements Artaud’s work in the way that it “helps to explain” it.  
The key itself is not elaborated upon, leaving only a negative series of supplementary 
‘causes’, all of which revolve around the artist as classical causa efficiens (receptivity, 
imagination, method, intention, and work rate).  Even when its essentiality is refuted, 
madness (through the critical conflict with the clinical) becomes woven into the fabric of 
the apparent cause above all causes.  
  
Such is the extent of this conflict that Rowell is compelled to confront, head on, any 
potential confusion with an apparently lesser and more conventionally ‘mad’ variety of 
art – art brut.  The artist, Jean Dubuffet, was a friend of Artaud’s who visited him several 
times at Rodez during a period where he gathered together works by patients in asylums 
in order to celebrate their qualities, saying that: “Those works created from solitude and 
from pure and authentic creative impulses – where the worries of competition, acclaim 
and social promotion do not interfere – are, because of these very facts, more precious 
than the productions of professionals.”351  However, as Rowell clarifies, Jean Dubuffet 
was nevertheless “careful to distinguish between Artaud’s drawings and those of the 
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clinically insane”.352  This implies a hierarchy of madness.  The ‘pointing out’ itself makes 
the distinction a matter of negative supplementarity – a support of the work through an 
acknowledged and promoted distancing from that which is nevertheless a distraction.  It 
is a matter of deploying supplementarity in order to anticipate and disable expected 
criticisms, even if, as Derrida asserts of Artaud’s work, “the critic and the doctor are 
without resource when confronted by an existence that refuses to signify, or by an art 
without works, a language without trace”.353  Artaud’s approach to his work is such that it 
challenges the very conditions in which it might be clinically or critically assessed.  As a 
result, it directs a searchlight towards any efforts to do so – illuminating the inadequacies 
of such endeavours to assess it in terms of the very ‘image of thought’ discussed in 
chapter four (made up of identity and representation) that Artaud rejects.  Deleuze and 
Guattari support this view in Anti-Oedipus.  They attack the conflict between those who 
would dismiss Artaud’s written work as being beyond literature because of his madness, 
and those who would argue that his work, as literature, is beyond madness, saying that 
“both groups hold at least one thing in common; they subscribe to the same puerile and 
reactionary conception of schizophrenia, and the same marketable neurotic conception 
of literature”.354  
 
This section began with Artaud raising doubts about his own thought process, and has 
ended with the concerns of others about the same.   
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In relation to Adorno and Benjamin, the ‘immaterial aura’ of madness can be conceived 
only negatively.  This occurs here in three ways.  Either as that which undermines the 
validity of the work itself by enveloping it within a context of mental illness as its 
governing and instigating factor; by its becoming an underlying principle that ‘supports’ 
the work by way of a deliberate distancing from established forms of madness; or finally 
by contrasting the work by way of an ‘in spite of’ (as if to say that the artist produced 
works of art in spite of the ‘handicap’ of mental illness).  This section therefore draws 
attention to the negative connotations of mythologising (and therefore supplementing) 
an artist’s life and work (in this case, the mythologised ‘Artaud’), which dominates critical, 
clinical, or apologist discussions of their output.  This discussion is therefore of 
importance for studies into the relationship between mental health and art, and 
curatorial approaches to, and uses of, sensitive biographical information that can 
influence the ways in which displayed works are received.    
      
Ébauches, Notebooks, and the Subjectile 
 
This section addresses the ambiguities and confrontations between work and artist, artist 
and supplementarity, supplementarity and work, showing how philosophical concepts 
and art criticism arising from the history of supplementarity can influence the creation 
and reception of works.   
 
Artaud’s works on paper can be loosely divided up into four types; spells, portraits, 
pictograms, and notebooks.  The traits of each are often to be found in the others, with 
no set organisation or method applied.  The spells were letters covered in symbols, and 
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often burnt and/or stabbed in some ways (the ‘spell’ aspect being Artaud’s implication 
that good, or bad thoughts, could be transferred through them, and to the recipient).  The 
portraits are characterised by an apparent technical deficiency, roughly rendered in 
charcoal.  The pictograms (the term used by Derrida) could in fact apply to the other 
three types of works – being any works on paper that combined drawings, sketches, 
marks, and writing.  However, they also refer to Artaud’s drawings that were more 
figurative (along with written content), without necessarily being portraits.  The 
notebooks, which go further than any of Artaud’s other works in breaking with 
representation and conventional approaches to the ‘production’ of art, were made up of 
a large number of school notebooks that amounted to over 20,000 filled pages of imagery 
and text. 
 
It is important to point out that the notebooks remained in the possession of Artaud’s 
friend Paule Thévenin until her death in 1993, at which point they were donated to the 
Bibliothèque Nationale de France in Paris.  Though Derrida collaborated with Thévenin on 
the book The Secret Art of Antonin Artaud in 1986, in which the book is split into two 
essays, there are no references to the notebooks themselves, but only to portraits, spells, 
and pictograms.  It should also be noted, as suggested by the title of their book, that at 
that time no major exhibitions of Artaud’s works on paper had been held.  As such, when 
Derrida writes about these works, they must be understood as, at that point, ‘outside’ art 
history – an effect that in turn emphasises the confrontational and problematic forms in 
which Artaud’s creative works appeared. 
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Eight years prior to his contribution to The Secret Art of Antonin Artaud (his text, ‘To 
Unsense the Subjectile’), Derrida wrote his major work on art – The Truth in Painting 
(1978).  Included in the diverse discussions about art was Derrida’s development of the 
concept of the parergon.  As discussed in chapter one, parerga are referred to by Kant in 
The Critique of Judgement as being the ornamental elements that are added to a work of 
art in order to win approval (such as a frame, or clothing added to a sculpture).  Derrida 
takes this further by using the concept of the parergon as a method of problematising not 
only the distinctions, borders, and limits between a work-of-art, and work-for-art, but of 
the complex interrelation between work and non-work.  For Derrida “there is a trembling 
of the limit between the ‘there is’ and the ‘there is not’ ‘work of art’, between a ‘thing’ 
and a ‘work’, a ‘work’ in general and a ‘work of art’”.355  This “trembling of the limit” 
refers to the points of indiscernibility where the distinctions between work and support, 
work and supplement, are no longer clearly defined and distinguishable.  The parergon 
becomes a shared territory made up of both the work and the non-work.  Maquettes, 
architectural preliminary drawings, and displayed studios can be understood within this 
specific framework as being in part parergonal through the respective ways in which they 
are utilised as supplementary materials that support or frame works of art.  However, as 
shown through the discussions on Heidegger’s causality, Deleuze’s non-hierarchical 
simulacra, and Adorno’s notion of enigmaticalness, they can also be understood as 
singular creations in themselves.   
 
Some of the ambiguities surrounding this will be developed shortly via Derrida’s 
discussion of the subjectile; however, for now his concept of the parergon should be 
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clarified further.  For Derrida:  “A parergon comes against, beside, and in addition to the 
ergon, the work done, the fact, the work, but it does not fall to one side, it touches and 
cooperates within the operation, from a certain outside.  Neither simply outside nor 
simply inside.”356  The examples of supplementarity I have discussed are not entirely 
reducible to parerga (as objects or displays that can be elevated from a purely 
supplementary function or value).  However, all supplementarity, by framing a work can 
be interpreted as parerga.  The maquette frames the sculpture within a context of 
process; the architectural preliminary sketch frames the imaginary structure with an 
outline of its possibility; the displayed studio frames the paintings with the creative 
environment.  For Kant, the parergon is a mere distraction or decoration that obscures 
the real work of art.  However, Derrida sees the parergon as a zone in which the work and 
non-work merge.  The significance of this is in dissolving the apparent separation of the 
work by bringing it into an intimate relation to a space that is itself equally connected to 
the outside.  The outside is the setting or milieu, which serves as one of two grounds of 
the parergon, the other being the work of art.  As such the “parergonal frame stands out 
against two grounds, but with respect to each of those two grounds, it merges into the 
other”.357     
 
This merging is usually imperceptible – disappearing into both grounds.  The supplement 
or parergon (whether a frame, a maquette, etc.) distinguishes the separation of work and 
milieu by allowing them to merge within it, without merging into each other directly.    
However, for Derrida, Artaud’s ‘work’, causes the parergon to emerge in and as a part of 
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the work.  It is no longer distinguishing and disappearing, but indistinguishable and 
appearing within the work, as an integral element of the work, and no longer outside of it.  
Addressing Artaud’s works on paper, Derrida observes: “Violently mishandled, the 
parergon will be from now on incorporated in the work, it will make part of it.  Its 
exteriority, its transcendent neutrality, its mute authority will no longer be intact.”358  
Derrida’s interpretation emphasises the extent to which supplementarity can become a 
way of working, rather than a mere support for work.    
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Artaud’s ‘spells’, such as the example in Figure 16, contain numerous elements that 
confront and shatter the anonymity of conventional framing.  They are neither letters nor 
works of art, yet contain writing and imagery.  Both writing and imagery work together in 
tandem, reinforcing the ‘casting of the spell’ through mystical symbolism and written 
incantations.  Here, the medium itself is incorporated into the ‘spell’, with cigarette burns 
not only damaging the paper, but bringing each side into contact through the created 
hole that binds them.  The blood-like red echoes the aggressive nature of the written 
content, with threats of having people pierced alive and having their “marrows 
perforated and burned”.359   
 
The piercing, perforating and burning is both inscribed in writing, and inscribed into the 
material itself.  It is no longer an indifferent or passive surface, a mere piece of paper 
framing its contents, but becomes (for Artaud) a conduit for psychic energy, bearing his 
thoughts and emotions through stabbing marks or stubbing.  They do not appear as 
‘works of art’ as part of a tradition of art objects, but as weapons, curses, or occasionally 
blessings, designed for specific targets.  Here the auratic quality of the ‘spells’ is the 
essential element for Artaud, whereby the trace of the artist is imperative to their ability 
to work.  As Sylvère Lotringer explains: “Although strictly speaking, Artaud’s spells are not 
artworks, being aimed at one person only, they were the essence of his art which, like 
magic, instantly does what it says.”360   Whilst it is true that Artaud’s spells were aimed at 
one person, many of them, such as the one in Figure 16, carry broad and wide-reaching 
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threats that encourage the recipient to spread.  In this sense, for Artaud, the recipient 
becomes the messenger, with an effect that is both instant and continuous.  The survival 
of the ‘spells’ owes nothing to Artaud - who conceived of them as vital but dispensable 
extensions of his existence – but to unintended acts of preservation.  Stephen Barber, 
underlining the temporal nature of these spells, describes one such incident of 
preservation: 
 
Artaud’s spells are experimental works of destruction, assaulted in conflagratory 
immediacy and with a momentary, corporeally focused purpose, whose form 
accidentally possessed an afterlife of survival, since, in several cases, he 
dispatched the resulting objects back to France by mail, to associates such as 
André Breton, who preserved them and later gave them to archives or art 
museums.361 
 
Neither art nor non-art, but existing on the border between the two, the ‘spells’, precisely 
through the absence of conventional methods of execution and presentation that would 
establish them as ‘works of art’, are able to bring to light the instability of classification 
(on both the side of the supplement and that of the work of art).  Agnès de la Beaumelle, 
emphasises their innovative contrast with the established forms of work at that time 
when she describes them as being “a totally new means of graphic expression”.362  At the 
same time, it resists reduction to that of a purely graphic object.  By making the parergon 
a part of the work (and therefore exposing it and forcing it to emerge from its merged 
duality), the ‘spells’ simultaneously destroy the established limits between the work-
elements and non-work elements.  Derrida argues: 
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The traces of burning and perforation belong to a work in which it is impossible to 
distinguish between the subject of the representation and the support of this 
subject, in the layers of the material, between the upper and the lower, thus 
between the subject and its outside, the representation and its other.  It is really a 
question of a destruction.363 
 
Derrida identifies a correlation between his concept of parerga, and a term found three 
times in Artaud’s writing – the subjectile.  In each case, Artaud refers to the subjectile as 
something encountered or confronted in the act or process of drawing.  The most 
detailed reference is the second one, made in 1946: 
 
This drawing is a grave attempt to give life and existence to what until today had 
never been accepted in art, the botching of the subjectile, the piteous 
awkwardness of forms crumbling around an idea after having for so many 
eternities laboured to join it.  The page is soiled and spoiled, the paper crumpled, 
the people drawn with the consciousness of a child.364 
 
Derrida develops the idea of the subjectile into a form of complex support for (but not 
limited to) the work of art.  There is one reference in ‘To Unsense the Subjectile’ to the 
subjectile as a “parergonal support” which underlines the correspondence between the 
two.365  However, the subjectile is a particular type of parergon – indeed the founding 
(and at the same time founded) parergon.  It is founded as a pre-established set of values, 
relations, significances, and conditions.  It is founding as constituting the foundation or 
support for the work, which Derrida describes as being projected onto it.  As such, the 
subjectile is at one and the same time the engagement with a support that becomes a 
particular type of support only in the moment of engagement; the already grounded 
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projectile.  It is never simply a particular surface, nor does it relate particularly to this or 
that representation that might be constructed upon it.  Derrida notes:  “The subjectile, 
that is to say the support, the surface or the material, the unique body of the work in its 
first event, at its moment of birth, which cannot be repeated, which is as distinct from the 
form as from the meaning and the representation.”366 
 
Artaud’s approach is to attack the subjectile, to wrestle with the pre-established and pre-
empting limits not just of a particular material, but of an entire history of art and 
representation.  This attack manifests itself through his wilful combination of traditionally 
disparate elements such as image and text, in the manner of manipulating the medium 
itself, and in the technical (or consciously non-technical) approach to the drawings 
(“people drawn with the consciousness of a child”).  This incorporation and subversion of 
the history of representation therefore echoes Fer’s critique of Hesse’s displayed test 
pieces, and reinforces the extent to which the supplement, practice, and discourse 
interweave and react to one another.  Also, when Naomi Schor, in Reading in Detail: 
Aesthetics and the Feminine, argues that: “for the archaeology of the detail, the sexism of 
rhetoric is of crucial significance”,367 Schor highlights how historical literature has 
characterised the interest in the detail of works as ornamental and feminine, in a 
prejudicial inference of inferiority and triviality.  This important study of the detail, and 
the influence of gendered politics on how the detail has been historically perceived 
negatively, provides both context and support to this discussion of institutional 
approaches to hierarchical classifications of the supplement.  This study also correlates 
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with the present discussion by emphasising the deep and layered subtext of forms of art 
practice and art reception, against which Artaud (and later, Hesse’s) works can be 
interpreted as forcefully rejecting or complicating.368        
 
Edward Scheer, perhaps over-emphasising the centrality of Artaud’s encounter with 
aesthetics that take place in/through/upon the subjectile, indicates how “Artaud’s modus 
operandi will be to make visible how the subjectile has been made to act falsely or not at 
all, under the system of fine arts, and then restore it to its impossible truth.”369  I would 
not call it Artaud’s “modus operandi” as this implies a hierarchical ordering of objectives 
that place the subjectile itself on an elevated level in need of being made visible.  
However, Scheer is right to suggest that the subjectile is a serious concern for Artaud.  
Even before the first mark has been made, Artaud conceives of his work in terms of a 
deeply connected relation to the properties of the medium that go beyond the tangible 
qualities, saying that “fine paper encourages you to make masterpieces, coarse and 
repulsive paper encourages you to make useful and needed works that will no longer be 
able to pass as beautiful”.370  Referring back to Heidegger’s four causes, this implies an 
acute awareness of the interrelation between the respective aspects of the creative 
process, with the causa materialis and causa formalis no longer considered as subservient 
to the causa finalis.   
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In Artaud’s work there is no distinction between preliminary and completed works as the 
support is never just a first stage, but is intimately and irrevocably intertwined with the 
work that is wrestled from it.  Deleuze’s affinity with Artaud’s approach to the ‘image of 
thought’ mentioned earlier can be seen to be justified in the non-hierarchical works on 
paper that actively reject “fine paper” that might encourage thinking in terms of 
masterpieces.  Instead, they are created 
on/within “coarse and repulsive paper” 
that already resists pre-established 
expectations of “the beautiful” and 
raises conventionally considered ‘lowly’ 
material (at the time historically 
associated with a lower order of 
‘secondary’ preparatory works, beneath 
‘higher’ arts such as painting) to a level 
that demands to be engaged with on its 
own terms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17:  Antonin Artaud, 'Portrait of Jacques Prevel', 26 
April 1947. Centre Georges Pompidou, Paris, France. Image 
redacted. 
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The clearest example of this demand can be seen in Artaud’s only exhibition following his 
release from Rodez, which took place on 4 July 1947 at the Galerie Pierre, at the 
invitation of Pierre Loeb, its owner and Artaud’s friend.  The show was made up of 
portraits such as Figure 17, that included texts within them.  This image, ‘Portrait of 
Jacques Prevel’ (1947), breaks with several conventional approaches.  The distorted 
features of the subject are emphasised by the bold outlines and absence of other details, 
such as shoulders or backgrounds.  The head and neck appear to be floating or severed, 
surrounded by the surface of the paper that is itself framed by text.  The text, which is a 
poetic warning to the subject, describes the “sin that his entire face mediates”.371  Text 
and imagery are made to respond to one another, with the text describing what is being 
depicted, and the image dictating the text.  Such portraits fall under what Derrida would 
call pictograms.  For Derrida these pictograms “do not tolerate the wall of any division, 
neither that of different arts nor that of genres, nor that of supports or substances”.372   
 
A description of Artaud’s approach to creating these portraits illustrates his indifference 
to conventional rules or expectations of representation, as well as his incorporation of the 
surface/subjectile into the creative process itself.  Artaud would regularly use both sides 
of a sheet (irrespective of any evidence showing through), and had a similar disregard for 
the faded but evident trace of effaced imagery remaining.  Thévenin, having seen Artaud 
work (and having sat for portraits) describes Artaud’s general indifference to these 
potential obstacles: 
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He takes no notice; perhaps indeed he will incorporate these phantoms in his 
work like so many marks of his progress and, in his war against the support, he will 
induce some violence to surge forth from these wounds he has inflicted upon it, 
the violence doubling that of the drawing.  He takes his pencil or his stick (he uses 
pencil lead, coloured pencils, the soft Crayola-type chalks) as he would a true 
weapon, in order to constrain the subjectile.373 
 
In the Galerie Pierre show, Artaud was by all accounts committed to putting on a 
successful and professional event.  Perhaps buoyed by the Surrealism exhibition taking 
place at the same time (which he had turned down), he arranged two evenings of 
performances involving invited speakers reading selections of his work.  However, for the 
most part, Artaud was evidently uninterested in any ‘traditional’ interpretation of his 
works on paper.  In the text for the catalogue of this single exhibition, Artaud provides a 
detailed and powerful explanation of the portraits (divided up here and in subsequent 
references to reflect the layout on the page): 
 
I have moreover definitely / done away with art / style or talent in / all the 
drawings / you will see here.  I mean to say / that woe unto who / would consider 
them as / works of art, / works of aesthetic / simulation of reality. / None of them 
strictly / speaking are / works. / All of them are drafts, / I mean / probings or / 
burrowings / in all directions / of chance, possibi- / lity, luck or / destiny. / I have 
not sought / to refine my strokes / or my effects, / but to manifest / some sort of / 
linear patent truths / whose value would reside / as well in words, / written 
sentences, / as in graphic expression / and linear perspective. / So it is that several 
drawings / are mixtures of poems and / portraits / of written interjections / and 
plastic evocations / of elements taken from / the materials / of human or animal 
forms. / So it is that / these drawings must be accepted / in the barbarity and 
disorder / of their / graphic expression “which never / concerned itself with / art” 
but with the sincerity / and spontaneity / of the stroke.374       
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When Artaud says that “none of them strictly speaking are works.  All of them are drafts” 
(ébauches), it is clear that Artaud is looking to distinguish the contents of the exhibition 
from any classical understanding of a completed work.  By describing his portraits as 
ébauches in the exhibition catalogue he immediately pulls the rug from underneath 
anyone seeking to interpret or assess them in accordance with the standard criteria of 
completed works.  Instead, he emphasises their ‘active’ and investigative nature, as the 
sites of experiments in probing, and burrowing, “in all the directions of chance, 
possibility, luck, or destiny”.  Ébauches – being sketches, outlines, drafts – would seem to 
designate their place as the very definition of preliminary or preparatory material to 
supplement something that is to come after.  However, there was no sense at the Galerie 
Pierre of this being akin to the Città Nuova show, where Sant’Elia’s sketches and drafts 
represented the potential genesis of a larger and grander project of the future.  There is 
no suggestion of the ébauches being ‘unfinished’ or to be developed and ‘worked up’ at a 
later date.  Instead, Artaud qualifies the use of this term, of which there is a sense that it 
was still inadequate for Artaud, by describing the works in terms of their use for testing 
the waters, pushing the boundaries.   
 
The use of these words, “probing” and “burrowing” describe an ongoing exploration of 
the world, through which the ébauches allow this to take place.  There is here no 
question of ‘complete’ or ‘incomplete’ works, because that would be to already approach 
them from an art-historical perspective and vocabulary, whereas the execution of these 
portraits was part of a process that “never concerned itself with art” in the first place.  
Artaud explains that his only concern was with “the sincerity and spontaneity of the 
stroke”.  Here there is a sense of looking to express an unrefined, unpolished or 
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ornamented ‘truth’ – both in the act of expression, and in that which is being expressed.  
This “sincerity and spontaneity” coupled with his endeavour to “manifest some sort of 
linear patent truths” brings together (in a certain way) both Schopenhauer and 
Heidegger.  Here the “linear patent truths” Artaud refers to are both something to be 
manifested through the creative act, as well as being a spontaneity that carries with it the 
quality of sincerity untainted by the refinements that Schopenhauer claims ruins the 
works.  The subjectile becomes a site from which truth must be wrestled, and which has 
the capacity to conceal or unconceal it depending upon how it is confronted.  The 
subjectile emerges here as a conceptual method of understanding very specific and 
idiosyncratic forms of expression that confront that which already (or might) come to 
disrupt the creative act.  The importance of this for the thesis is in showing how historical, 
theoretical, and curatorial methods of supplementing works (often influenced by one 
another) are woven into the creative process, and can become identified as obstacles to 
be overcome, illustrated in a heightened sense in Artaud’s works on paper.  The struggle 
against such obstacles is not always successful.     
 
Derrida alludes to this (in a text where he acknowledges a strong correlation between 
Heidegger and Artaud) when he says of the subjectile that it “can always betray the truth, 
either by revealing it, or, by hiding it”.375  Artaud refers to some of the drawings as being 
“mixtures of poems and portraits”, and demands that they be “accepted in the barbarity 
and disorder of their graphic expression”.  
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Artaud’s explanation of his drawings is marked by an almost apologetic (yet defiant) tone, 
which anticipates a negative reception to his struggles with the subjectile, and with 
historically established methods of working.  Derrida picks up Artaud’s defence of the 
“disorder of their graphic expression”, in what he calls Artaud’s ‘maladroitness’.  Indeed, 
during the early stages of the period where Artaud first started to produce large drawings 
during his incarceration in Rodez, he qualified his works thus when he writes in 1946: 
 
My drawings are not drawings but documents.  You must look at them and 
understand what’s inside.  Judge them only from the standpoint of art or 
truthfulness as you would a telling and consummate object and you’ll say:  
 
This is all very well, but there is a lack of manual and technical training and as a 
draftsman Mr. Artaud is only a beginner, he needs ten years of personal 
apprenticeship or at the polytechnic of fine arts. 
 
Which is false, for I have worked at drawing for ten years in the course of my 
entire existence, but I despair of pure drawing.376    
 
Derrida sees Artaud’s maladroitness as an effort to “reappropriate this hand and body” 
from the “strict organisation of that kind of know-how which regulates itself by foreign 
forces and compromises with them.  The compromise itself is ‘the system of beaux arts’, 
its technique, its norms and departments, its devices.  The subjectile is one of them, but 
at the same time it represents and adjusts them to each other within the framework of 
the canvas”.377  These two defences of his works (defined as ébauches or as documents as 
opposed to works of art or drawings) appear to yield to the weight of the “system of the 
beaux arts.”  This happens by using the language of supplementarity to fend off 
accusations of technical deficiency, by aligning them with the sort of exhibitions of 
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preliminary and preparatory drawings and sketches that were familiar in Paris at that 
time.  Yet at the same time they are asserted as ends in themselves that “must be 
accepted in the barbarity and disorder of their graphic expression”.  Again it is expression 
that is essential to Artaud, and not the systems of hierarchical ordering and judgement 
within which they might be received.        
 
If, as ébauches, they are in any way supplementary, that which they supplement can only 
be Artaud himself.  Yet at the same time he is himself supplemental to these ébauches, as 
he probes and burrows in all directions, with them and through them in order to seek out 
ephemeral moments of truth.  And these moments, manifest on paper, echoing (but 
distinct from) the circle Heidegger describes of the artist who is only an artist when he 
creates artworks, find Artaud and his ébauches supplementing one another.  Barber 
describes how, at the final event at the Galerie Pierre where he was to read a text to the 
audience, “Artaud would appear surrounded by his own drawings, as though by an 
army”.378  This romanticised description captures the interrelation between Artaud and 
his ébauches well, where both the portraits and Artaud himself are reinforced by the 
presence of one another.  Each portrait is just one form among many that allows Artaud 
to continue in his own personal exploration, an exploration where any technical or 
stylistic proficiency would constitute a compromise that pandered to outside forces.  
Rowell observes that: “From portrait to portrait, Artaud does not attempt to improve his 
technique, to progress, or to perfect his style.  On the contrary, his objective was to 
burrow even deeper under the skin, behind the facade, and to reveal psychological or 
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mystical truths which were only his to see.”379  The ébauches are “documents” that are 
left over or produced in Artaud’s ongoing efforts to bring expression into being, in what 
Deleuze and Guattari call “the Artaud experiment”.380 
 
Of importance here is the extent to which an artist (in this case, Artaud) can centralise the 
act of expression or the creative process, placing it above concerns for marketable 
products that would become the objects of consumption within galleries and museums.  
The argument of the previous chapter, that supplementary material emphasises (and 
creates an audience for) the engimaticalness of the creative process itself, is given further 
justification here through a discussion of works in which their significance for the artist is 
in their creation, rather than in what is created. 
 
Scheer describes Artaud’s works on paper: “One is not meant to accept it as an art object 
but as a document of the failed forms which it represents and which collapsed around the 
idea which they could only betray as they entered the atmosphere of the subjectile.”381  
In such interpretations (including Artaud’s own), the ébauches document rather than 
constitute the work; the ‘actual’ work being Artaud’s continuing journey.  As Derrida says, 
Artaud’s works on paper (at least the spells, portraits and large pictograms) are made as a 
result of “the arrest of the journey”.382  The arrest takes place when Artaud’s struggle 
with the subjectile succeeds or fails, only for a new struggle to follow.  After the arrest, 
                                                          
379
 Rowell, ‘Image of Cruelty: The Drawings of Antonin Artaud’. In Antonin Artaud: Works on Paper, p. 14. 
380
 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 370. 
381
 Scheer, ‘Sketches of the Jet: Artaud’s Abreaction of the System of Fine Arts’. In 100 Years of Cruelty: 
Essays on Artaud, p. 64. 
382
 Derrida, ‘To Unsense the Subjectile’. In The Secret Art of Antonin Artaud, p. 147 (original emphasis). 
300 
 
the gallery setting is akin to a jail, in which the forces of established codes and values of 
representation (in the ‘dogmatic image of thought’ that Deleuze considers Artaud, like 
himself, to be opposed to) impress upon them.  In this sense, the defensive and 
confrontational content of Artaud’s catalogue text can be better understood.  In such an 
interpretation, works of art on display could be described as by-products rather than end-
products, where working is considered of more importance to the artist than what is 
worked.  Chapter five discussed the extent to which museums and galleries can (usually 
inadvertently) draw attention to this as the primary enigma to be encountered.        
 
The catalogue text itself, accompanying an exhibition made up of both drawings and text, 
constitutes supplementary material of a complex and ambiguous nature.  An exhibition 
that involves texts by Artaud is introduced and framed by a text by Artaud that itself is 
not in the exhibition, but which nevertheless becomes integral and even central to the 
exhibition.  Furthermore, this supplementary text that is situated alongside the 
exhibition’s contents determines the status of the drawings and portraits as ébauches or 
drafts.  This causes the catalogue text, as that which defines and defends the status of the 
exhibition contents, to become the very element of the exhibition (that it is merely 
alongside) that embodies Artaud’s message most clearly.  The catalogue becomes a 
parergon.  The entirety of the exhibition is transformed through a reading of this text, 
which seemingly, instead of just introducing those in attendance to the works, serves to 
also introduce them to the audience by setting up the meaning of the drawings and 
portraits; altering their status and position in relation to conventional ‘concerns for art’.  
This illustrates the blurring of boundaries and slippages that can appear between the 
supplement and that which it supplements.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
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supplement is not fixed in a supporting role, but disrupts and distorts by its very 
presence. 
 
It is a form of supplementarity that is embedded in Artaud’s pictograms, or more 
accurately, it is a problematic sense of supplementary relations that Artaud incorporates 
into his works.  Does the written content supplement the imagery?  Does the imagery 
support the text?  For Derrida, Artaud’s pictograms – through their confrontation and 
disruption of the subject, the object, and the subjectile (as a ‘thrown’ foundation) – 
constitute a “destabilisation made into work”.383  It is this juxtaposition of text and 
imagery that are so carefully interwoven that disrupts classical or conventional limits and 
borders between support and work, between the inside and outside.  Artaud’s pictograms 
are at once both and neither.  Yet as Artaud was making these pictograms he was also 
producing other works that would go even further to challenge and destabilise these 
limits – a series of four hundred and six notebooks.  Barber provides a description: “A 
school-child’s notebook of the period habitually held forty-eight pages, each 22.5cm x 
17.5cm, so the total number of pages in Artaud’s notebooks amount to around 20,000 
pages.”384  Their importance consists in the understanding that: “If Artaud’s presence may 
be materialised and conjured in its most authentic state, resilient and uncompromised, it 
is in the form of those notebooks.”385     
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The first notebook appeared towards the end of Artaud’s time at Rodez, but their number 
rapidly increased following his release.  Pencil and pen are used to fill the pages with 
poetry, rants, lists, and spells, all haranguing and jostling for position against, beneath, in 
front of ‘drawings’.  They would often indicate body parts, coffins, machines, spikes, as 
well as more abstract suggestions of forms.  Figure 18 shows the extent to which the 
pages were often stabbed at, in this case where the pen or pencil has passed from one 
side to the other, cutting through existing pictograms, and creating holes to be traversed 
in future efforts.  Barber indicates their ‘function’ as a vital extension of Artaud himself – 
as an ever present method of immediate expression that serves multiple purposes, saying 
that: “Artaud’s notebooks must fulfil their immense duty of servitude towards him – 
annulling his enemies, resisting representational processes, generating elements for his 
new anatomy, and literally accompanying him, folded in his jacket pocket, on his transits 
through Paris.”386  Their portable form, already unsuitable for future display, were treated 
with a certain distain (in order to carry several books with him, Artaud would often have 
to fold them in half so as to fit them in his pocket) that indicates their practical, personal 
use.   
 
It is uncertain whether Derrida was even aware of the notebooks.  Nevertheless, they can 
be understood as the section of Artaud’s work that confronts the subjectile and 
incorporates the parergon more so than any other.  The school notebooks, by way of 
their practicality as cheap, convenient, and portable mediums, constitute an archetypal 
subjectile for Artaud’s purposes.  In fact, as schoolboy notebooks they represent the very 
form and forming of institutionalised learning and representational thinking that Artaud 
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wished to attack.  Figure 18 suggests such a battle against institutionalised learning 
(conscious or otherwise).  The text in the top half of the picture still conforms to the 
guiding lines provided by the textbook’s grid; a learned and ingrained approach.  
However, the sentences in the bottom half abandon this rigidity, increasing in size, 
overlapping the lines, and wrapping around the punctured holes (itself implying that the 
holes preceded the text).387  The notebooks also appear to go against Derrida’s assertion 
that “the arrest of the journey makes the work”, due to the extent to which Artaud 
incorporated the notebooks into the journey itself.  However, it is this very incorporation 
that supports Derrida’s comments on the pictograms, where the ‘work’ only appears 
when the journey is forced into an arrest via the conventions of the system of the beaux 
arts that demands ‘products’ to be shown and consumed.   
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Figure 18: Antonin Artaud, ‘page from exercise book 178', October 1946, Bibliothèque Nationale de 
France, Paris. Image redacted. 
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The notebooks break from the constraints of hierarchical representation, with no 
ordering of beginning, middle, or end.  In a manner that aligns itself with Deleuze’s 
writing on the simulacra that enter into non-hierarchical relationships of equal series, the 
notebook contents constitute an open-ended ‘totality’.  Barber alludes to this when he 
says that: “Each fragment of image or text, like each frame of a film, comprises an 
autonomous element that can be combined or separated at will, in order to find its place 
in the confrontations and transformations which he aims to materialise on his notebooks’ 
surfaces.”388              
 
Évelyne Grossman says in her introduction to 50 Drawings to Murder Magic:  
 
The action was played out on a different stage, that of his small exercise books; 
Artaud was alone on that stage – yet at the same time he was multiform, taking all 
the parts himself, and acting simultaneously as author, actor, and spectator within 
the confines of the page, as he constructed a work, an object, that was both his 
and not his.389 
 
The contents of the notebooks are in this instance no longer sutured to a privately 
‘schizophrenic’ conversation between the ‘artist’ and his own ‘creations’.  Instead they 
become in equal part internal and external to Artaud, where in this merging between 
Artaud and that which is produced, that is, outside of him, he merges with/into the 
outside as much as the outside merges with him. 
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The conventional model of supplementarity would be to consider the notebooks as 
preparations out of which the portraits were to be born, crystallised, and ‘perfected’.  As 
such, the notebooks would provide an unrefined, draft form of Artaud’s ‘work’ that can 
be used by curators and art historians to ‘decode’ the ‘proper’ works to which they are 
deferred.  But instead this model is turned on its head.  Though a relationship between 
the notebooks and portraits is clearly evident, it is not one of preparation followed by 
refined execution made available to the public.  The exhibition of his portraits and 
drawings at the Galerie Pierre was a result of encouragement and prompting from 
Artaud’s friends, rather than an active decision on his part to make his work available to 
the public – as if this was a consideration and intention when producing them.   
 
Margit Rowell underlines this notion of Artaud’s notebooks as existing outside of artistic 
categorisation when she says that: “Although he did not call it such, his writings are a kind 
of extended journal or diary, the expression of his true being – not art, just being.”390  In 
this relationship between portraits, drawings, and notebooks, it is portraits and drawings 
that are subservient to the notebooks.  It is only the private nature, and formal properties 
of the notebooks that suggest a function of preparation and an equipmental purpose 
within a working process – sharing these traits with the traditional artist’s sketchbooks, in 
which the initial, instant ideas were jotted down and saved for a later development.  The 
public presentation of this ‘project’ of spontaneous, instantaneous sincerity came only as 
an after-thought, as something that might serve to further Artaud’s own private ‘working’ 
– to supplement it.            
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Though it was known by some friends and associates that this had become Artaud’s 
preferred method of ‘working’, they were for the most part concealed from the public.  
Just before his death, Artaud was in the process of preparing a book, 50 Drawings to 
Murder Magic at Loeb’s prompting.  Loeb was interested in the “curious drawings” he had 
seen in some of Artaud’s notebooks, and he suggested publishing a selection.391  That 
Artaud agreed to the suggestion, and was actively selecting pages at the time of his 
death, indicates that there was no particular importance placed in maintaining their 
private existence, even if their existence came about through no prior considerations of 
potential publication.  
 
Artaud prepared a supplementary text for this book, which included the following 
section:  
 
We are not concerned here with / drawings / properly speaking, / or with any kind 
of incorporation / of reality by drawings. / These are not an attempt / to renew / 
the art / of drawing / in which I have never believed / no / but to understand them 
/ they must first be placed in context. / They are 50 drawings / taken from exercise 
books / containing notes / literary / poetic / psychological / physiological / magical 
/ especially magical / magical first / and foremost.392     
 
Once again, Artaud’s need to justify his creative process re-surfaces in an accompanying 
text, emphasising the text’s importance for placing his work (which he distances from a 
concern for drawings, or a renewal of the art of drawing) in context.  At one and the same 
time, Artaud draws attention to their outwardly preparatory or preliminary nature by 
explaining their origins in exercise books, whilst elevating their importance as works of a 
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psychological and ‘magical’ value.  This highlights the transformative properties of the 
supplement, which is here employed by the artist themselves in order to account for 
works never intended to be displayed, where the supplementary text forms a bridge 
between the creative act, and the public reception of what is produced in this act.  In 
Artaud’s approach to his works on paper, and his approach to their public viewing, 
supplementarity is incorporated, challenged, reversed, and emphasised.  Through this 
discussion of Artaud’s working process, the importance of the supplement (as both an 
obstacle and as a means of transformation), is shown to permeate through discourse, the 
creative act, and the displaying of works of art.  Whilst Artaud’s works on paper highlight 
these aspects of supplementarity in a very specific and direct way, the analysis of these 
works, and Derrida’s concept of the subjectile, opens up questions of the relationship 
between art practice, and institutionalised conventions surrounding art practice, that will 
be useful for artists, art historians, scholar’s of Derrida’s philosophy of art, and both 
museum and archive theory.                
 
 
Representing the Non-Representational 
 
In this section I discuss the use made of Artaud’s work after his death.  Of particular 
concern are the ways in which the techniques and material used by Artaud have affected 
the preservation and public display of his work, and the degrees to which biographical 
considerations (especially that of mental illness) have shaped the ways in which 
exhibitions of his works are marketed.  
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Indifferent to the notion of making the notebooks available to the public whilst he was 
alive, Artaud was nevertheless sufficiently concerned with their continued existence in 
order to entrust the vast majority of them to his friend Paule Thévenin.  Artaud packed 
them up in Thévenin’s large metal travelling trunk, and requested that they were not to 
be destroyed in the event of his death.393   
 
After some time had elapsed following Artaud’s death, Thévenin would discover upon 
opening her travelling trunk that it contained a dead rat that prior to its death had 
damaged some of the notebooks.394  This illustrates well the degree to which this 
substantial visual material of Artaud’s productive creative life was not subject to the 
protective conservational acts demanded of the material/works left behind by artists 
deemed of cultural significance.  As Barber writes, “his public status on 4 March 1948 was 
not that of a great writer or artist whose work demanded immediate preservation for the 
future enrichment of national culture”.395  Thévenin, a close friend of Artaud’s that would 
have had both an emotional investment in preserving and nurturing Artaud’s legacy, as 
well as a more informed awareness of the intensity and dedication of his own working 
process, was keen to make use of the notebooks left to her.396  No doubt with an 
awareness of the dominant role Artaud’s literary reputation had over his other creative 
outlets, her efforts to render the contents of the notebooks publicly available would 
neglect the drawings, marks, and stabbings.  Barber describes how “separated from their 
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vital confrontation with Artaud’s images and from the combat-surface of the notebook 
page itself, those texts’ extraordinary form stayed concealed”.397  The full content of 
Artaud’s notebooks, as well as the majority of his large drawings that were also within 
Thévenin’s collection, were to remain concealed for forty-five years after Artaud’s death.  
In September 1993 Thévenin passed away, with the notebooks and drawings being 
donated to the Bibliothèque Nationale de France in Paris.  The importance of this account 
is that it illustrates the contingency surrounding the survival of these works, the extent to 
which Artaud’s works were ‘forgotten’, and how, even when eventually utilised, the 
content made available was selective. 
 
Just over three years after these drawings and notebooks were donated to the 
Bibliothèque Nationale de France after Thévenin’s death, MoMA held an exhibition 
comprising of material from this donation, along with ‘works’ from private collections and 
various French museums and galleries (primarily the Centre Georges Pompidou).  In the 
foreword to the accompanying catalogue the Director of MoMA, Glenn D. Lowry, 
introduced the exhibition by saying that: 
 
Although these drawings ultimately must be seen in the broad context of Artaud’s 
complicated and disturbed life, and in relation to his extraordinary literary output, 
they also can be appreciated for what they are: discrete works of art, often of 
great power and beauty.  And while Artaud’s literary genius was recognised – if 
not fully appreciated – during his lifetime, it is only recently that his legacy as a 
visual artist has become clear.398   
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This comment at once emphasises the biographical influence upon the suggested and 
anticipated reception of the show, with reference to his “disturbed life” juxtaposed with 
acknowledgement and praise for his literary reputation.  Here an unusual reversal of 
‘visual art’ takes place.  The historical knowledge of the ‘artist’, usually established upon 
the grounds of their visual output, precedes that of the ‘work’ itself, which for the most 
part had remained largely unknown since shortly after their creation.  In this respect, the 
‘work’ is subordinated to, and made to supplement, the “broad context” of Artaud’s 
biographical information.  It is the establishing of a dominant historical notion of ‘Artaud’ 
grounded upon a constructed image of Artaud’s life and work that was carried out over a 
forty-five year period, where much of this material was unable, due to its concealed state, 
to have any bearing.  As with Sant’Elia’s works on paper, scarcity coupled with a 
mythologised reputation, equals commodity value.      
 
When Lowry says that Artaud’s legacy has “become clear”, it is rather in the sense of a 
fuller and more detailed picture of Artaud’s total visual output becoming available.  The 
historical role Artaud’s output occupies in the development of visual art, on the contrary, 
becomes more ambiguous and indistinct.  It is this ambiguity that pushes Artaud’s 
‘unearthed’ material toward a supplementary position in relation to both other works of 
that era, and indeed to the historical picture of Artaud already established at that point.  
Elsewhere in the preface to the catalogue, Lowry emphasises the biographical relevance 
of the work.  He highlights its personal and internal value, as opposed to that which may 
be engaged with or productively encountered, stating that “as intense as they are 
personal, these strange incantations and spells, fragmented images, and penetrating 
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portraits offer a glimpse of Artaud’s world”.399  Like discovered diary entries or 
preparatory sketches, the material is put forward as having an auxiliary function – 
subordinated to the task of embellishing a pre-existing image of Artaud the individual.   
 
The work of this exhibition presents a problem that exposes crossovers between 
conventional applications/uses of supplementary material usually in relation to a 
respected or revered body of work to which the supplementary material is subordinated.  
Here the material concerned resists the established structures and codes employed to 
present and critique a show of visual works.  Even the title of the exhibition presents a 
problem of a certain familiar usage that is ill-fitted to the exhibition’s contents – a point 
that Denis Hollier identifies when asking us to:  
 
Think for a moment about the title of the show: Antonin Artaud: Works on Paper.  
In an artist’s catalogue raisonné, the expression ‘works on paper’ refers to that 
part of his or her oeuvre that the artist hasn’t put on a major, canonical support, 
canvas if a painter is in question, bronze or marble if a sculptor.  Internal to the 
plastic arts, this taxonomy doesn’t apply to literature, however.  Artaud, to my 
knowledge, has never painted on canvas.  The slight, if poetic, détournement that 
applies this rubric to Artaud’s drawings, to the plastic production of a writer, this 
entails interesting semantic effects: The expression ‘works on paper’ no longer 
referring primarily to the support of the work, but to the types of signs traced on 
it.400 
 
Further to Hollier’s observations, I would add that the exhibition title is an 
acknowledgement of the supplementary status the organisers gave to the material being 
displayed.  Hollier is correct in highlighting the absence of “major, canonical” pieces by 
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Artaud, along with the anomalous nature of naming the show after a term that is 
traditionally used to delineate supporting, preliminary, or preparatory material.  
However, the title at the same time emphasises such connotations – ensuring that the 
work (despite absent “canonical” pieces to which they might refer/defer) can be 
understood as being of a ‘lesser’ nature than prevailing notions of art works proper.  In 
short, the exhibition title is a method of presenting the contents of the exhibition as being 
supplementary material through the use of a phrase that, though literally accurate, is one 
that usually implies the existence of a more established and revered body of work to 
which such ‘works on paper’ provide insights.  
 
Recalling Derrida’s notion of the subjectile as the locus of a battle between the artist and 
internal or external institutionalisation, the gallery setting, in a sense, is already a defeat 
or a renewed onslaught against the work.  New forms of representation, in all its 
structured organisation, is brought together in force, where in the case of the MoMA 
show, even the artist’s own reputation is used ‘against’ the works.  In Figure 18, the 
‘victory’ of institutionalisation is literally stamped onto Artaud’s work, with the red stamp 
simultaneously cataloguing and ordering the page, whilst indicating that the contents of 
the page are considered to be of such a ‘lowly’ status and value as to be susceptible to 
alteration and disfigurement.    
 
Margit Rowell, in an accompanying essay within the exhibition catalogue, astutely 
addresses both the uncompromising and indiscernible quality of the works, and also the 
obscuring nature of the shadow cast by the life of Artaud and his literary reputation, 
saying of the works that:  
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It must be said that the context within which they might be examined is 
problematic.  Whereas it is clear that they cannot be totally dissociated from his 
biography or from his written oeuvre, their extraordinary expressive impact forces 
us to acknowledge them on their own terms.  This being said, it is difficult to 
compare them to the work of other artists of any given period, including Artaud’s 
own.401 
 
This quotation highlights the dualistic state of the material displayed, whereby the work 
“forces us to acknowledge them on their own terms”.  This is in part due to the qualities 
of the pictures and ‘drawings’ that still retain their originary sense of being isolated 
adventures, probings, and burrowings that were never intended to be understood or 
evaluated within a wider context.  At the same time, they are subsumed by an historical 
awareness that meant that at the time of the MoMA exhibition, Artaud’s biography and 
written oeuvre had dictated the formation of his reputation whilst these works remained 
concealed for forty-five years.     
 
Of the sixty-eight works that were displayed in the MoMA exhibition, none were taken 
from the notebooks.  Such was/is their format that the issue of display itself is rendered 
problematic before anything else.  In recent years, the French publisher Gallimard has 
provided two potential solutions to make public at least part of the content of this 
considerable body of material.  In 2004, they released a hardback edition (later translated 
and released in England) of what was constructed to be as faithful an interpretation of 
the proposed book being worked on by Pierre Loeb and Artaud at the time of Artaud’s 
death – 50 Drawings to Murder Magic.  The book contains a preface from Évelyne 
Grossman in which she emphasises the “careful and technical rendering of the seemingly 
crude and chaotic imagery (consider the cast-shadow work (hatching, stump drawing), 
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the use of light (‘the as-it-were flickering light of these drawings’) and of chiaroscuro”.402  
Such a description recalls the discussion of the importance of technique explored in 
chapter two.  In 2006, Gallimard released a series of precisely rendered facsimiles of one 
of Artaud’s notebooks from January 1948, from the period just before his death.  Barber 
describes their precision: “the paper, pencil-marks and ink-marks reproduced to the last 
detail, with only the corporeal elements of the original notebooks, and the gestural rips in 
its paper, missing”.403  This recalls the discussion of aura in chapters one and five.    
 
Gallimard’s endeavour to reveal aspects of at least one notebook in an imperfect but 
rigorous manner shows an intriguing level of care and dedication in looking to navigate 
around the ‘problem’ presented by the format/medium in which the vast majority of 
Artaud’s visual material would appear.  The facsimile is devoid of the trace or impression 
of the ‘artist’ - precisely the crucial auratic quality that forms a significant dimension of 
Artaud’s engagement with/upon/through the subjectile - in opposition to Benjamin 
(though perhaps given the necessity of a facsimile at all, Benjamin’s position in regards 
the reproduction is pertinent).  However, it is able to place in close proximity an example 
of Artaud’s most intimate works in the hands of interested participants.  The facsimile is 
here a supplementary object that, rather than being positioned adjacent or beneath that 
which it supplements, is instead in-place of it (or at least one of over four-hundred 
versions).  The one facsimile stands in for the entirety of the notebooks – dependent 
upon their existence and receiving almost all of its own qualities directly from that to 
which it is deferred.  However, the facsimile exceeds the notebooks in as far their 
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potential to be shared and consequently experienced.  The facsimile renders the 
(imperfect) form of the notebook accessible, whilst nevertheless emphasising the 
uniqueness of the original. 
 
The problematic format of his material, along with the issue of the biographical servitude 
towards which the works in the MoMA exhibition were in part positioned, was made even 
more apparent at the largest show to date dedicated to Artaud.  Called simply ‘Exposition 
Antonin Artaud’, the exhibition took place at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, in 
2006-2007, and consisted of over 300 items, including 60 of the notebooks (their largest 
public showing).404  The show, despite consisting of the largest ever collection of his 
‘works on paper’, was heavily orientated towards a biographical account of Antonin 
Artaud.  The works become subsumed within this overriding intention to, perhaps 
contrarily, piece together the multiple and fractured identities Artaud passed through.   
 
Divided into four outer sections dedicated, in turn, to his self-portraits, theatre work, his 
writing, and his involvement in film, these rooms surround a centre space of a primarily 
biographical nature, as if to emphasise the centrality of the biographical/personal focus of 
the show in relation to the various projects or endeavours that orbit around it.  Key 
figures from his life (including his doctors) are introduced, alongside medical information 
indicating the diagnoses and proposed treatments that would lead to his sessions of 
electroshock therapy.  Personal belongings such as his passport are presented alongside 
‘spells’ held in Plexiglas and up against lights so as to allow the imagery and text on the 
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other side to become discernible.  The exhibition ensures a totalising submersing into the 
varied forms of expression employed by Artaud during his life, with the walls, floors and 
ceiling filled with passages from his texts, whilst audio recordings fill the space with his 
voice.405     
 
Such an exhibition as that at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, was no doubt 
exemplary in both celebrating the multi-faceted forms of creative endeavours, as well as 
painting a vivid picture of his extraordinary and tumultuously tragic life.  However, in a 
significantly more precise, exacting, and intrusive manner than in the MoMA exhibition, 
the biographical image (one that cannot help but be incomplete and fabricated) takes 
centre stage.  It renders any available material (letters, descriptions of friends, doctors, 
acquaintances, photographs, stage costumes, ‘spells’, notebooks, portraits, audio 
recordings, personal artefacts) as supplementary material.  The use of such material 
causes the mythologised ‘Artaud’ to eclipse an engagement with Artaud’s work, and 
whilst the enigma of the creative process discussed in chapter five is in part supported, it 
remains subordinate to an historical account of the mythologised individual.406   
 
Turning back to the notebooks themselves, and the problematic nature of their 
accessibility, the Bibliothèque Nationale de France is currently undertaking the laborious 
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task of documenting and digitising each of the 2,000 pages of all 406 notebooks in order 
to digitise them.  On one hand, a vital quality of the notebooks - their tactile, assaulted, 
worked at presence – will resist all attempts at replication on an online digital archive.  On 
the other hand, this process offers the best solution yet to the ‘problem’ of opening them 
up to a new form of direct experience.  As Barber argues: “The digital world, in its infinite 
replication and transmutating representation of Artaud’s notebook pages, may negate 
the vital presence of gesture within them, and make it a consumable, assimilable artefact, 
like any other; or it may serve to re-activate presence.”407  I suspect the reality will fall 
somewhere in between, where the shortcomings of the digital representations will be 
countered by their superior ability to reach a wider audience that is increasingly used to 
navigate the web in order to experience and consume all aspects of culture.     
 
What then would become of the original notebooks themselves?  Barber raises his 
concern that the notebooks will be irreversibly affected by the process of digitisation as 
“the digital fundamentally shifts the status of whatever it engulfs”. 408  To this end, there 
is again an echo of the debate between Benjamin and Adorno, in which the privileged 
position of the original work may be made to give way in the face of a technology that 
jettisons the significance of the auratic in favour of a radicalised form of expression, 
communication, and function.  The opposing argument is of course that no matter how 
perfectly scanned and captured, the digital versions will never be able to replicate the 
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madeness (or ϑεσει) of the notebooks themselves.409  The digital rendering of the 
notebooks will have the added effect of preserving the contents in a more or less 
permanent, endlessly reproducible manner.  In turn, it would allow the original notebooks 
to be better conserved (though most likely condemned to the subsidiary status of 
artefacts wheeled out for occasional shows; impractical and cumbersome in comparison 
to their digitised versions).  A digitised collection of Artaud’s notebooks will allow them to 
become more accessible than the original versions would ever be able to, beyond a 
solitary encounter. 
 
This section establishes the extent to which the mythologising of artists, identified in 
chapter two as originating as early as the Renaissance, continues to dominate 
contemporary art exhibitions.  The prominence of mental illness characterises (and 
therefore distorts) the uses of Artaud’s works on paper since his death, which shows the 
extent to which uses of supplementarity dictate the ways in which an artist’s reputation 
can be shaped and perpetuated.  The problematic nature of Artaud’s incorporation of 
supplementarity is invariably acknowledged, but reduced in importance within the very 
institutional mechanisms of definition that his work opposed.  This discussion also has 
implications for the philosophy of technology, wherein creative techniques (such as the 
use of notebooks) limits the capacity to which original works can be displayed, whilst 
encouraging new uses of digital technology to overcome these shortfalls in ways that call 
for a reconsideration of the value of technological developments in preserving and 
making available, historical works.    
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Conclusion 
 
Through an exploration of Artaud’s approach to his works on paper, Derrida’s notion of 
the subjectile that relates directly to Artaud, and the ways in which Artaud’s works has 
been used since his death, this chapter highlights the importance of this discussion for 
understanding three significant issues concerning the role of the supplement. 
 
The first section of this chapter introduces the notion of ‘negative supplementarity’, 
which is defined as a use of supplementary material in a way that overtly distorts or taints 
the interpretation of an oeuvre, at the expense of other qualities.  The implications this 
has for other areas of study into artistic practice extend to appropriation, mythologising, 
the influence of medical information, and other forms of information such as criminal 
history, drug addiction, and political activity.  Supplementarity is therefore identified as 
an intervention that can dominate public and historical perceptions of works of art and 
creative activity. 
 
The second section addresses problems of a supplementary nature that can be identified 
by, contested, and incorporated into creative practice.  This section is important for 
highlighting the ambiguities that exist between classically or conventionally defined 
borders between support and work, revealing the extent to which these ambiguities can 
encourage or restrict approaches to creative practice.  This section also draws attention 
to the ubiquitous nature of institutionalised modes of producing, displaying, and 
critiquing works of art that formulate a matrix of supplementary values, methods of 
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working, or expectations that permeate (and therefore knowingly or unknowingly shape) 
the creative process itself. 
 
The last section contrasts the concerns of the second section with a discussion of how 
influential negative supplementarity and institutionalised or conventional approaches to 
the interpretation and public display of works of art can be.  This section is important for 
both revealing and emphasising the capacity for supplementarity to establish a 
mythologised characterisation of the artist that frames discourse and the presentation of 
their works in a specific way.  The third section also addresses the importance of 
technology in both art practice and art display, whereby supporting material used by an 
artist can lead to new approaches (particularly digital) that simultaneously archive and 
make available, works considered to be of public interest. 
 
Overall, this chapter, in distinction to the three previous case studies, places 
supplementarity at the centre of art practice, art discourse, art archiving, and art display.          
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Conclusion 
 
In the introduction to this thesis I outlined its three core objectives: to address the ways 
in which supplementary material affects and alters the meaning of ‘the work of art’; to 
analyse the ways in which supplementary material has been archived, preserved, and 
displayed; and to understand supplementary material as ‘cultural objects’ that have their 
own importance, whilst directly impacting on how works are produced, received, and 
interpreted. 
 
These objectives have been addressed through two chapters that establish the key 
concepts relating to the supplement that have emerged in philosophy and art history, and 
by four case studies that each respond to a particular question: what is the supplement?; 
how is supplementary material classified?; why is the supplement important?; and in 
what way is supplementarity problematic for the status of works of art?  Through my 
discussion of these questions I have addressed my three objectives in detail, and have 
shown that supplementarity is an important, yet under-developed area of study with 
particular implications for art practice, art theory, archive theory, museum theory, 
cultural studies, the philosophy of technology, and the philosophy of art.  This thesis 
therefore establishes a theory of supplementarity that calls for a re-interpretation of 
supplementary material and its relationship to how works of art are understood, with 
supplementarity encompassing a rich and complex series of objects that are of cultural 
importance. 
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In chapter one, ‘The Supplement and Philosophy’, the key philosophical concepts of 
importance to supplementarity are identified in the works of Kant, Schopenhauer, 
Heidegger, Benjamin, Adorno, Deleuze, and Derrida.  These are discussed in detail, 
establishing how supplementarity, often indirectly or obliquely, has influenced or been 
disregarded in philosophical interpretations of the meaning of art and art works.  Chapter 
one is significant for the thesis as it identifies the philosophical concepts applied to works 
of art that become problematic or have their implications extended into new areas, when 
re-considered in direct relation to supplementary material.  This chapter introduced these 
key philosophical concepts explored in the four case study chapters, and also outlined the 
importance of supplementarity as a relevant philosophical consideration. 
 
In chapter two, ‘The Supplement in Art History’, the same approach to chapter one is 
employed, whereby the key events and concepts emerging from art history are identified 
and discussed.  This chapter shows how the history of art is at one and the same time a 
history of supplementarity, where the discourses that constitute the recorded history of 
art have continuously shaped the interpretation and creation of works of art.  As different 
approaches to supporting works of art became prioritised or discarded, the use of 
supplementary material is shown to fluctuate, whilst remaining of continued importance 
for establishing the context in which artworks were, and are, produced, received, and 
displayed.  Yet despite this pivotal role, supplementarity itself has remained largely 
unexplored.  Chapter two identifies three valuable categories for emphasising the 
importance of the supplement: ‘Interpretation and Display’ – where the supplement is 
influential for interpreting art in terms of classification, education, and display; ‘The 
Production of Value’ – wherein the role of supplementarity is explored in relation to the 
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production, creation, or re-presentation of works of art; and ‘Technology and the 
Supplement’ – where the importance of equipment (whether the material used, or the 
means by which works can be circulated and interpreted) for shaping creative practice is 
underlined. 
 
The question addressed in chapter three – ‘what is the supplement?’ – extends the 
discussion of technology by re-evaluating the status of particular forms of art equipment 
(in particular, works-for-art).  Through my interpretation and application of Heidegger’s 
notion of causality I show that the distinctions between art and equipment that 
Heidegger himself had argued, are opened up to a more complex and detailed analysis 
when applied to works-for-art such as Moore’s sketches, maquettes, plasters, and 
bronzes.  All of these forms of work are shown to not only fall between Heidegger’s 
distinction between art and equipment, but are revealed to combine creativity and 
equipmental use in very specific ways.  The notion of ‘enshrining’ is asserted as a new 
way of considering the act of utilising preliminary or preparatory works in the creation of 
further works, and is an original claim of this thesis that has implications for the 
evaluation of the creative act.  My interpretation of Heidegger’s notion of causality 
provides a way of analysing the construction of both works-of-art and works-for-art, by 
combining Heidegger’s approaches to both equipment and art in a way that shows how 
the act of creation itself, rather than the classical causa efficiens that centralises the 
importance of the artist (and which is rejected by Heidegger) is identifiable in works-for-
art in a way that is incompatible with a purely equipmental function.  The status of 
conventionally defined preliminary and preparatory material is shown to not only be 
complex, rich, and capable of analysis in itself, but is shown to complicate its use by the 
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artist themselves, or by their estate.  Commodification is shown to take place, not just as 
a means of making use of material left over from the creative process, but due to the 
qualities that such preliminary and preparatory works contain that allows them to 
become commodities. 
 
In chapter four I respond to the question – ‘how is the supplement classified?’ – by 
showing that differences between ‘support’ and ‘complete’ works have been 
conventionally and historically classified through the application of particular methods of 
interpretation that can be traced back to Plato’s philosophy of identity, and which have 
continued to dominate Western attitudes towards the distinction between model and 
copy.  Further to this discussion, the classification of the supplement is also shown to be 
vulnerable to historical and political events (such as the early death of the artist, or the 
political motivations of groups or individuals associated with an artist).  Through a 
combination of Deleuze’s concept of the ‘sign’, and his re-interpretation of Plato’s 
concept of the simulacrum, I applied these methods of interpreting art to Sant’Elia’s 
works on paper in order to demonstrate the extent to which such works can be 
experienced as having their own unique aesthetic qualities.  These qualities are shown to 
become illuminated once the classical and hierarchical division of model and copy has 
been called into question.  This chapter is important for showing that nominally material 
‘support’ (together with its implications for the philosophy of technology) is not 
irrevocably reduced to a supporting role in relation to complete works of art, but is 
capable of being experienced aesthetically in its own right, or elevated to a position of 
cultural importance under specific conditions of appropriation.  
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Chapter five responds to the question – ‘why is the supplement important?’ – by 
establishing the ways in which concepts and approaches emerging from philosophy, the 
history of art, and art theory, have combined to (for the most part) inadvertently 
centralise the importance of the creative process.  The distinctive nature of Bacon’s 
relocated and reconstructed art studio allowed for a detailed analysis of the cultural 
importance of supplementarity, and its significant implications for interpretations of 
works of art.  Benjamin’s notion of aura was shown to have a continued resonance in the 
experience of art, whereby the very reproductions (in this case, photographs, films, 
documentaries, and books) served to mythologise and strengthen the importance of the 
‘original’, and the auratic qualities associated with biographical association.   
 
This is coupled with my interpretation of Adorno’s notion of enigmaticalness – the 
puzzling and mystifying nature of art that for Adorno constitutes its cultural value – which 
I use to turn against the apparently negative effects of the demystifying processes of 
supplementarity that Adorno and Horkheimer called ‘deaestheticisation’.  For Adorno, 
educational devices, works-for-art used to show methods of working, and biographical 
material, would all go against the enigmaticalness of works of art, because they became 
efforts to ‘solve’ their mystery.  Instead, I argue that within the concentrated and 
sanctified environment of the art gallery or museum that encourages profound or richer 
experiences, the inclusion of supplementary material centralises the enigmaticalness of 
the creative process itself.  Supplementary material such as works-for-art and 
biographical material, exhibited as solutions to works of art reduced to riddles to be 
solved, instead invite new questions and mysteries.  As Derrida states:  “The supplement 
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transforms and detaches. Both at once.”410  This is a pivotal chapter of the thesis that 
establishes the extent to which supplementary material can transform the experience of 
art by making the creative process of central importance (emphatically represented by 
Bacon’s relocated and reconstructed studio), whilst detaching the outcome (or work) of 
the creative process from its position as a focal point.  The supplement is important 
because, by being displayed in an environment historically designed to emphasise a 
concentrated consideration of what is on view, it becomes important.   
 
Chapter six, in its response to the question – ‘how is the supplement problematic for 
works of art?’ – distinguishes itself from the previous case studies by focusing on an artist 
who not only incorporated the problematic nature of supplementarity into his creative 
process, but who directly influenced the philosophical and art-historical discourse 
concerning the subject of this thesis.  The supplement is problematic for works of art 
because it disrupts conventional approaches to the creation, reception, and displaying of 
works of art.  Supplementarity is not passive, but is instead always disrupting boundaries, 
borders, margins, and distinctions between the supplement and what is supplemented.  
This chapter analyses a series of complex interactions between different forms of 
supplementarity that become projected, incorporated, rejected, and re-classified.  In this 
chapter I establish the notion of ‘negative supplementarity’ whereby a specific 
consideration outside the work itself (in this case, the stigma of insanity), become 
attached to an artist’s work in such a way that it dominates its reception.  In the case 
study of Artaud, this stigmatism is shown to be incorporated into Artaud’s own approach 
to his work, along with a conscious effort to struggle against the numerous supporting or 
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outside/adjacent factors that pre-empt, influence, or frustrate the creative process.  
Through a detailed discussion of Derrida’s concepts of the parergon and the subjectile 
(the latter being directly taken from, and applied to Artaud), supplementarity is shown to 
be deeply interwoven into the creative process, whilst capable of emerging as an 
important artistic consideration in its own right.  This chapter also shows how such an 
open engagement with this problematic and disruptive area of the creative process has 
been accommodated and navigated by the very institutions that Artaud struggled against.  
Madness permeates the accompanying literature to exhibitions of Artaud’s works, and in 
the case of ‘Exposition Antonin Artaud’, is brought to the fore through the inclusion of 
psychiatric reports and historical accounts of the doctors that treated him.  The 
implications that the incorporation of supplementarity into the creative process has for 
technology, archiving, and display are also shown, where facsimiles and digital scans are 
employed to resolve the problems of displaying material never intended to account for 
such concerns.  This chapter therefore establishes the extent to which supplementarity 
can disrupt approaches, interpretations, classifications, and the accommodation of works 
of art. 
 
The discussion of supplementarity is not only identified as a major concern existing within 
the philosophy, history, criticism, and creation of art, but is shown to have important 
implications for both historical and contemporary studies into the production, status, 
distinction, classification, appropriation, displaying, archiving, and experiencing of works-
of-art, works-for-art, and supporting material in general.  Through the four case studies 
these implications are introduced, supported, and established in ways that open up and 
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emphasise the importance of the supplement for understanding and re-considering 
approaches to, and evaluations of, works of art and the creative process.        
 
This thesis encourages new research into the role of supplementarity in: creative practice, 
the archiving of artists’ works and biographical material, the philosophy of technology (in 
particular the re-evaluation of the different materials used in the creative process, as well 
as interpretations of equipment), archive theory (both classical and digital), museum 
theory, and the history of art.  It will also be of value for studies into the history of 
drawing (in particular, its classification and use in displays), the ‘cult of personality’, 
curating (in particular, the transformative effects of the uses of supplementary material), 
the museum experience as ritual (and its effects on how different forms of work are 
interpreted), post-processual archaeology, studies of ornamentation, and the relationship 
between mental illness and art (in particular, the extent to which discussions of mental 
illness ‘frame’ the ways in which certain works are presented and understood).  
 
This thesis also has implications for more specific studies of Henry Moore, Antonio 
Sant’Elia, Francis Bacon, and Antonin Artaud, as it calls for a reconsideration of the 
classification and displaying of their works and associated biographical material.  The use 
of philosophical concepts in this thesis encourages new research projects into 
interpretations of art in the works of Kant, Schopenhauer, Heidegger, Benjamin, Adorno, 
Deleuze, and Derrida, as it extends these interpretations to different forms of the creative 
process, such as conventionally defined supporting material. 
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Having begun this project with an interest in the curious nature and appeal of displayed 
works-for-art that seemed to escape conventional classification, the journey of my 
research has led me into unanticipated depths of art history, creative practice, and 
philosophy that stretched far beyond my expectations.  I intend to extend this journey by 
conducting further research that explores in more detail the centrality of the creative 
process, the notion of the ‘incomplete’ in art, digital approaches to archiving (including 
the potential of 3D printing to transform the process and theories of technological 
reproduction), a more detailed study of the symbolic value of Bacon’s studio door, and 
the deconstruction of reconstruction (in particular, the act of myth-building) that uses of 
supplementary material instigate. 
 
What began as a study of the use of preliminary and preparatory works in exhibition 
displays has ended in a call for the re-evaluation of the significance of what have been 
historically neglected and unjustly subservient works of great cultural importance.  The 
status of the work of art itself becomes problematic in an approach that emphasises 
different stages in the creative process, and the value of biographical material that is no 
longer strictly informative.  Over the course of this thesis, supplementarity emerges as a 
hidden or largely overlooked issue that permeates the history, criticism, practice, and 
philosophy of art, whilst acting directly upon it in ways that have shaped its course, 
defined its margins, and served to act as a vital, yet unsung, support.  Through this 
discussion and analysis of the complexities, subtleties, disruptions, and illuminations of 
this important, yet perennially deferential area of art history, I hope to bring this 
culturally significant topic of study out of the shadows, and into full view.   
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Appendix One 
 
The following paper was presented at ‘Philosophy &….’, The Society for European 
Philosophy and Forum for European Philosophy Annual Conference, 31 August – 3 
September 2011, York St John University. 
 
Francis Bacon and the Unconcealment of Truth 
 
 
For thirty years the artist Francis Bacon worked amongst the chaos of his Kensington 
apartment at 7 Reece Mews, until his death in 1992.  Six years later archaeologists and 
conservationists, under the direction of the Hugh lane Gallery, began to systematically 
remove the studio contents, including the floor, the walls, and the door; bringing the 
material back to Dublin.  Finally on the 23 May 2001 The Hugh Lane Gallery opened up 
their new display to the public – the meticulously reconstructed studio.  But can it still be 
called a studio?  Can it yet be called a display? 
  
Using Heidegger’s interpretation of truth as ἀλήθεια, or unconcealment, as a 
methodological tool, I will look to explore the ways in which the material I refer to here as 
a display, currently gathered together in the Hugh Lane, has passed through a series of 
truths.  Where each emergence of such a truth signals the submerging and obfuscating of 
others, and where prominence is in the hands of those who preserve perceived 
significance. 
  
To begin with alétheia and the display; what is it that emerges, what is it that stays veiled, 
and what is it that is particular to this display?  Indeed this very word, ‘display’, lends 
itself well to the conceptual language employed by Heidegger.  Derived from the French 
‘despleier’, this in turn is derived from the Latin ‘plicare’, meaning to fold (or more 
literally, to fold inwards), with the assigned prefix, ‘dis’, making ‘displicare’ – to unfold – 
or to fold apart.  This idea of the display as an unfolding or folding apart easily evokes the 
Heideggerian imagery of ἀλήθεια as an unveiling of something that was formerly 
concealed.  For something to be unfolded implies that it had previously been folded 
inwards.  Unfolding is a revealing, an unconcealing that allows something to be brought 
into view, and in this way the term ‘display’ seems all the more apt for describing Bacon’s 
relocated/reassembled studio.  From out of its ‘veiled’ existence in the impractical-to-
access building of Kensington, this display allows something of the studio that was 
previously hidden to be revealed.  However, with every unconcealment there is an 
accompanying concealment;  ἀλήθεια, is for Heidegger never revealed to us as a totality, 
but only as partial revelations that come to us at the expense of others.  With the display 
in the Hugh Lane, accessibility emerges as the authenticity of its original location slips 
away from us.  An insight into the private life of the artist is illuminated, but only through 
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the fading into obscurity of the mystery and intrigue that could only exist in the 
foreground as long as so much remained veiled. 
   
The private sanctuary, an essential part of the ‘atmosphere’ Bacon identified when he 
first experienced the place, was a specific truth that could only ever appear lit up and 
vivid to Bacon himself.  By recreating the studio in a public gallery, the echoes of this 
sanctuary are obliterated, replaced by something altogether different, where instead of 
an escape from the world that Bacon had control over, we now have a space accessible to 
all, albeit from behind glass; instead of a select group of familiar faces congregating 
within the studio, we have an endless stream of strangers passing around a display.  
Furthermore, so many objects that constitute the display, were for Bacon a mixture of the 
merely ‘ready-to-hand’, holding little or no value for him, and able to be utilised as part of 
his artistic projects precisely because of this ‘lack’ of significance.  For the viewer 
however, the most inconspicuous of objects (for Bacon) might reveal (unconceal) so much 
more to them.  A copy of Viz magazine, which for Bacon may have warranted no further 
thought following its purchase, can for the viewer seeing this in the display represent a 
certain proclivity for a form of humour that one had never expected.  The reverse is 
equally applicable, where a photograph that may have held a deep, personal value to 
Bacon, in a sense finds this value concealed from us.  Unshackled from sentimentality, 
other truths about the photograph may rise up, which perhaps only the dissociated 
stranger is in a position to grasp (for instance the judgement of formal properties, 
unhindered by an emotional attachment to the subject). 
   
Already we can see how considering such things in terms of ἀλήθεια’ causes them to shift 
and reform depending upon the beholder and the context in which the beholding takes 
place.  The ‘truth’ contained within this display is something wholly dependent on the 
specific context of its current existence, where whatever truths existed for this 
assemblage of objects in the past is only relevant in as far as they are able to persist 
through to the current situation, whether through the qualities inherent in the objects in-
themselves, or by knowledge passed on in whatever forms to those experiencing the 
display. 
   
The ability of a truth to persist could be called a chain of preservation, whereby the 
concerns, priorities and requirements of whoever made use of the material in question, 
allow such truths to endure for a certain amount of time, and within a certain context.  
There are at least three main contexts that apply to the material in question.  Bacon’s 
functioning studio; the shrine maintained by Bacon’s close friend and beneficiary John 
Edwards; and the Hugh Lane display. 
   
Bacon’s studio was constantly morphing into a gathering together/ordering of material, 
as the artist dictated what did or did not persist in his studio at any one time.  Paintings 
were destroyed, books and photographs were lost, newspaper clippings materialised and 
became assimilated into the mesh of visual influences.  In this context, Bacon was the 
primary preserver of significance, bestowing meaning and truth upon the objects around 
him.  In April 1992 this kinetic, ever-changing territory became still. 
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Following Bacon’s death, factors such as sentimentality and practicality caused the studio 
to be partially preserved, as other aspects were discarded (the sweeping away of dust, 
the possibility of ‘interfering’ with the studio’s contents...).  For those years it fluctuated 
between an existence as a private shrine to a companion, to being the treasure trove 
revealed to a select few, as Edwards allowed a small number of friends and interested 
parties to have private viewings. 
   
But what changed in this Kensington studio at the moment of Bacon’s death?  After all, it 
was just a room, filled with various things.  It had a function as an art studio, and 
suddenly, due to the death of the artist that had occupied it, this space was in effect cast 
adrift.  Where did the significance come from that would later justify the painstaking 
transporting, piece by piece, to another country? 
   
Two key factors would instigate the new chain of preservation; the emotions of John 
Edwards, and the success/fame/reputation that Bacon had achieved through his 
paintings.  The former can of course only be understood in a vague way, with little but the 
few words Edwards said on this period, and our own ability to empathise through 
recourse to similar experiences from our own lives.  The maintenance of the space would 
undoubtedly have been dictated by Edwards’ personal ability/inability to cope with grief.  
As the heir to Bacon’s estate, it would have been his decision entirely if he decided to 
sweep away the contents of the room altogether.  Considering Bacon’s own comment 
about wishing to be put in a plastic bag and thrown in the gutter, as well as his habit of 
discarding or destroying many of his own works, it is not too outlandish an assumption 
that Bacon would have harboured little sentimental concerns about the future of his 
belongings.  Edwards may well have wished to adhere to what he considered to be 
Bacon’s own preferred treatment of the studio.  Edwards himself admitted that after 
bequeathing the studio to him, Bacon had encouraged him to modify the building and 
add another floor, which goes to strengthen the assertion that the initial steps of 
preservation were taken by Edwards alone, and were not instigated by Bacon before he 
died. 
   
It is common for someone grieving to wish to leave in place the belongings and traces of 
the one they have lost.  As Heidegger alludes to in Being and Time, the memory of the 
deceased can ensure that to some degree their being perseveres.  Leaving the studio in 
place was a way of keeping Bacon ‘alive’, while at the same time respecting his memory.  
This respect is all the greater, the more important the material left behind was to that 
person when they were alive. 
   
The notions of success, fame and reputation carry with them certain connotations, but 
also imply certain prerequisites, not least in that they all refer to assertions carried out by 
others, and consequently indicate an artist’s cultural imprint.  Francis Bacon was a 
successful artist, recognised as such by people in positions of power and influence.  For 
Edwards, this aspect of Bacon’s ‘cultural imprint’, the deceptively simple fact that Bacon’s 
life and work were orientated around his painting, serves to contribute a significant 
emotional value to the studio and its contents.  The studio contents could in many ways 
be said to be Bacon’s essence.  This invested the contents of the studio with an 
importance that suddenly became a matter of potential public interest, while 
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simultaneously serving a private purpose.  The instigating factors for preserving the 
contents in a more open context were now in place.  Through Bacon, his beneficiary, 
gallery owners, curators, archaeologists, conservationists, and eventually viewers, the 
studio undergoes a series of changes to its role, its value, its reality.  Each stage of 
existence is accompanied by a dynamic form of preserving that relies upon the one that 
precedes it, whilst transforming the preceding one by bringing something new into the 
sphere of its constituent parts.  In the case of this studio/display a ‘multiplicity of values’ 
create a patchwork of its historical development.  Some of these values fade in and out of 
prominence; others appear momentarily and help to carry it over to its next 
manifestation before disappearing from perception or concern.  With the studio/display 
there is also a vivid thread running through each stage of the patchwork, radiating a 
valuation that demands to cast its shadow over each and every stage.  The presence of 
Bacon in the material remains in the foreground. 
   
Having arrived at the decision to donate the contents of the studio to a gallery, the next 
stage was to find a gallery willing to take on the task of ordering the chaos.  Edwards 
initially approached the Tate Gallery in London, and whilst they chose to decline the offer, 
those at the Hugh Lane in Dublin were delighted to accept this gift.  However, in order for 
the display to be constructed in Dublin, it would inevitably have to be dissected piece by 
piece.  Archaeologists and conservationists were brought in for their skills in dealing with 
analogous circumstances.  The positions would be recorded, the individual pieces would 
be packaged and labelled, the packages would be carefully moved by a professional 
shipping and transportation company, before the display was constructed in the Hugh 
Lane.  It is clear that various forms of estimating and attributing value had become 
involved in the process in ways that digress further and further from the value of Bacon’s 
work.  Specific archaeologists, conservationists and transporters were brought in, which 
all involved the Director of the Hugh Lane, Barbara Dawson, casting value judgements on 
their ability to carry out the requested tasks.  This is of course still dictated by the 
interests of the gallery, however not only do they relinquish a large element of control 
over to these external departments, they are also signalling the first point where the 
studio material itself takes on (however momentarily) a value that is no longer (or at best 
rudimentarily) derived from the force of Bacon’s reputation.  Suddenly the material is 
seen with eyes unclouded by value through association.  Instead this material is handled 
and preserved by professionals coming to it with their own sense of values.  On one hand, 
Bacon’s reputation and significance is the reason these people were charged with this 
task, but on the other this particular truth of the material being handled could be said to 
have slipped beneath the surface of the river Lethe. 
  
Archaeological values come into play upon the studio contents, values that include the 
careful removal of material, the recording of locations; the cautious and considered 
approach to uncovering hidden information; the informed and knowledgeable insistence 
upon what may or may not be unsalvageable when encountering material that the 
onlookers from the gallery wish to save.  Not only will they concern themselves with the 
values of applying these acquired skills, but also with the professional self-valuation of 
performing their task well.  In short, ἀλήθεια emerges in the material in a way quite 
distinct to those interested in preserving the sentimental or cultural value it may have.  
Similarly, those tasked with shipping and transportation will apply their own set of 
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professional values when handling the packaged material.  Little more is needed than a 
‘fragile’ notice on a package for those charged with ensuring their safe journey to remain 
indifferent to the importance others hold for the contents.  The same processes, the 
same considerations and priorities would be applied in order to guarantee that the task 
ahead can be achieved successfully.  The interventions of these external (and to all 
intents and purposes, indifferent) assistants in the preservation process between studio 
and display, illustrate some aspects of the complex series of ἀλήθεια and λήθή that are at 
play upon and around the material as it is passes through the stages described above.  
We can see that the studio’s contents take on different values that are ultimately dictated 
by those making use of the material, but in many stages of this process of preservation, 
are significantly driven by the ‘preservers’ maintaining the presence of Bacon for the 
material, in a state of unconcealment.   
 
The pilot flying the plane containing the crates and packages becomes an active 
participant in the preservation process; however their knowledge of the significance this 
material has to Francis Bacon (and the importance this has for many others) may well be 
completely concealed from them.  Conversely, the considerations that cargo, whether 
this cargo or cargo in general, has for the pilot (such as the various safety responsibilities, 
fuel adjustments etc.), will most likely remain completely concealed from those that later 
experience the studio material in its displayed form.  This truth of the work is a value of 
the material that will find itself rapidly sliding down the scale of importance once the 
material’s function is being established by people with different considerations in mind 
when estimating its importance.  For them, this is not worthy of preserving as an 
unconcealed truth, and instead it is deemed acceptable for this aspect of the material’s 
journey to become concealed and forgotten, and it is consequently consigned to oblivion.  
Upon arrival the studio contents, now in the hands of the curators of the Hugh Lane, are, 
so to speak, ‘sieved’ in such a way as to allow only certain ‘truths’ to pass through into 
public view.  Other objects and artefacts are collected and gathered together in the 
gallery’s archive.  Others, being estimated as having little or no value, are finally 
discarded, save perhaps for a description in the exhaustive record documenting the 
contents in their entirety.  A process of ‘sieving’ can be clearly seen to be taking place at 
each of the aforementioned stages, but it is at this stage that the sieving subjects the 
material (and what of it is to be unconcealed) to a creative act of selecting and editing; 
sculpting with values clinging to the material at hand so as to construct something new 
and intended to endure.  No longer transitory, no longer passing from one momentary 
use to another, the contents of Bacon’s studio are for the first time elevated to a position 
that brings them into the light of unconcealment in ‘their own right.’  The tangled, 
sprawling corporal residue left behind by Bacon’s creative process has now been 
unfolded, dis-placed, and re-placed; until the studio has finally been replaced by the 
display. 
  
Although the display is certainly something new, its cultural significance, its general 
interest to the public, and the value of the material that form the display, remain, as we 
have seen, bound to the figure of Bacon the working artist.  After all, it is this very relation 
that has allowed the material to persevere in the way that it has, remaining superficially 
in the same state as Bacon left it, though of course in actuality it has been adjusted, 
refined and manipulated to create the desired effect; the illusion of authenticity. 
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I said above that the studio was replaced by the display.  To elaborate on this further, it is 
in a very literal sense that the contents were re-positioned, placed elsewhere, moved to a 
new location.  This act of displacement destroyed the studio, seeing it meticulously ripped 
apart and scattered, before chosen aspects of the original were brought back together; 
however, now in a different location, within a different context and for a different reason.  
The display is not identical to the studio; instead many aspects of the original are lost, 
whilst at the same time new aspects appear in the pseudo-simulacrum. 
   
Under consideration here is the phenomenon whereby the value of a thing (say a paint-
spattered stack of newspapers) is subordinated to the value of another thing (say the 
reputation of an artist in Western culture) in such a way that were this relationship to be 
somehow severed, the former would undergo a ‘darkening’ of its significance, slipping out 
of its illuminated state, and into anonymity.  As long as the subordinating/subordinated 
relationship is maintained, the subordinated thing continues to receive and contain a 
‘truth’ that gives it a richer cultural significance (as a thing of use to us).  This truth does 
not simply stay at rest in the subordinated thing, but acquires the potential to affect the 
way in which the subordinating thing is valued and estimated in its own unconcealment.  
The former relies entirely upon the latter, where the latter can continue to exist in its 
valued state quite happily without the former, however the latter can in turn become, as 
it were, ‘distorted’ by the former.  A thing that is unconcealed in its being in such a way as 
to take on a value that makes it important in the eyes and hands of certain quarters of 
our society, but is only capable of being unconcealed in this way through its binding 
subordination to the existence of another thing (which nevertheless need not physically 
exist, as in the case of a dead artist), is still able to wield a power over this other thing to 
such a degree that it can in certain circumstances rise to a height unreachable by the very 
object that determined its value to begin with.  This height can be measured in terms of 
the ability of this thing to shed light on that which it is associated with.  Its truth can, if 
the conditions are right, bring further truths into unconcealment, with the possible 
ramification of creating a light that engulfs the thing or things to which it is subordinated, 
causing them to constitute a truth that is in turn subordinated to the very thing that is 
itself already subordinated to its existence.  This circular process is at play in a very 
particular way in the example of the Hugh Lane display. 
   
In the first instance, the studio and its contents are entirely subordinated to the dual 
aspects of Bacon the artist, and Bacon’s artworks.  It serves as a bridge between the two.  
We can see how the value of the studio and its contents is derived from the significance 
of Bacon and Bacon’s art.  Without the cultural importance of Bacon and his artworks, his 
studio would be devoid of its value to offer an ‘insight’ into the workings of a highly 
regarded artist; it would see its ‘usefulness’ for ‘us’ fade.  Instead, because it does have 
this important relationship to Bacon and his artwork, it is seen by some to have the 
power to illuminate the former, bringing new knowledge and information into view for 
consideration in such a way that art historians, critics and interested members of the 
public feel they may be able to understand Bacon’s creative process, influences and 
working environment, and consequently be better positioned to interpret his paintings by 
stepping into an approximation of the light of the unconcealed...ἀλήθεια...of Bacon’s own 
position when these paintings were first created.  Yet instead of being an imperfect or 
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inferior version of its apparent model, the ‘copy’ is instead invested with a new function, 
a new meaning and its own truth, a truth entirely distinct from any truth possessed by the 
studio.  The whole process of preservation yields information that bathes the contents of 
the studio in brighter lights than it has ever previously received.  The codex, a 
comprehensive account of every item found in the studio, records the studio’s totality in 
a never-before seen level of precision that is not only unique amongst the documenting 
of an artist’s studio, but is among the most thorough analyses of an individual’s 
belongings ever undertaken.  The display allows one to virtually step into the shoes of 
Bacon and form a more vivid approximation of how he used his studio than any to be 
gained from photographs or descriptions.  Each individual item could be analysed, 
allowing the possibility of identifying traces of paint on certain photos, pages torn from 
books that are found to have been the reference for a completed painting, and many 
other pieces of information that make themselves available to our own particular insights 
and interpretations.  Armed with this newly gathered knowledge, and returning to a 
consideration of the studio as it was left behind by Bacon, we are able to project a more 
revealing gaze upon it. 
   
The Hugh Lane display is one of the most curious of simulacra, as it appears on the 
surface to be a copy constructed out of the dismantled remnants of that to which it pays 
homage.  It could be argued that through this act of copying, the supposedly copied 
subject is brought into its own specific unconcealment, where the studio in-itself is finally 
elevated into the limelight, without deference to an absent artist.  The studio as a totality 
is first isolated from its immediate association with the artist, allowing the particularities 
of the place to come to the fore.  For a brief moment the studio is received in its naked 
state, unconcealed by motives, idealised functions and emotional ramifications.  Then 
through the multiple stages of preservation it gradually undergoes a series of changes, 
losing material here, gaining required additions there, until the display is created – 
produced out of a combination of adherence to the studio, and the requirements of 
creating something that can be accessible for an interested public, as well as utilising the 
available material in such a way that it can be studied in detail.  The display is not a copy, 
but arrives at its own unique ‘being’, and acquires its own specific value, only through this 
act of copying.  Of crucial importance here is that through this isolating, preserving, 
copying and finally a calling for the created display to be overcome, the character of the 
studio, its value and cultural significance, its identity as a totality, are repeatedly and 
increasingly emphasised.  To pull it apart, record it, and send fragments around the world 
is one thing, but through putting it back together again a proclamation about the 
meaningful role the studio should be recognised as having in future considerations of 
Bacon’s life and work is being loudly made.  This proclamation is made all the more loudly 
through the fact that the display is only partially faithful, achieving a surface accuracy that 
suffices to represent the studio in a new way, highlighting the importance of the 
experience of the display, over a fidelity to the reality of the studio itself.  The studio, 
through the isolating, preserving and copying process, has become idealised.  This 
idealisation solidifies the reputation of the destroyed studio, and raises the created 
display to the level of a stele or monument, a marker bearing testimony to the studio and 
the artist, as well as serving as a vivid echo of the spiritual home of many of Bacon’s 
paintings. 
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The status of ‘monument’ placed upon the display does not detract from its own 
significance, as if this were to bind it ever more tightly to the memory of the studio.  
Instead it emphasises the display’s difference to the studio, allowing it to stand in place of 
the fallen studio, and simultaneously taking on the role of a locus around which 
discussions about the artist, his creative process, his working studio and his paintings can 
take place.  But this monument casts a huge shadow...a shadow that is all the further 
reaching and tenebrous, all the more capable of consuming that which lies behind it, the 
more brilliant its face is illuminated by the light.  The treasure trove of destroyed 
paintings, reference books, photographs and supposedly completed paintings, find 
themselves becoming supplementary material in relation to the idealised studio-as-
display, rather than being brought into their own states of unconcealment.  The process 
of isolating, preserving and copying the studio effectively sweeps up and carries along the 
material contained within it, designating the contents as parts forming the whole.  The 
creative construction of the display cements the connection the contents had with the 
studio, and now have with the display.  The recording and archiving of material not 
currently on display that was carried out by those at the Hugh Lane, along with the 
loaning rather than selling of individual items to other galleries, keeps the ‘being’, 
‘truth’... ἀλήθεια.... and value of these objects firmly sutured to the being of the idealised 
studio-as-display.  This totality, in the way that it maintains its presence as a totality, 
dominates and permeates the value of the content.  The truth of the material, its 
ἀλήθεια, is tainted, or rather altered, by its utilisation as useful components of an 
overarching schema.  The individual materials that forms the totality have their value and 
cultural significance tied to the mast of the main display; so much so that even the 
attempts to utilise specific material as a means of retrospectively gaining insight into a 
now submerged truth, arrive at results warped by the conditions of the present and the 
presentation. 
   
A place has been created for the ἀλήθεια of the display to be accessible, but this place 
pervades any potential territory that singular elements of the content might hope to 
occupy.  The unconcealing truth constructed in the Hugh Lane dominates the horizon, 
drawing the component parts back into its realm in order to receive a valuation based on 
the combined effect, rather than for the individual components to be appreciated in-
themselves.  The spectacle of the display neutralises the value of the composite parts in a 
way that directly opposes the truth of this material as it would have revealed or 
unconcealed itself to Bacon.  In the spectacle, everything is utilised for serving one 
purpose.  However, when Bacon was working as an artist, everything within his studio 
would have served its own unique purpose, and would have been treated as such.  In the 
display we see only the direction of Edwards, Dawson, the archaeologists, and the 
conservationists – pushing the material towards one outcome – that of a display 
replicating Bacon’s studio.  However, for Bacon each component served its own purpose.  
The tin of beans that was converted into a paintbrush holder; the piece of cloth that could 
smear paint; the David Gower photograph that could be manipulated. 
 
When I spoke to Barbara Dawson she mentioned how people had sought to have 
postcards verified as authentic cards posted by Bacon.  For me, these were fragments 
that had broken free of the boundaries of Bacon’s personal life, and had gone on to 
acquire their own chain of preservation, consisting of their own significations, playing 
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their role in another story which was concealed from Bacon.  Yet we could both recognise 
the madness in attributing so much significance into simple objects.  Dawson herself was 
able to recognise that the display at her Hugh Lane gallery mostly consisted of ‘rubbish’, 
but it is a collection of rubbish that forms part of the tapestry of a figure so culturally 
significant that it provides a bridge between the mundane and the profound.  The illusion 
of authenticity as a guiding objective means that the walls, books, paintings and paint-
spattered newspapers are given equal billing as characters that assist in creating the 
overall effect, which rises up over the sum of its parts and positions itself vividly in its 
unconcealed truth. 
   
Yet in what way does this cache of informative and wide-ranging material broaden our 
understanding of the formation of value for that which falls between artist and art, and 
between equipment and artwork?  All and more is available here to be analysed, but this 
very abundance blinds us as we strive to access this very space.  To be sure, the display 
includes material that was clearly capable of matching the description of something that 
exists between artwork and equipment, but little or no trace remains present for us, 
having passed into λήθή just as the display revels in its own ἀλήθεια.  We have seen how 
enigmatically elusive such answers can be, as the fragile accessibility of their being can so 
easily become subsumed in the being of another that illuminates our present through its 
‘presence’.  We have seen the complex and entity-specific processes of preservation that 
the truth of a thing may pass through in order to reach us, arriving filtered and distorted, 
but arriving all the same. 
   
The painting allows the truth of peasant boots to disclose itself to us, without the painted 
boots being exposed to the concealing forces that hide us from the real ones.  This is not 
to say that the painting itself, as an object, cannot be utilised for other purposes, and 
therefore drawn into and subsumed by the ontic world that shields us from accessing the 
truth of its being.  Around the space opened up by a work, and held open by preservers, a 
swirl of outside forces gather, looking to capitalise on the truth thus opened up, to bring 
it back under the domain of the concealed ‘state of affairs’ of the usual and the everyday.  
Turning our attention back to the Dublin display with this in mind, we can understand 
that the work of art as ἀλήθεια, illuminates the ontic world that surrounds it, whilst it 
itself emerges from that world.  In effect, the work clears a path for the contents of the 
immediately surrounding world that the space it opens up appears within, to be utilised 
and ‘used up’ in a new way altogether from that of a piece of equipment, as what is 
illuminated is bathed in the reflective glory of this truth.  Where a work of art is said to 
work, the unconcealed truth of its being appears to the beholder as so unlike anything 
else, as so beyond the usual experiences encountered, that a desire arises to understand 
(that which is by its very nature ungraspable) by way of the ontic, everyday material at 
our disposal.  This drive to understand the unknowable truth that comes forth in a work 
can only ever lead to a distortion and ‘re-concealing’ of the truth.  The more we attempt 
to understand the truth as ἀλήθεια through the means of processes and methods taken 
from the ontic, the further away we move from what has been unconcealed.  Yet many 
are drawn into the search for elucidating their experience of a work, discerning the 
indiscernible undisclosed truth. 
 
